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As Políticas, O Comércio, e a Colonização em Angola na Viragem do Século XVIII 
 
John Whitney Harvey 
 
Resumo 
 A presente dissertação analisa a colonização, as políticas, e o comércio na viragem do século 
XVIII. Estes tópicos serão apresentados através de três capítulos que assumem dimensões espaciais 
distintas: o sertão Angolano, o litoral, e a perspectiva Atlântica. Separar o trabalho em limites 
geográficos e conceptuais facilita a percepção das ligações entre eles, e permite compreender 
Angola como um agregado das três áreas espaciais e conceitos coloniais, interdependentes entre si. 
Construindo estas ligações cruciais, cria os meios pelos quais a forma como estes processos 
coloniais se transformaram pode ser identificada.  
 O primeiro capítulo centra-se nas políticas e na colonização do sertão Angolano. Esta parte 
discute os métodos de colonização e introduz actores políticos e comerciais que serão relevantes aos 
próximos capítulos. O segundo capítulo explica a estrutura comercial Angolana no litoral, e a sua 
inerente vinculação ao sertão e as políticas do território. Os primeiros dois capítulos formam a 
fundação que permite a disquisição chegar à dimensão Atlântica pela introdução dos principais 
temas e personagens no capitulo final. Assim, o comércio dos escravos servirá para evidenciar a 
maneira como eventos que ocorreram em Angola e no Brasil se influenciaram mutuamente, e como 
acabaram por afetar o sertão, bem como os comerciantes do litoral de Angola. Um discurso 
envolvendo as ideologias da escravatura e a Atlantic History permite um conhecimento mais 
profundo do enquadramento do estudo do comércio de escravos, e como Angola foi afectada por 
eventos isolados que produziram processos de mudança. A tese que esta dissertação pretende provar 
é que as políticas, o comércio, e a colonização em Angola eram fortemente conectados por motivos 
económicos que instigaram um período de transformação na viragem do século XVIII. 
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Abstract 
 This dissertation explores Commerce, politics, and colonization in Angola at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. The work will discuss these topics through three main chapters that are spatially 
divided into the Angolan hinterland, the coastal region, and the Atlantic through the Angolan 
perspective. Separating the work into distinct geographical and conceptual boundaries makes it 
possible to discern the interconnectivity as well as the interdependency of Angola as an aggregate 
of the three geographical areas and Portuguese colonial forces. Making these important connections 
provides the means through which the way that these colonial processes transformed can be 
identified.  
 The first chapter focuses on politics and colonization in the Angolan hinterland. It discusses 
methods of colonization and introduces political and commercial actors that are relevant in 
following chapters. The second chapter discusses the Angolan commercial structure on the coast, 
and its inherent connection to the hinterland and politics in the territory. The first two chapters set 
the stage through introducing major themes and characters that permit the disquisition to reach the 
Atlantic sphere in the final chapter. Here, the Angolan slave trade will serve to evince the manner in 
which events that occurred in Angola and in Brazil mutually impacted each other, and as a result, 
the hinterland and coastal merchants. This will be done through discussing the ideologies of slavery 
and Atlantic History that allow a deeper understanding of the parameters through which the slave 
trade can be studied as well as how Angola was deeply affected by isolated events that produced 
processes of change. The overarching thesis that this dissertation intends to prove is that politics, 
commerce, and colonization in Angola were intrinsically connected through economic motives that 
incited a period of transformation at the turn of the eighteenth century. 
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 This thesis seeks to explore politics, commerce, and colonization at the turn of the 
eighteenth century in Angola. The method of analysis used to best understand the period in Angola 
is to divide the work into three chapters with distinct spatial and conceptual dimensions. The 
following discussion uses the Angolan hinterland, the coast, and the Atlantic as the three spatial 
reference points through which the methods of colonization, politics, and commerce can be 
explicated. The Angolan hinterland is to be understood as the districts along the Kwanza River, and 
in Benguela and the southern interior area. The Coast is comprised from South to North as 
Benguela, up through Luanda, the Kongo, and the Loango Coast. The Atlantic will be considered 
through the Angolan perspective. These dimensions are chosen because it is what contemporaries 
viewed as falling under Portuguese jurisdiction, as seen in documents consulted. The reason that the 
chapters are organized in this way is to show the interconnected nature of the themes examined. 
Once the interdependency is established, important trends that impacted the colonial, political, and 
commercial state of the Angolan territory are exposed. 
 The history of Angola at the turn of the eighteenth century is comparatively understudied to 
other locations throughout the Portuguese empire, as well as to other periods of Angolan history. 
However, seminal works exist that provide crucial insight into the Portuguese political and 
commercial structures as well as into the African communities. These books are thematically 
important to the entirety of the thesis in order to strengthen the framework that comprises the 
present disquisition. Joseph Miller’s indispensible work Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and 
the Angolan Slave Trade (1730-1830) is undoubtedly the most essential and voluminous project to 
date on this subject matter. Although its temporal scope follows that of this thesis, it references the 
turn of the eighteenth century with brilliantly clear analysis that allows for better comprehending 
the colonial situation that precedes 1730. Miller also wrote a series of articles that prove vital for 
reference. Similarly, John Thornton’s Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic world, 
1400-1800 accompanied by many of his articles that specifically relate to the kingdom of Kongo 
provides information on Portuguese institutions while providing exhaustive research relating to the 
African dimension of Portuguese Angola. Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola 
and Brazil During the Era of the Slave Trade by Roquinaldo Ferreira was published in the latter 
part of the production of this thesis, but its readership greatly enhanced the general understanding of 
Angola at this time and making connections towards the close of the writing process. Additional 
recent works such as Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa: Empires, Merchants and the 
Atlantic System, 1580-1674 By Filipa Ribeiro da Silva were also formative readings that enriched 
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the information gathered for this dissertation. These authors and important books were formative 
sources for the entirety of the thesis, but other works were instrumental to particular chapters. 
 Books that did not prove important to the entirety of the thesis but were crucial to 
understanding each part covered a narrower thematic scope. For the first chapter on the Angolan 
hinterland, Os Capitães-Mores no Século XVIII by Carlos Couto was important to understanding 
the Military involvement of the Angolan officials in the hinterland. Important to the second chapter 
were Trade and Conflict in Angola by David Birmingham and The External Trade of the Loango 
Coast, 1576-1870 by Phillis Martin. Phillis Martin is one of the foremost scholars on trade at the 
Loango Coast, however her Portuguese bibliographical and archival references are scant compared 
to those of other European powers. Regardless, the work serves as a superlative reference through 
which the study of the Portuguese perspective was made possible. The final chapter depends 
primarily on thematic articles as well as the books mentioned in the previous paragraph. Additional 
books important to the subject matter that served as supplementary readings were for example The 
Atlantic Slave Trade by Herbert S. Klein. These were not the only books that enhanced the 
discussion, but were certainly some of the most notable. 
 The entirety of the archival research cited throughout the dissertation was collected at the 
Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino. The Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino was chosen because although 
other important archives exist in Lisbon, it has the most comprehensive repository of documents 
and manuscripts relating to administrative, financial, military, and political issues. Choosing this 
archive provides a focus through which immense amounts of information can be examined from 
issues relating to the overseas territories. The documentation consulted was from the Angolan 
faction of the archive, consisting of correspondence between Angola and centralized bodies such as 
the Overseas Council. The archival content is composed of letters and reports written by officials on 
the colonial situation in Angola. It also has inventories of colonial structures and petitions for 
offices, as well as quantitative data regarding population, imports and exports, and the slave trade. 
The archive is an excellent source of boundless information, however there are two identifiable 
problem areas evident in the documents.  
 The first problem area is that the manuscripts available at the archive are almost in their 
entirety sent from Luanda to Lisbon because of Luanda’s political importance. This downplays 
other areas within Angola such as Benguela that were either excluded from the subject matter or 
characterized as more peripheral than may have been accurate. The documents therefore assume an 
association with Luanda, or Luanda at the very least is a reference point from which unrelated 
material is gauged. The second problem is detecting possible motives, or political or personal 
interests that conditioned the manner in which the document is written. Many of the writers of the 
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manuscripts were clearly cognizant of the recipients, and the content and writing style of the letters 
show that they were written with their audience in mind. Asking for more resources, or showing 
personal accomplishments within the documents was accompanied by rhetoric that was pleasing to 
the central authorities so that their objectives were met. An extension of this is that in many cases, 
the primary reason that officials that wrote to the Overseas Council for reasons other than the 
current state of the colony were to complain about individuals, events or resources, or to incentivize 
promotions. While it is important to respect the originality of the documents, the secondary sources 
mentioned among others as well as awareness of the motives associated with the manuscripts help 
to create the most accurate representation of the period.  
 The boxes consulted intensively at the archive were numbers 12-24, while other documents 
were considered for supplementary purposes such as codices 544 and 545. Consulting the dozen 
boxes was sufficient for studying Angola at the turn of the century encompassing the half-century 
between 1675 and 1725. Encapsulating the turn of the century into a quarter century on either side 
of the year 1700 permitted the detection of important trends, commercial and political figures, and 
an intimate understanding of the period in its entirety. In examining the material, it became clear 
that the most effective way of characterizing this period was to choose the dates 1684 to 1725. 
Within this framework the dates 1695 and 1720 serve as dates that produced fundamental changes, 
however in order to prove the importance of the dates they must be viewed as processes of change 
rather than just a single event.  
 The first chapter is a discussion of colonization and politics in the Angolan hinterland. This 
chapter’s functionality is to set the stage for the following chapters by analyzing the ideological 
changes that occurred in the interior that changed the course of colonization methods. It follows by 
exposing the intention to militarize the interior using methods that appeased the central authorities, 
and increased Portuguese presence in the most important interior areas of the period using 
inventories and correspondences as of 1684. This includes introducing political figures that were 
most involved in colonizing the African populous in the interior and trading within the commercial 
networks.  
 Government officials such as the captain-majors and governors are examined within this 
period because they were the most important military and political figures in the Angolan 
hinterland. Although the governors were not physically involved in the interior, their heavy 
involvement in commerce drove their trade collusions with the captain-majors to impact methods of 
colonization and military force that shaped colonial relations with Africans. The governors also 
chose the captain-majors, who were the highest Portuguese authorities in the hinterland. Who the 
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governors elected as captain-majors gives light to why the captain-majors acted as they did, as well 
as how commercial prowess was the salient trait among those chosen for the position.  
 The major trends discussed in regard to the hinterland officials concern commerce as well. 
The violence and warring committed by the captain-majors was largely due to methods of 
enslavement and commerce, and local authorities attempted to hamper their ability to continue such 
practices. In 1720, a law prohibited high ranking colonial officials from commerce, which allowed 
other commercial actors to trade in the hinterland without the hold that the collusion between the 
two military officials enjoyed. This law affected not only the government officials, but trade itself 
within the interior zones. How this affected the interior will be examined, which transitions into 
commercial relations on the coast of Angola. 
 The second chapter deals with commercial relationships on the coast of Angola. This shows 
the connections that the hinterland held with the coast through commercial agents. The chapter 
contains an in-depth analysis of both African and European traders that were mutually vital to 
sustaining the entirety of the commercial system. Through discussing the commercial relationships 
within the Angolan economic system, the means through which they traded such as items of 
monetary value and credit will be discussed. Trade networks and monetary value systems within 
Angola enable deliberation over the impact of monopoly contracts that taxed the export of human 
cargo before being sent overseas. The contracts and their holders were both politically and 
economically vital to the territory of Angola, and serve as a perfect transition into the Loango 
Coast. From 1684 until the early 1720’s, Portuguese and British merchants conflicted over 
jurisdiction over trade along the coast that culminated in Portuguese military force. This further 
supports the political and commercial interdependence that will be exposed in the first chapter, as 
well as Loango as an important contributor to the Angolan economy, especially as the slave trade 
expanded throughout this period and Portuguese contractors depended on Loango to meet the 
quotas for goods sent abroad.  
 The third and final chapter concerning the Angolan slave trade serves to show the Atlantic 
dimension of Angolan politics, commerce, and colonization. The slave trade was undoubtedly the 
most important contributor to the Angolan economy. The slave trade was also an insidious force 
that was an implicit motive for colonization. The ideological dynamic of the slave trade from both 
the European and African perspective will be analyzed, as well as Atlantic History. Atlantic History 
is a field of study that helps define the slave trade through its parameters and problem areas. 
Including a discussion of the state of the art of academic scholarship on the slave trade and Atlantic 
History provides perspective through which the Angolan slave trade can be brought into the 
Atlantic scope.  
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 Comprehending the current state of study on the slave trade and Atlantic History permits 
discourse to reach the agents of change within the slave trade that influenced the subjects discussed 
in the previous two chapters. A law from 1684 restricted the amount of human cargo that could be 
transported from Angola to the rest of the Atlantic, which limited transportation resources and 
changed many aspects of trade in Angola. The discovery of gold in Brazil in 1695 was an impetus 
to colossal changes in the slave trade that enormously affected commerce in Angola. The political 
and commercial implications of gold in Brazil will be shown, leading into ramifications suffered in 
Angola resulting from favoring gold extraction as opposed to agricultural resources. The 1684 law 
continued to impact trade from this point forward, and proved to be increasingly important when 
the governors were excluded from trade in 1720. The law impacted the availability of slave vessels 
for export that the governors formerly financed. This influenced future mandates that supported 
increased commercial freedom in Angola as well as regularization of the slave trade in an attempt to 
resolve the issues created by commercial interests that reverberated throughout the entirety of the 
Angolan society.  
  Angola at the turn of the eighteenth century experienced great change in colonization, 
politics, and commerce with economic gain as the common denominator. These three concepts were 
intimately connected through economic interests that were mutually affected through formative 
changes in any one element. Whether in the Angolan hinterland, on the coast, or throughout the 
Atlantic, compositional changes and tendencies severely impacted the entirety of the territory. 
These fundamental connections intended for isolated purposes deeply influenced other spheres 















Politics and Commerce in the Angolan Hinterland 
 The Angolan hinterland at the turn of the eighteenth century was a crucial frontier of 
colonization and commerce. This chapter seeks to discuss political, colonial, and economic trends 
that occurred in the Angolan interior from both the viewpoints of hinterland and coastal actors. 
Portuguese colonial success was essentially confined to the coast, holding largely nominal control 
of the Angolan interior. However, a series of jurisdictions were established along waterways such 
as the Kwanza River among African populations that became important commercial centers. The 
districts were areas that were considered essential to local trade between the Portuguese and 
Africans, whose local transactions influenced commercial relations on a broader scale through the 
use of contracted porters and financial collusions. Although the various hinterland centers were 
commercially significant, they served many functions, such as military frontiers. Each of the 
jurisdictions were occupied by infantry lead by a captain-major.
1
 Some of these jurisdictions had 
military structures called presídios that held military cantonments, and were a beacon of control and 
commerce.  
 The districts in the interior became increasingly important over time as commercial routes 
integrated. The African communities participated in the European commerce and valued their 
commodities, placing importance on the locations of the Portuguese districts rather than their 
kingdoms. Although many of the presídios were located in preexisting commercial areas, it made 
those places more important, and especially effected kingdoms whose political centrality was not in 
the same place. As the Angolan slaving frontier moved eastward, the Portuguese used military force 
in order to capture slaves. The lucrative nature of this method of slaving incentivized commercial 
relationships between intermediaries in the hinterland and financiers on the coast. The most salient 
of these relationships was between the governors of Angola and the captain-majors.  
 The governor-general was the highest authority in the Angolan territory. The governor’s 
premier position was the result of the military nature of the Portuguese overseas colonies in the 
period. Aside from coastal protection, development of the interior was crucial to showing the crown 
successful military efforts. Consequentially, frequent correspondence showed the governors 
rationalizing expenditures and exaggerating the state of the colony in order to be sent more 
                                                 
1
 Words such as military offices that have clear translations that do not detract from the original meaning are translated 
into English, such as in this case, from capitães-mores to captain-majors. This is notable, however, because of 
contemporary discord between the translation of terms such as this, as authors such as Joseph Miller and Mariana 
Cândido translate it as captain-major, whereas Filipa Ribeiro da Silva chose captain-general. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I have chosen to maintain the use of modern Portuguese orthography for words that either cannot be 
translated into English, or that lose the essence of the word through doing so. Words of African origin such as people, 
institutions, place names, etc. will be presented in Anglicized spelling where possible. Although this is the case, it must 
be understood that quotations from contemporary texts will maintain the spelling used in each individual case.    
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manpower and resources. This position held a wide range of powers, and also entered commercial 
relationships in order to supplement their income.  
 The governors and captain-majors were largely involved in trade relationships, with the 
captain-major serving as the hinterland commercial agent that gave the governors’ goods 
precedence over others. The captain-majors committed violent acts and war techniques in order to 
accrue slaves for sale in their jurisdictions, which caused incredible damage towards relationships 
with the African communities. Who the candidates were for these two positions may indicate why 
the jurisdictions as a mechanism of colonization were not as successful as they could have been as a 
result of economic motives. In fact, the case of the captain-major may be attributed to a strong trend 
of africanization that lead them to identify less with Portuguese colonial interests, and more with 
their role as inhabitants in African communities and as merchants. At the turn of the eighteenth 
century, several attempts were made to hinder the violence and commercial preferences, which 
culminated in a law in 1720 disallowing commerce for any government official in the overseas 
territories. In addition to curbing the commerce conducted by the governors, it changed the captain-
majors enslaving and commercial strategies in the hinterland.  
 The primary points of analysis will be viewed through the lens of the military government 
and its relationship with the interior African states. Colonization conceptually and through 
commercial outposts in the interior will be discussed, as well as the Africanization of the 
governmental roles through isolation. The militaristic rhetoric employed by governors attempting to 
show success in the colony to continue financing interior expeditions is fundamental in exposing 
the importance of the hinterland, even though their presence was largely unsuccessful as a purely 
dominant force. The way that militarism was presented also changed throughout this period. The 
governors’ collusion with the captain-majors was a retrogressive act in relation to the colonization 
of the hinterland. Additionally detrimental were the captain-majors’ conduct in their jurisdictions. 
The captain-majors were widely accused of being the source of many of the problems associated 
with Portuguese colonization, however the root of their issues were largely a result of the 
demographics they were drawn from and the circumstances of their surroundings. The commonality 
between the candidates for captain-major is that the position was viewed as a means for financial 
gain. Attempts were made to curb the trade relationships between governors and captain-majors that 
had greater impacts than just the end of their financial relationship, and this became clear by the 
first quarter of the eighteenth century. 
 
Colonization Methods and The Angolan Peoples 
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 Colonization in Angola began through exploratory expeditions extending down the coast of 
the African continent. Diogo Cão first explored the Portuguese territory, situated on the Southwest 
coast of Africa from 1482 to 1485, sent by King João II of Portugal. The continued Portuguese 
colonization effort began immediately by sending missionary delegates into the African kingdoms 
and Cão renaming the Zaire River the “Rio de São Jorge”. Almost a full century later, in 1575, 
Paulo Dias de Novais anchored on the Ilha das Cabras, and subsequently founded the colony’s 
capital city of Luanda on the mainland in 1576, officially recognized in 1605, where he became the 
first governor and captain-major of Angola. The position of governor-general was created almost 
two decades later in 1592,
2
 of what was then the captaincy of Angola. The early focus on Luanda in 
the colony secured the city as the Portuguese cultural, political, and economic center of the West 
African littoral. 
 The capital city of Luanda was of essential importance to the Angolan territory. Although 
other port cities established such as Benguela that was 700
3
 kilometers South of the capital, and 
Loango located roughly 372 kilometers North of it were notable and gained importance throughout 
this period, Luanda was preeminent. This chapter focuses on the Angolan hinterland, but the 
fundamental place of convergence and political consolidation stemmed from this city inward. 
Luanda since its inception was regarded as a place that amalgamated myriad cultures, peoples, 
languages, and commercial styles and products. It was an extremely “africanized” community that 
began as a fort-city, rapidly becoming a site of major commercial activity.
4
 Contemporaries 
considered the city so culturally and linguistically diverse, that some referred to it as “Babylon”.
5
 
Luanda, situated on a large hill on the bay, grew in commercial importance over time, and 
increasingly traded raw materials and human cargo throughout the Portuguese empire. 
 After the Dutch occupancy of Luanda from 1641 to 1648, the relationship between Angola 
and Brazil became clear, as military supplies and commerce were sent with overwhelming volume 
between the two colonies before and afterwards. The connection between the two colonies 
progressed with the slave trade. The slave trade was a fundamental part of the Angolan export 
economy, and equally crucial to Brazilian agricultural produce and mining. In fact, the institution of 
human export from Angola was implied in the majority of interpersonal relationships, and the 
lucrative aspect of it drove many individuals in powerful positions to involve themselves for 
personal rather than collective gain.  
                                                 
2
 Delgado, Ralph, História de Angola: Primeiro Período e parte do segundo, de 1482 a 1607, Luanda: Livraria 
Magalhães, 1961, p. 55. 
3
 Mariana P. Candido, “Merchants and the Business of the Slave Trade in Benguela, 1750-1850,” African Economic 
History, No. 35 (2007). pp. 1-35, p. 1. 
4
 Isabel Castro Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola:  Dinâmicas Comerciais e Transformações Sociais no 
Século XIX,  Lisbon   nstituto da Coopera ão Portuguesa, 1  7, p. 110.  
5
 “babilonia”, May 23, 1724, AHU, Angola, cx. 22. 
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 It is important to understand Luanda as wielding these characteristics that inevitably drove 
its characterization as a colonial entrepôt. As a result, Luanda drew people who arrived voluntarily 
from Lisbon who sought fortune. Consequently, leading up to the eighteenth century it became an 
almost prerequisite qualification to hold noble status in order to be considered for a high-ranking 
political position, some of which were even from the royal family. Angola had an abnormally high 
percentage of nobility in its government positions, and the value attributed towards military 
positions among the Portuguese elite is perhaps evident in that seven of nine governors named in 
Angola after 1666 were such.
6
 Luanda, however, could not have held the commercial importance 
that it did without the hinterland communities.  
 Throughout this period, methods of colonization in the hinterland shifted from 
evangelization to warring and violence. The religious orders were fundamental in colonizing the 
native population since the very beginning of Portuguese efforts in Angola, but by the end of the 
seventeenth century there was a clear ecclesiastical decadence.
7
 The first expeditions were made 
with religious leaders and conversion was understood as a way of designating a Europeanized or 
subjugated individual. Religious conversion was also a way of social and political standardization, 
and was less overtly intrusive than other tactics. Religious schools were set up, and baptisms were 
commonplace throughout the colony. However, by the end of the seventeenth century, it was clear 
that militarism was more effective than evangelization as a means of colonization.  
 Four monastic orders were most predominant in Angola. The Franciscan order was 
dominant earlier in the colony’s history, but its offshoot, the predominantly Italian Capuchin Order 
gained considerable ground. The Capuchin and Jesuit missions were well documented in Angola, 
and the Jesuits in particular owned immense amounts of land and resources. The fourth order was 
the Carmelites, of primarily Spanish origin, but the most influential missionaries were the 
Capuchins and the Jesuits. However, this period in Angolan religious history was marked more by 
conflicts between the orders rather than by colonization.  
 The religious orders in Angola at the turn of the eighteenth century did not have a 
harmonious relationship. Disputes over land and jurisdiction in the interior were contentious issues. 
Also, although many missionaries came to Angola to evangelize the African population, some of 
the religious figures were dependent on state administered stipends, and were responsible for the 
“spiritual welfare of settlers, soldiers, and administrators.”
8
 Hence, evangelization was not their sole 
function in the territory, and the majority of religious figures were not Portuguese persons. 
                                                 
6
 Bicalho, Maria Fernanda, and Ferlini, Vera Lúcia Amaral, Orgs., Modos de Governar: Idéias e Práticas Políticas no 
Império Português, Séculos XVI-XIX, São Paulo, 2005, pp. 79.  
7
 Ralph Delgado, História de Angola: Terceiro Periodo 1684-1836, Luanda: Livraria Magalhães, 1961, p. 274.   
8
 David Birmingham, Portugal and Africa, London: Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 71. 
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Although the salient purpose of the missionaries was conversion, the fact that many of the religious 
figures were foreign, and that the supreme authority for priestly conduct and purpose was the 
Vatican rather than Portugal questions their direct or purposeful involvement in Portuguese 
colonization initiatives. Whether the missionaries’ evangelization process was consistent with 
Portuguese political and military aspirations or not, it is doubtful that missionaries were consciously 
working in stride with the Portuguese imperial pretensions.
9
 On a similar token, Portugal was 
unable to fulfill its responsibilities designated through the padroado giving the empire the task of 
organizing and financing religious activities in its dominion.
10
 Although the church was an 
important part of Angolan society, the political and economic means of colonization will be the 
focus of the discussion.   
 The Portuguese colonization of the Angolan peoples according to Beatrix Heintze can be 
considered in two categories. The first category is through voluntary vassalage and the other is 
through military conquest. The Portuguese did not have a particular efficient “technique” that lead 
to colonizing the African peoples, but maintaining the idea of Africans as underdeveloped aided in 
asserting dominance.
11
 Before discussing the ways in which the local kingdoms were “colonized”, 
the word ‘colonization’ must be discussed.  f colonization is agreed upon to denote political control 
of a collective of settlers from a common external origin over those native to a particular place, then 
the means (voluntary or forced) to the end of political control is the central issue. However, the root 
of the word ‘colonization’ is the same as that of ‘culture’. The Latin root word, colere means 
‘cultivate’, originally understood for agricultural signification.
12
 This word, when reapplied to 
indigenous societies’ subjugation to Portuguese political dominance in Angola, implies that the 
indigenous societies adopted the colonial political infrastructure, and cultural norms in a subservient 
manner, coming under the European cultural norms. With this assertion designated as the motive of 
colonization, the way in which it was realized can also be defined.  
 Catarina Madeira Santos highlights three different styles of colonization. The first 
designation is colonization as translation or transcription. What this type infers is that a system of 
imperial language is used that transmits ideologies or institutions of colonialism. For example, 
political language that identifies a colonial system, or hierarchies of vassalage of one group to 
another creates the perception of subjugation of one demographic over another. The next type is 
defined as tangential colonialism, or ‘entrepôt’ Colonialism. This refers to elements such as the 
presídios that were spread throughout the territory in different areas conducive to sustained contact 
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with the native populous and it is understood as intermittent or minimal colonialism. The last type is 
colonialism as invasion. This clearly implies a set of beliefs or principles of domination, and the 
direct intention of subordinating a particular sector of humanity.
13
  
 The three aforementioned types of colonialism appear not only to be almost never mutually 
exclusive in Angola’s case, but in fact in many cases all three simultaneously held true. Colonialism 
as translation and colonialism as invasion both stem from an ideological standpoint, whereas the 
entrepôt is a physical architectural presence. Although the presídios were of an intrinsically military 
nature creating an image of dominance and military force, the difference between the functionality 
of the structure and the actions performed by its inhabitants were often very different. The 
placement of the structures made them prime areas for markets, and agriculture as well. The 
military structures were considered to be manifestations of colonial dominance, but their 
commercial component was the most important. However, their isolated state also produced mutual 
cultural acquisitions. Because the presídios were placed in the hinterlands of Angola and served 
several different functions, many of the inhabitants experienced stark manifestations of cultural 
mixing resulting from long stints in the isolated centers. The Military men often intermarried, spoke 
the local language, and adopted local customs. A disconnect between the positions purpose and its 
execution differed greatly as a result, and will be be discussed at length later in the chapter.  
 The most pertinent form of colonialism in this context, and which may serve best as an 
extension of entrepôt colonialism, is colonialism through economic means. As a result of 
Portuguese presence in the Angolan territory, displacing African peoples that preceded them, 
greater integration occurred. The slave trade was the driving force between many wars, dislocation 
efforts, and commercial transactions that provided for a broader reach of interpersonal interactions 
and restructuration of societies. This also lead to many people changing what was societally valued 
in terms of food, raw materials, and clothes, creating far more dependence on trade and monetary 
systems for survival. The natural progression of such trend included the standardization of 
commercial ideologies and methods, as the cultures internalized certain trends or goods as 
indicative of status or livelihood. Although the Portuguese presence in Angola was largely nominal, 
almost in its entirety east of the Atlantic coast, the physical and cultural proximity between the 
Portuguese and Africans created complex commercial, social, and political relationships that 
inevitably proved to be the most effective form of colonization.  n fact, the “impossibility” of 
forced colonization in the Angolan interior obliged the Portuguese to rely on the “colonizing 
effects” of commerce and market places, making the African communities rely both indirectly and 
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directly on Portuguese commercial and political structures.
14
 The primary sources available today 
that construct the colonial reality of Angola use language that indicates a colonial political and 
military structure, but the motives of the officials are often tainted with intent to justify their actions 
and presence in Angola to the central powers. Because of the lack of sources from a plurality of 
perspectives, using economic means as the terms for colonialism in Angola allows for it to be 




 The Angolan territory that the Portuguese either considered under their jurisdiction or were 
involved with through commercial and political networks was extremely geographically diverse, 
with many topographical and faunal differences. To the North of the colony splicing the equator 
was a rainforest that extended from the coast inward, surrounding much of the interior of the Congo 
River. Tapering off from the rainforest was the Savannah Mosaic, comprised of a dryer, grassier, 
and less dense forest that extended south to the bottom of the tributaries of the Congo River. From 
the area just above Luanda, down to the Kunene River, along side the sliver of land between it and 
the coast that makes up part of the Namib Desert is a woodland area. Directly below Luanda, 
however, was the Kwanza River that served as the most accessible route inland and its banks 
housed the greatest population of Portuguese personnel off the coast, as well as the greatest interior 
colonial presence. To the other side of the woodland area is the Kalahari Desert that has intermittent 
patches of forest, and a swamp reservoir in the North. Southern central Angola is also home to 
mountainous regions up to the central Angolan Huíla Plateau, about 225 kilometers inland.  
 Because of the harsh climatic conditions, the different kingdoms or peoples of eighteenth 
century Angola are most effectively placed using topographical boarders such as rivers because the 
highest population densities were located close to fresh water sources. There were several African 
communities that were crucial to this period of Portuguese colonization in Angola. The Vili 
Kingdom covered as much as 460 miles along the Western coast, extending from Cape Lopez down 
to the Congo River. This expanse encompassed major ports of export, including Loango Bay and 
Cabinda.
16
 The Kingdom of Kongo that lay on either side of the Congo River negotiated with 
Portuguese missionaries, traders, and other personnel since the inception of their attempts at a 
permanent stronghold in Angola. Above the Malebo Pool (formerly Stanley Pool),
17
 a rather 
densely populated area, were the Tyo (or Teke) peoples. All of these northern kingdoms may 
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actually have originated from directly above the Malebo Pool. In fact, linguistic and cultural 
constants indicate that the Teke, Vili, and Kongo Kingdoms were likely previously connected.
18
 
Along the right boarder of the Kwango river, resided the Yaka, directly above the Shinje peoples, 
with the Chokwe at the bottom of the river. To the right of these Kwango River inhabitants were the 
Lunda that migrated substantially throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century becoming 
deeply involved in the slave trade. The same can be said for the Jaga who referred to themselves as 
the Imbangala, a group of disputed origin that covered a large expanse of the central plateau east of 
Luanda, by the Kwanza River.
19
 The Jaga were accused of committing both infanticide and 
anthropophagy, many times acquiring new members not just by birth, but by the acquisition of 
Africans fleeing slavery or persecution from their original kingdoms. Some of the confusion that 
arose over their origin and composition may be attributed to coastal African contemporaries 
generalizations, labeling unknown Africans coming from the interior of the colony as Jaga.
20
 
However, the Kimbundu speaking peoples of the Luanda Plateau such as the Ndongo that was an 
aggregate of the Kimbundu societies suffered the greatest Portuguese influence. This area was 
originally meant to designate Angola, whose namesake was the Ndongo leader called the “Ngola”.
21
 
Where Portuguese dominance was essentially nominal elsewhere, the Ndongo were enormously 
subjected to the earliest period of the slave trade in Angola, depleting their population and 
destroying their sovereignty. Where slavers drew from the periphery of other kingdoms through 
war, the Ndongo were exposed to central attacks. The Ovimbundo covered a large expanse below 
the kwanza toward Benguela, where although the city was established in 1617, they met the 
colonizers with a great deal of resistance. By the eighteenth century however, they were 
“inexorably drawn into the Portuguese economic system.”
22
 To the South of the Ovimbundu were 
the Ovambu peoples above the Cunene River.
23
  
 Although these were the Major kingdoms or ethnic groups of the time, other states were 
important to this era of Angolan history. These other groups were either lesser in population, further 
into the Angolan hinterland, or were considered vassal states to other powers. The division of native 
chiefdoms into vassals and non-vassals was “a determining element of Portuguese rule in 
Angola.”
24
 Some of the vassal duties were free commerce with the exclusion of foreign 
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competitors, porters for officials, and the extradition of slaves. The most important obligation was 
military service, and “without this, the Portuguese could not have maintained themselves in Angola, 
let alone conquered other regions.”
25
 What would previously have been considered rather 
endogamous communities underwent a period of transformation, both in relation to the way that the 
kingdoms interacted, and how they viewed commercial relationships. Whether implicated by the 
changing economic value set, or overtly through commercial exchange, the slave trade as an 
economic incentive was the driving force to these changes.  
 Portuguese military expeditions were engulfed in a state of almost constant war, and other 
European powers such as the Spanish, Dutch, English, and French became involved in the colony’s 
commercial relationship. This was an extremely violent period in Angolan history, with an 
appalling death rate. Communities were severely depopulated because of war, raids, slavery, or 
climatic conditions, creating communities of castaways or the integration of fleeing Africans into 
neighboring kingdoms.
26
 The last quarter of the seventeenth century showed the fall of many of the 
African monarchs into vassalage. One example would be the establishment of a fort at Pungo a 
Ndongo in 1671, marking the complete subversion of the Ndongo.
27
  What increased interaction 
may have achieved however, is a fundamental change in the African political and economic 
infrastructure. The social structure of many of the African kingdoms was linked to the number of 
dependents. The African ideology of slavery was viewed in terms of what a person was able to give. 
The poorest in the communities could only offer their services, and thus served those of higher 
status in the community. This economic philosophy was based in the African ‘use-based’ economy 
that valued the immediate return of an object, whether human or otherwise. It appears inconceivable 
that the Africans would offer slaves from their own communities to the Europeans, but this seems to 
have originated from the “misplaced projections of a modern liberal civilization's individualistic 
ethic” into a situation in which people sensitive to the omnipresence of death “apparently calculated 
value in forms more enduring than fragile individual human lives.”
28
 Further analysis of African 
ideologies of slavery follows in the third chapter. 
 The African political economy highlighted the importance of possessing scarce material 
goods that were symbolic of power, and as exotic material goods became more common in Angola, 
the acquisition of dependents as slaves became increasingly essential. Consequently, the slave trade 
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was an agent of ideological change that further incentivized militarism and warfare in hopes of 
capturing slaves as spoils of war as the evolution from slaves as dependents or as power, to slaves 
as commodities became essential and war was the most secure way of obtaining them. The 
transition to a slave economy of export and credit systems inevitably changed the composition of 
many African kingdoms. An increased importance placed on commercial exchange became a 
centralizing force for the African kingdoms, creating trade markets and merging the centralized 
power.
29
 The trade markets as a centralizing power was contingent upon a previous decentralization 
before reforming societies to incorporate the markets circulating goods. Decentralization as a first 




The Kongo is an example of an African Kingdom that the Portuguese were heavily involved in that 
experienced a great transformation at the turn of the eighteenth century. Throughout this period the 
kingdom experienced immense sociopolitical strife and constant war. The capital, Mbanza Kongo, 
renamed São Salvador by the Portuguese was the center of political power and commerce. 
However, a series of factors greatly disrupted the internal dynamics of the kingdom that caused 
immense decentralization and a shift to the coastal city of Mbanza Nsoyo. John Thornton contends 
that there were a number of agents of change rather than merely Portuguese war efforts. Instead of 
major events such as the Portuguese victory at the Battle of Mbwila in 1665, beginning a half-
century period of change in the composition of the Kingdom of Kongo, he states that it is necessary 
to examine cultural, political, or geographical aspects using a methodology akin to the ‘Annales 
School’ rather than relying solely on events.
31
 Although there may have been other circumstances, 
David Birmingham contends that the salient factor for the decomposition throughout this time in the 




 Mbanza Nsoyo became far more important to the Kongo, especially after defeating the 
Portuguese in 1670 with Dutch aid.
33
 Although the capital São Salvador was in poor condition after 
sustained war up until this point, the Kongo was extremely important for trade routes in search of 
raw materials and as of 1700, salt on the coast. The decentralization as a result of wars at the end of 
the seventeenth century inevitably restructured the kingdom, resulting in greater importance of trade 
relationships. Because Mbanza Nsoyo was situated on the coast, its inhabitants accrued a great deal 
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of wealth through trade, which contributed to São Salvador’s decline as well.  n fact, Mpinda, the 
port at Mbanza Nsoyo became the “main port of exit for slaves shipped out of the Kongo for the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade.”
34
 This shift that occurred throughout the period of civil war in the 
Kongo, decentralizing the state, shifted much of its power to the coast and markets became a 
driving force for population density rather than political power or agriculture as centralization was 
restored to the kingdom under Pedro IV in 1715.
35
 The central markets and importance of coastal 
export proved more important than other factors in the re-composition of the kingdom. As 
previously shown for the African coastal communities from Benguela to the Kongo Kingdom, the 
Vili Kingdom on the Loango coast succumbed to the same fate. The economic relationships 
furnished between the Africans and the Portuguese created interlinked economies, and by the 
eighteenth century, the Vili experienced socio-political changes that correlated to the expanding 
slave trade on their coast as well. New products, interactions, and opportunities for ambitious 




Militarization of the Angolan Hinterland 
 As economic incentives proved vital to the natives’ connection to the Portuguese, the same 
is true to the intra-imperial conflicts in the Portuguese government. The Portuguese central political 
structure held an inherently militaristic nature at the turn of the eighteenth century. There existed 
several nuclei of power, but military dignitaries that enjoyed a wide range of political freedom held 
the preeminent positions. The highest political authority in the territory was the Governor-General, 
who served for all intensive purposes as the commander in chief. The royal authorities chose the 
governor, who presided for triennia.
37
 The selection process for the governor throughout the 
seventeenth century was mediated through a ‘competition’ of candidates to the Overseas Council,
38
 
who were royal advisors on colonial policymaking. The Overseas Council was given a particular 
amount of time in which it would present the written candidacies, and open them to a vote.
39
 The 
selection of the governors was based on the royal policy of awarding mercês, or rewards of 
honorific positions for “loyal service to the crown,”
40
 although the allocation of these titles was 
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given in an increasingly indirect manner from the throne throughout the Ancien Regime.
41
 When 
there was not a clear favorite, or when the decision concerned a particularly important governor, the 
decision would be sent up to the Council of State. This post was understood as direct representation 
of the crown, and the metropole preferred governors coming from Lisbon, and some arrived at 
Luanda from a previous military post in Brazil.  
 The Overseas Council preferred candidates that followed instructions and showed deep 
loyalty to the throne. To ensure allegiance to the patria when sent to the overseas such as Angola, 
the crown “turned to the strongest defender of the throne,” the military nobility.
42
 Because of 
corruption, disobedience, a bad economy, and external military threats, the Overseas Council was 
pressured to choose competent governors. The governors selected almost always had experience 
overseas, as well as in “active combat,”
43
 and belonged to prestigious military orders such as the 
Order of Christ, which were inextricably linked to the throne.
44
  n order to keep the governors’ 
behavior in check, they were subjected to devassas,
45
 as well as a review upon completion of their 
term. Regardless, the distance from the metropole and the power obtained gave way to mistreatment 
of the position and corruption. 
 The governor’s primary functions extended beyond the military sphere into the judicial and 
civil as well, as stated in the Regimento
46
 to Aires de Saldanha de Meneses on February 12, 1676.
47
 
The first regimento was given to D. Manuel Pereira Forjaz in 1607,
48
 and became a standard for 
governors at the beginning of their terms. The regimentos indicated not only what the Crown 
expected of gubernatorial conduct, but also goals for the continued colonization of Angola. One 
example is the regimento from 1624 to Fernão de Souza that set the stage for many facets of the 
period of the Ancien Regime. Some of the plans in place were to more intensively inventory 
resources such as military artillery, propagate the faith for greater integration, better define judiciary 
and financial issues and jurisdiction, improve the contentious relationship with the African 
population, and regulate the influx of ships as well as trade with foreigners.
49
 The broad natured 
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power bestowed upon the governors evidenced in documents such as in this case not only showed 
the importance of the military in the colony, but it created myriad conflicts of interest, and set the 
stage for the governor to engage in illicit acts for personal gain. This power, although, did not go 




, and the 
Provedor da Fazenda.
52
 These three power structures covered the civil, judicial, and financial 
matters respectively. They created an extreme amount of internal conflict, sending numerous 
complaints to the Overseas Council about disagreements amongst themselves, most often dealing 
with the governor and another party.  
 Although there was a wide range of military ranks in Angola, the ambiguity of the spectrum 
of duties allocated to the governor and captain-major allowed for misuse of their power for personal 
gain. Regardless of this, the great majority of contemporary correspondence between the governor 
and the imperial authorities constructed an image of a militarizing state. The very structure of the 
colony was intended as such, and it is clear that the crown intended to maintain the status quo. This 
is manifested in the penchant that the crown displayed towards those faithful to the throne, and 
certain actions that the crown took, such as reinstating the Mestre de Campo on June 12, 1703 that 
served as superior to the Municipal Council, and governed the province in the absence of the 
Governor. Eight years later, in 1711, the Municipal Council attempted to regain control, but were 
rejected again on December 9, 1712,
53
 and then once again after another attempt in 1714, 
maintaining the Mestre de Campo as the governor’s replacement.  t appears that the preferential 
treatment that the crown gave the army officials was to their own detriment. The military officials 
were meant for the defense and expansion of the colony but through the predilection towards 
military officials, the crown did not consider the potential difficulty that these very people would 
have in governing the colony. The lack of experience or aptitude in governance that people such as 
the Mestre de Campo were proclaimed by the Council to have exhibited further exposes the crown’s 
intent as to maintain the military nature regardless of personal performance. The crown eschewed 
the appointment of those born in the overseas to maintain the interests of the kingdom as the 
primary objective, but as a result, often their level of competence in terms of governance was 
dissatisfactory. Appointees from the metropole were removed from their former colonial realities, 
and were either not prepared to govern within the Angolan colonial context, or proved indulgent or 
opportunistic upon ascendance to their positions.  
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 The military nature of the colony is evidenced in the selection of military officials as 
preeminent leaders at the turn of the eighteenth century, and the militaristic rhetoric within the 
documents sent to the central authorities supports this. The military officials frequently discuss 
subjects with a militaristic nature such as war, the need for more resources, or personnel. The 
fidalgo ethos of the governors is evident through appeasement to the Crown, especially since it is 
clear to them that the king was primarily interested in expanding colonial influence. The servile 
ethos, or displays of zealousness in upholding the crowns interests were often coupled with actions 
of authoritarianism and violence in their powerful positions.
54
 This indicates that they could have 
used the military language in order to satisfy the central authorities, for reasons that were favorable 
to themselves.   
 On May 22, 1683, for example, a communiqué written on behalf of the future Governor Luís 
Lobo da Silva that assumed the position a year later outlined three of his intentions for the arrival. 
The first is that the territory needs “a great deal of help that consists of four hundred soldiers”
55
 in 
order to “save” the colony. The existing soldiers were less numerous, and very costly to the royal 
endowment, prompting the need for “quantity and quality of the soldiers”.
56
 The second was that he 
planned to “increase the amount of cavalry” while contracting them from “Brazil without outlay 
from the royal treasury.” The third element was the transportation of “ammunition, arms, and 
artillery that was necessary.”
57
 These three elements are clear examples of the militaristic rhetoric. 
Because governor Lobo da Silva’s arrival was still pending at the time that this document was 
written and his promises were conditioned by correspondence with Angola rather than experience, 
it is highly implausible that he could have known exactly what would benefit the colony. Even 
though the governor’s rank was military, and it is natural that the document would be substantively 
military related, he emphasizes a notable increase in resources, even though it also states “it could 
be necessary to continue warring.”
58
 Without urgent need of resources or a perceived immediate 
threat at the time, the desire to emphasize such need to the Crown and to arrive to the territory with 
such a large number of reserves shows itself as an intentional display of militarism.  
 Governor Luis Lobo da Silva was not the only example of the governor’s ethos of servitude 
to the throne. Several other examples exist of other governors attempting to validate their military 
role in the colony, showing great importance to their post. João de Silva e Sousa brought with him 
sixty soldiers upon arrival to Angola in 1684, as well as others such as João Saldanha da Gama who 
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promised two hundred new military men in 1721 when he passed through Angola.
59
 Once in 
Angola, the governors also sent notices showing the necessity to fortify, proposing to build a new 
fort, as well as stock the existing structures throughout the colony with ammunition, military 
garrisons, and other resources essential to the colony’s protection.
60
 A high percentage of these 
soldiers would have been destined for the hinterland presídios that were in perpetual need of 
personnel. 
 An additional way in which the militarism was shown was through the general conception of 
Angola as a militarizing force through descriptions of the different forts and presídios. A document 
from the same era, November 20, 1684, indicates that the 400 soldiers that arrived in the transition 
in governorship between João da Silva e Sousa and Luís Lobo da Silva had come into fruition, 
making the nine present military campaigns equal seven hundred total personnel.
61
 This is 
perceived as a triumphant feat in in increasing the numbers of soldiers that could be dispersed 
throughout the area, feeding the interior with military aid. The document gives an inventory of all 
of the people and assets that each presídio contained, focusing mostly on the presídios in 
Cassandama, Muxima, Massangano, Cambambe, and Pedras, as well as a description of the state of 
the jurisdiction of Dande, discussing the need for such personnel.  
 The presídios were where the military personnel resided. These were made from pug, placed 
by water, and at commercial centers.
62
 The presídios placed in commercial centers in the interior 
along the Kwanza River were Massangano (1582), Cambambe (1582), Ambaca (1617), Pedras 
(1671), and Muxima (1595). South of the Kwanza in the Benguela region were Benguela (1617), 
and Caconda (1680).
63
 Athough Benguela is situated near the coast, it is included among the 
presídios for the purposes of this paper because it shared all of the traits that the other presídios 
held, and was certainly peripheral to the Luanda officials. Each presídio, except for Muxima and 
Massangano had a military cantonment, and were staffed, along with the captain-major, with 
sergeants, lieutenants, and ajudantes, among others including a few dozen soldiers. 
64
 As these 
presídios were spread throughout the hinterland world, they were in constant contact with the 
African populous, and the lowly or undesirable Europeans. Closed off in their limited surroundings, 
the captain-majors were confined to their presídios, often times that were in a state of decadence 
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and disrepair. This was the reality of the military official, surrounded by endless thick vegetation, 
whose only explicitly official function was the safety of the area.   
 The presídios guarded by the captain-majors in the hinterland that additionally aided coastal 
conflict when necessary presumably experienced difficulties in their maintenance and effectiveness 
at the turn of the eighteenth century. Understanding that there were several contributing factors to 
the presídos’ decline, there may have been ulterior motives to characterizing the structures in this 
way. There are several accounts of the condition of the presídios throughout the period, but three 
main accounts create an image of degeneration. The first two sources are inventories of the 
resources within the structures including personnel with lists of numbers and ranks as well as 
various products. As mentioned above, taking inventories was important to showing the current 
state of affairs. The third source is a letter from the governor of Angola to Lisbon. The three 
documents, from 1684, 1713, and 1729 respectively maintain evidence symptomatic of the downfall 
of the structures, but the way in which the material is presented speaks more to possible motives for 
having made these distinctions, than substantiating legitimate ruin. 
 By 1684, the Presídio of Muxima held several military ranks, such as a captain-major, a 
tambor, lieutenant, sergeant, a corporal, an ajudante, a clerk, as well as forty-five soldiers. It housed 
an immense amount of guns, gunpowder and ammunition, citing “200 firearms,”
65
 as well as levers, 
axes, and other goods such as food and agricultural equipment. The presidio was described as 
containing everything it needed, and aside from fear of neighboring vassals and general poverty of 
the surrounding inhabitants, was in good condition.  
 The Presídio of Massangano was in a similar state, with the same military officers 
occupying the presídio, yet this one held sixty soldiers, fifteen more than Muxima. The presídio was 
in the third most populous area in Portuguese Angola, and placed in the “heart of the hinterland.”
66
 
It was in constant danger of attack, and was adequately equipped with much more ammunition and 
resources than those of the other presídios, including military and agricultural aid from the African 
vassals in the vicinity that proved “valuable” to the defense and upkeep of the presídio.
67
 The 
presídio of Cambambe had fewer residents and less quantity yet similar supplies, listing only fifty-
five firearms. Ambaca was in similarly adequate condition, although in a state of constant war with 
neighboring peoples, especially the ‘reiy Jinga’, and it housed a Jaga by the name Calandulas, as 
well as one named Quinhengo Quialaza, that had separated from the quilombo by Cassange, 
becoming ‘vassals’ of the conquest.
68
 Many of the surrounding populations were “obliged” to do 
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agricultural work, as well as serve in the wars when necessary. The Presídio das Pedras was in a 




 In the territory of Benguela, the presídio was “of great importance and very lucrative,” as a 
function of the slave trade.
70
 It was equipped with substantially more resources, including several 
military officials, and one hundred and two soldiers. Benguela had such a surplus of firearms, that 
not only were all of the soldiers equipped, but “some at the trading house.”
71
 The data presented 
indicates the relatively positive state that the presídios were in. Granted there was opposition from 
vassal states, and there existed other climatic or interpersonal difficulties, the presídios appeared to 
be adequately equipped. The major issues presented were a constant need of potable water, and that 
commerce was maintained in the hands of the few. Each presídio was presented with how many 
‘vassals’ were expendable for military purposes, and that they (in explicit reference to the African 
population) “<were> extremely poor and without commerce nor other earnings.”
72
 It is notable that 
these military documents reinforced the idea that the structures had sufficient resources, but that the 
commercial and vassal relationships had been strained.  
 By 1703, as an interlude between 1684 and 1713, contemporaries complained that the 
presídios had experienced a great deal of destruction. These establishments had been “very 
damaged” due to negligence, and much of their stock was essentially unusable due to rust.
73
 Nearly 
thirty years after the initial inventory was taken, in 1713 an update was provided that appears to be 
an attempt to show that the presídios were in an acceptable state. This inventory follows the French 
intervention discussed below and strained relationships with the Africans at the locations of the 
majority of the presídios. Until this period, in preparing for further unrest they had rebuilt and 
restocked the losses that resulted from the intrusions. In virtually every case, there were more 
military officials guarding each presídio by this time. The Presído in Ambaca, for example, grew 
from forty soldiers to one hundred and three.
74
 Although the number of soldiers more than doubled, 
the resources within the presídio worsened substantially. Even though the presídio appears to have 
been restocked throughout the period between the two inventories (the number of firearms rose 
from 60 to 158)
75
, of the one hundred and fifty-eight firearms present, eighty-three of them were 
deemed unusable. The variety of goods was also drastically reduced.
76
 Muxima may have 
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experienced the most drastic decrease, because as of 1713, there were only twenty two more 
soldiers than had previously protected the presídio, although the number of fire arms reduced from 
200, to seventy eight, “all poorly prepared.”
77
 The presídio das Pedras more than doubled in the 
number of military personnel, and although the number of items such as guns increased from fifty 
to one hundred and thirty nine, ninety of them were classified as too old, leaving only forty nine as 
adequate pieces of machinery. The presídio at Cambambe appears to have been the only one that 
visibly increased in personnel, and in equipment throughout the thirty years, more than doubling in 
military residents and employable utilities. Benguela by 1713 only held forty-six soldiers, and 
fifteen military officials, which is only one half of what it had in 1684. The stock had depleted 
immensely, and the goods such as firearms were numbered at one hundred and thirty nine, although 
only twenty-five were operational. The incentive to show that the hinterland military structures 
were increasing in number of personnel and resources signifies improvement of the inland 
colonization. The presídio at Caconda even lists a collection of French guns, suggesting the element 
of victory over the European aggressors. However, categorizing the guns into usable and old may 
indicate that even though the material resources contained in the interior were growing in number, 
they needed an influx of new resources to replace the old in order to continue the militarizing 
hinterland project.                
 The apparent trend of the decadence of the state of the presídios continued throughout this 
period to such a degree, that by the end of Governor Paulo Caetano de Albuquerque’s first triennia 
in 1729, he communicated the neglect and misuse at the hinterland structures through a missive to 
Lisbon. Because the governor’s tenure began in 1726, the document discusses the state of the 
colony until that year, and what he did to improve the situation. By this time, the territory was in 
“such a miserable state for its defense, as well as in equal ruin in the administration of justice, 
towards its total perdition, because the insults, robberies, and disorder lead to its ultimate 
decadence.”
78
 The image constructed of the presídios was that they were not only in decline, but 
many were in atrociously poor condition. The presídio in the Benguela territory was in such poor 
condition, that the number of soldiers was reduced to thirty, there was no medical help available, 
and the walls of the fort were “ruined.” The gate had been unhinged and destroyed, and all the 
artillery was dismounted. African militants in turn killed the captain-major of Benguela, Francisco 
de Souza da Fonseca, as well as five other military officials.
79
 This insinuated that the captain-
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majors injustices towards the natives continued to the degree that they revolted against him, 
especially at the convenience of less troops stationed there.   
 The governor listed a series of things that he attempted to do in order to maintain order and 
upkeep in the presídios, but the rampant misuse was far too prevalent for this to happen. This 
included apprehending a great deal of the military persons. Soldiers at the various presídios were 
robbing in the streets, stealing the equipment from the presídios, and creating havoc amongst the 
people, forcing people out of their houses and stealing their belongings.
80
 The captain-majors 
though, were the most disobedient as “each of them did whatever they felt like, without fear nor 
respect in the <presídios>.”
81
 An embellishment of the likely behavior of the officials, it further 
substantiates their continued tendency to misemploy their positions to the detriment of the 
relationships between the African ‘vassals’ and the Portuguese government.  
 The commonality between the presídios in Massangano, Muxima and Ambaca was that all 
of their walls had literally crumbled to the ground, their soldiers were absent, or were not wearing 
their military clothing, and they had limited artillery and gunpowder. The distressful tone of these 
statements makes it clear that there was a lack of financial resources, but may also speak to the 
africanization of the troops, becoming more integrated in the hinterland societies, and performing in 
ways that were self-serving rather than in the interests of the colony. These forts needed urgent 
repair, and African ‘vassals’ were enlisted as aid, especially because the other European powers 
trading in Loango posed a threat as well. Storage units that did have utilities such as gunpowder 
were exposed to the elements, and were destroyed by rainfall because of the miserable condition of 
the presídios’ roofs. Cassandama was neglected to such a degree, that three of the remaining five 
horses for cavalrymen were too malnourished to ride, and even they did not possess arms or boots, 
“and it was a great mockery when that so-called company arrived.”
82
  
 Knowledge that territorial ‘control’ of Angola was largely confined to the coast, combined 
with the overwhelming usage of vassal language to describe Portuguese relations with the interior 
brings the validity of the documentary content into question. Another aspect is that in order to fuel 
the colonial machine in Angola, constant conflict, mortality, and corruption meant the continual 
need for more financial resources. The document from 1684 coupled an inventory of the different 
presídios with a great deal of vassal language. Military successes were highlighted such as African 
troops and vassals, as well as equipment, yet although this was during a recession in the Portuguese 
empire, they needed commercial stimulus. The second document shows an increase in most cases in 
manpower, but it makes a striking distinction. The document from 1713 categorized the utilities 
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within the presídios into two groups: usable and old. While this differentiation invites one to 
believe that there was an absolute necessity for new resources as a large portion of them was old, it 
reveals the presence of the larger trend of militarization. 
 Firearms were used as examples within the inventories because they were highly valued 
weapons in the colony. They were also consistent with trends among the other objects, and many of 
the other supplies were directly related to guns such as gunpowder and ammunition. By the late 
seventeenth century, guns were a contentious issue in Portuguese Angola. The guns, especially new 
ones such as muskets were considered superior technology to the apparatuses used by the 
Africans.
83
 It was also important for the inland structures to have a large supply of guns because of 
other European powers giving them to the Africans who could thus defend themselves against 
Portuguese retaliation. Old or fewer guns were less intimidating, which was a stark concern for the 
Portuguese. 
 Classifying resources as old creates the need for new goods, but it does not mean that the 
items did not function. This in turn incentivized the metropole to send reinforcements to the colony 
that was undergoing the militarizing process. Regardless of the urgency for aid, this would not 
transmit the element of failure but rather that in order to continue the colonial project in Angola, 
intent to continue the endeavor and extend military force was essential. 1713 was directly after a 
period of intense conflict in the interior, and after costly repairs, showing the need for new material 
was important to continued colonization. The most blatant example of the militarizing trend is 
exemplified in the third document. Governor Albuquerque concurrently demonstrates the 
destruction of the presídios and glorifies his own actions taken in order to improve the colonization 
process in Angola.  n the governor’s characterization of the deplorable conditions of the presídios, 
he discusses personal triumphs performed in order to save them. In reference to Benguela, he stated 
that he traveled there almost immediately in order to help reconstruct the edifice, and even fed the 
soldiers from his own supply.
84
 The governor helped restock the presídio with artillery that he 
brought on his seaward voyage, and enlisted carpenters from his ship to rebuild the razed portions 
of the structure as well as mount the new artillery.
85
 The governor continued by asserting that he 
delegated others to the task of reconstructing the presídios along the Kwanza River, that took four 
months to complete. In addition, he had a bridge constructed at Ambaca that facilitated travel and 
trade to and from the area.
86
 The governor clothed many of the soldiers, and repaired other forts 
along the coast. These improvements that Albuquerque contracted were extremely costly, and the 
                                                 
83
 J. D. Fage, “Slaves and Society in Western Africa, c. 1440-c. 1770,” Journal of African History, 21, 1980, pp. 289-
310, p. 107. 
84
 AHU, Angola, cx. 19, fl. 42, 1713. 
85
 AHU, Angola, cx. 19 fl. 42, 1713. 
86
 AHU, Angola, cx. 19 fl. 42, 1713.  
26 
 
apprehension of criminal acts committed by soldiers diminished the supply. Outlining the expenses 
and increasing need for troops, he implores the authorities to replenish the colony’s assets. 
Governor Albuquerque’s choice of words in his statements of his altruistic actions and attempts to 
help the colony is both desperate and extreme, making it appear as though the colony was in 
shambles, and that if he had the capital, he could fix the problems. 
 The manner in which Governor Albuquerque relays the state of the colony detracts from the 
validity of his statements about the presídios’ conditions. These structures and surrounding 
communities maintained vital importance to the colony’s interior for several decades after his letter, 
which indicates that although he had them repaired they could not have been in such grave disorder. 
However, implicit in this letter is the intent to increase military presence and expenditure. Explicit 
manifestations of decadence in the state of the colony, exclusively referring to military structures, 
while intrinsically rationalizing his militaristic position as governor conveys Albuquerque’s 
intention to incentivize financial support from the central authorities. However, the latent exhibition 
of commercial incentives through building the bridge meant to sustain commercial relationships and 
expediency signifies the important connection between the colony’s colonization efforts and 
commerce. This shows a change in the rhetoric from a primarily militaristic standpoint to a more 
commerce based one. Commerce was mentioned in the previous documents, but the correspondence 
from Governor Albuquerque is more focused on militarism as well as trade. The building of a 
bridge was intended to create more commercial connectivity between the hinterland presídios. 
Mentioning the problems with the soldiers obedience as well as their lack of military clothing 
indicates that they were likely integrating more with the African communities as well as focusing 
on commercial relationships, or taking advantage of their power to indulge in coercive trade. 
Because the coast was largely under Portuguese dominion, the hinterland was in constant need of 
resources. Rather than substantiating a continued decadence in the territorial expansion, especially 
considering the fact that the presídios often required maintenance but were not entirely razed, 
entails the urgency of Crown support in order to further a military agenda. The military agenda as a 
colonial project in the territory enjoying little more than nominal control motivated economic 
sustenance driven towards augmenting the number and size of intimidating structures and troops, 
perhaps even to give more credence to the inaccurate representations of the vassal relationships 
presented to the central authorities. Militarism should also be understood as an economic trend in 
the hinterland that needed constant financial sustenance. In the context of the Angolan presídios, 
militarization had clear economic as well as political and colonial implications.  
 In some cases, the militaristic rhetoric was supported by legitimate concern. Other European 
powers as well as African inhabitants aggressed towards the Portuguese in Angola, whose 
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weakened state required essential defense resources. Primarily the Dutch, French, and British 
empires brought on military intervention. The Dutch sack of Luanda was the first and most 
successful military seizure of Portuguese territory and resources. The strongest hold that the Dutch 
forces had on the Angolan territory preceded the turn of the eighteenth century when they occupied 
Luanda from 1641 until 1648, attempting to forge a direct trade route between Salvador, Brazil and 
Luanda. After the Dutch lost control of the port city, they continued to trade on the northern coast 
of the colony with the Congo, and in Loango.
87
 The three major European empires mentioned 
participated in minatory trade relationships and military impositions on territory that the Portuguese 
considered under their jurisdiction, but the most pertinent to the discussion at hand was the French 
invasion of Benguela. The other major European presence on the Angolan littoral took place on the 
Loango Coast, and will be discussed in the following chapter.   
 The motive for the French attack on Benguela is attributed to international politics in 
Portugal in November of 1700 with the death of Philip II king of Spain. The French proposed the 
Duke of Anjou as the heir to the throne, but this would have greatly altered the European balance of 
power, and placed Spain under French rule. Other European powers such as the Dutch, English, the 
Low Countries, and Portugal supported Archduke Charles of Austria, which brought about the War 
of Spanish Succession in 1701. In 1703 Portugal signed two treatises, one with the English and the 
Low Countries, and one with a more offensive character with the English, Dutch, and Leopold I. As 
these other countries were offensively opposed to France, ipso facto, France became Portugal’s 
adversary rather than ally.
88
 In a retaliatory effort on June 10, 1705, a French naval fleet attacked 
Benguela with “four high board ships” and within two days, by June 12, the French had an army 
500 strong, and within the week counting 1300,
89
 sacked the city. Most structures in Benguela were 
completely razed to an unrecognizable degree, and the presídio headed by captain-major José 
Lourenço that was in fair condition yet poorly stocked and with few soldiers, was destroyed with all 
its contents burnt away. To make matters worse, the “Mandombes that lived next to the presídio 
betrayed <the Portuguese> on this occasion.”
90
 In fact, many of them celebrated the destruction of 
the presídio. By the 30
th
 of the same month after continued theft and pillage, the French left the bay. 
 Following the razzia committed by the French in Benguela, urgent notice was sent to other 
parts of the Angolan territory, first to the Count of Sonyo
91
 to warn of possibly pending attack, and 
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to employ Dutch and English vessels to help in solidarity against their common enemy.
92
 Many 
more troops were necessary for replacing the troops that passed because of the invasion, because 
the “seven presídios and six forts” could not provide the necessary back up, as they were needed to 
maintain order in the hinterland.
93
 The fifty soldiers in Massangano were also sent down to aid 
against the French invaders. Caconda, however, could not respond due to conflict between the 
captain-major and the soldiers, as well as issues raised from violence against the African 
inhabitants.
94
 After this initial attack, the forts and presídios were repaired or reconstructed. 
Subsequently, the presídios in Ambaca and Pedras needed to be refurbished and restocked as a 
result of resources spent in a conflict against Reinha Jinga, D. Veronica de Guterres, after she 
attacked the vassal state of soba Cahenda “without plausible reasons.”
95
 Massangano and Muxima 
also suffered problems that emerged from mistreatment of the Africans by authorities in the 
presídios. Throughout this period, the weakened state of the military forces in Angola was coupled 
with revolts and unrest between the Portuguese and the African states. Difficulties posed by several 
conflicting forces such as the African states and the initial French attack weakened the Portuguese 
military substantially in the political epicenters, and as a result in the periphery. The French army 
was intent on creating a link between Angola and Brazil, and focused more intensively on the other 
side of the Atlantic afterwards. Fear of a French return to Benguela or an attack on Luanda sparked 
the reconstruction and stocking of the presídios, yet there was no further major military threat in 
Angola, aside from commercial proceedings, especially along the Loango Coast. On November 7, 
1712, the French, Spanish, and Portuguese armies signed an accord to cease war for a period of four 
months. On April 11, 1713, a series of negotiations culminating in the Treaty of Utrecht ended the 
war in Europe, and the French hostilities momentarily ceased.
96
 The hostilities caused by the 
French, and subsequently by the African natives were very costly to the military forces in the 
interior for up to a decade afterwards.
97
 Although there were other military altercations between the 
Portuguese and European powers, the French Attack on Benguela was the most damaging to the 
Portuguese peripheral military forces.     
 Aside from these demonstrations of militarization, the language of dominance and 
subjugation is almost always present. This language is manifested in demonstrating the dominant 
nature of the relationship with militaristically charged words. There is no doubt that this period was 
in a constant state of war and fear of invasion throughout the colony, but even in times of peace the 
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language was clear. Interestingly, many of the African natives that were considered vassals served 
as soldiers when necessary, including some cases in which there were “quilambas that serve<d> 
with their people in the wars.”
98
 Although the military employed a great deal of natives used in the 
conquest of other kingdoms or for protection, in some cases such as above, they retaliated when 
opportunity arose. The native soldiers many times outnumbered the Portuguese, and realistically, 
military feats were often accomplished under their terms. 
 The information and requests presented by the governors after further analysis should be 
considered not only as appeasing the crown, but also as cloaking personal motives that contributed 
to the precariousness of the political situation in Angola following such entreaties. Constant 
construction or reconstruction of forts was extremely expensive for the economic resources 
available in Angola, and more capital was constantly required, as Angola suffered a series of 
financial hardships. Many of the troops requested by governors originated in places such as Brazil 
and Madeira. Even troops serving in locations such as Madeira were not prepared for the Angolan 
climate. An overwhelming number of contemporary testimonies showed that the troops that came 
from the archipelago off the African coast died almost immediately after arrival. The troops that 
came to Angola were often “incompetent officials” or “unskilled,” vulnerable to pestilent diseases, 
and as one contemporary stated in 1718, the governors did not appear to choose to send anyone 
“that was not totally ignorant of this profession.”
99
 This was most likely an exaggeration prompted 
by the frustration of receiving troops that could not endure the Angolan conditions, did not have a 
previous military career, or did not achieve the standard of service expected of them but the image 
that the governors upheld was clearly one of militarization. 
Politics and Colonization: Captain-Majors in the Interior 
 The economic impact of colonizing methods such as militarization in the interior is shown 
through the inventories and correspondences from military officials, but the captain-majors much 
like the governors had a wide range of power meant for colonization. The military role of the 
captain-majors actually held a series of unrelated duties due to the fact that it was the highest-
ranking hinterland government position. Their raison d’etre is still largely undefined, but the 
consensus is that the captain-majors used their power in ways that secured commercial profitability. 
 It is curious to note that the meaning of the mechanism of those provisions was never truly reached, nor was 
the motive of mercantile activity of the hinterland authorities, despite their commercial functions having been forbidden 
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by law on August 29, 1720; but this did not  prevent the captain-majors from being attributed, for such motives, to the 




The duties ascribed to this post covered an enormously wide range of tasks that included commerce, 
agriculture, religion, and military spheres. The selection process for this position was that the 
governor proposed a candidate to become captain-major that was in turn reviewed by the Royal 
authorities for a period of twenty days. The captain-major served just as the governors of the 
territory, for triennia. These officials served in two different categories. The first category was the 
captain-major of a jurisdiction
101
 in which he served as a military intermediary between African 
‘vassal’ states and Portuguese settlers, and the second type was of presídios.  
 As discussed above, the presídio was a military structure placed in centers conducive to the 
confluence of commercial goods and networks in the hinterlands of Angola. Here the structures will 
be discussed in relation to the captain-majors. Although the presídios served a primarily military 
function, housing military personnel and intended for defense purposes, the residents by the 
presídios were most concerned with commerce. They were a “model of occupation, created by the 
Portuguese,” that “permitted military occupation,” and the propagation of the Christian faith, in 
order to protect merchants “that did not hesitate to advance into the hinterland to obtain 
merchandise that was indispensable the normal operation of the coastal cities at favorable 
prices.”
102
 In fact, the feiras
103
 were situated adjacent to these structures.  
 The presídios were so far removed from the central power that they adapted to local 
economics and demographics.
104
 Because the interior was still controlled by the African peoples, 
the presídios illuminate the way in which the Portuguese attempted to assume at least nominal 
control of certain areas in the hinterland, dominating fractional areas. The structures acted 
essentially as islands of Portuguese colonization in a sea of African control. The placement of these 
structures gave initially artificial importance to the particular zones that gained importance with 
treatise with African sobas that lead the indigenous populations of the area. The increasing 
importance of the areas ascribed to the presídios, the various direct and indirect military 
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interactions, and the supreme importance of commerce in those areas created a “disaggregate”
105
 
effect in the composition of the African societal structures of the period.  
 The placement and atmosphere of the presídios, and perhaps more importantly the 
demographic chosen to occupy the position of captain-major allows for understanding the origin of 
the immense amount of injustices and atrocities that they committed. Although it is certain that the 
captain-majors abused their power, resulting from the unchecked nature of the deep hinterland, who 
they were is important to discuss. There was not one particular background that was given the post 
of captain-major. Some of the captain-majors were chosen among “filhos da terra,”
106
 who were 
often times African or mulattos
107
 because they were more susceptible to the grueling conditions 
posed by heat that was unbearable for some people that did not grow up with it. Many governors 
chose locals as captain-majors not only because it almost guaranteed that they would be able to 
finish the course of the position, but they also had an intimate knowledge of the terrain, and spoke 
the local language.
108
 In 1697, for example, the presídio das Pedras had vacancies for three 
positions, one of which being the captain-major. In a correspondence from the king to Governor 
Luis Sezar de Maneses, he expresses trust in the governor’s choice to select the people that were 
“most capable for these services.”
109
 Although electing Africans as captain-majors would have been 
a logical choice for governance of the hinterland because of their identity with the locals, this did 
not become particularly frequent until the second half of the eighteenth century. However, it did 
occur because the local residents and governors viewed choosing an African for the position as 
favorable to their acquisition of slaves.
110
 
 Many of the captain-majors arrived in Angola as a foot soldier after having committed a 
serious crime. Convicts in Portugal or Brazil were often sent to Angola as punishment for a period 
of years. Referred to as degredados, the institution of sending convicts to penal colonies dates to the 
beginning of the early modern period. However, in the seventeenth century, Angola became a 
preferred location to send convicts.
111
 When the governors arrived in Angola accompanied by 
soldiers to help replenish the colonial forces, it was common for the vast majority of the soldiers to 
be degredados. For example, one hundred percent of the soldiers that Governor Aires de Saldanha 
de Meneses brought were convicts.
112
 In 1685, Luis Lobo da Silva contended that the vast majority 
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of the soldiers he boasted of bringing were in fact criminals as well.
113
 Henrique de Figueiredo e 
Alarcão’s 1717 arrival to Luanda brought with him a fleet of soldiers that contained merely one 
individual that was not a convict.
114
 This indicates the high number of persons in Angola that were 
forcefully sent there, and the inexperience of the military as a career for those obligated to pursue it. 
Although these criminals were consigned to Angola, they could roam freely throughout the territory 
to which they were sent. Unable to become a state official or assume a local bureaucratic position, 
the prevalence as arriving in the military in essence merged the two identities of soldier and 
convict.
115
 Fulfilling service duties to the empire originally thought of as a way to improve their 
personal behavior and feed the colonies with support, this was conducive to Angola’s constant need 
of reinforcement. The degredados arrived in Angola with such label, and presumably desired to 
break free from the oppression that they suffered from arriving under this circumstance as soon as 
they set foot in Angola. The venture inland freed them from the constraints imposed on the coast, 
and incentivized them almost immediately to begin furnishing commercial ties with others. Soldiers 
in Angola were underpaid, and in some cases far later than expected, which undoubtedly lead them 
to desire to trade goods including contraband. Trading commodities and slaves with credit, and 
accruing personal wealth and interpersonal business relationships, eventually “such a successful 
trader would have become a large and favored customer of his commercial backers in Luanda, or 
Benguela, and perhaps even a <captain-major>...appointed by the Angolan governors to command 
an important district in the colony’s interior.”
116
 The degredados were uncommitted to the 
wellbeing of their communities, and heavily focused on maximizing their own profits, and even as 
captain-majors were willing to break the law if it meant capital gain.
117
 Once the captain-majors as 
well as officials in other ranks began a career in the interior, the prospect of leaving or even 
returning to Portugal became improbable. The isolation in the interior clearly had an effect on the 
resident soldiers, to the extent that many of them that originated elsewhere chose to leave their 
positions and remain in the hinterland to live amongst the African communities. The issue of 
renegade soldiers in Angola became so pronounced, that by 1692, the Overseas Council became 
concerned with the growing number of military personnel that left their post to live amongst the 
Africans in the interior.
118
 There was already an insufficient number of hinterland soldiers and with 
the vast majority forced rather than electing to go there, the preoccupations were legitimate, 
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especially because the will to leave military posts to live among the Africans shows a failing 
colonizing force. 
 Marrying women from within the native population promised an even longer stay in the 
hinterland, in some cases indefinite. This contributes to explain the fact that many of the captain-
majors focused more on their commercial relationships, and violence towards dissent than on 
Crown interests. Mamedy Alvarez da Guerra for example, by 1703 had married within the 
community at Massangano, and although he was well mannered, did not appear to be carrying out 
his duties or making an effort to delegate construction of new forts or other structures for the 
Portuguese in the district.
119
 The extreme seclusion in places with primarily African populations 
and birthing biracial and by virtue bicultural children, coupled with little to gain from remaining 
linked to the Portuguese army would have led them to focus on trade that became easier as they 
identified increasingly as intermediaries between the Portuguese and Africans.  
 After these military personnel served the colony for an extended period of time, they would 
have made a commercial name for themselves and become a part of the hinterland communities. 
These economically ambitious and connected individuals may also have harbored resentment 
towards the Portuguese crown after being forced to leave their homeland, or assessed that there 
were few benefits to being restricted by the Portuguese commercial and military policies, leading 
some of the captain-majors to leave their post and remain in the interior. The absence of prior 
military training and interest in the institution lead many of the convicts to entirely desert the 
profession and remain as merchants in the communities. Another demographic that many of the 
captain-majors would have been chosen from were lançados. On a general note, the lançados were 
people that fled inland from the African coast, and integrated into the African communities.
120
 They 
were originally of European blood, whose descendants became mulattos, as the majority of them 
married into the African communities that they escaped to.  
 Upon settlement in the African communities, the lançados integrated themselves and 
became acculturated into the African way of life and language. These people opted to flee into the 
hinterland for a plethora of reasons, but the primary objective was to escape persecution that they 
were condemned to suffer on the more densely European populated coast. The motives ranged from 
religious oppression or royal decrees to commercial regulations. Lançados came to be understood 
as brokers that were essential in linking trade relations between the Portuguese and Africans.
121
 
These Portuguese settlers and their descendants were less mobile than other traders, and 
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commercially adept, which would have been an ideal trait for captain-majors. The reasons that the 
lançados often fled largely led to their public image as “delinquents”
122
 because of their frequently 
criminal past.  
 After extensive time in the Angolan hinterland, the lançados adopted African customs such 
as language, religion, dress, and other cultural traits. The transferal of their values from European to 
African may have created a crisis of faith. António Carreira attributes this to the “degradation” of 
their Christian ethics.
123
 It is unlikely that the loss of their Christian code of ethics is what lead them 
to conduct commerce in unethical and violent ways, however it is probable that the lançados lost 
their European culture through adopting African characteristics, leading to lesser allegiance to the 
Portuguese crown and other institutions. As such, they became intermediaries between national and 
foreign merchants, and the local sobas in the trade of goods and slaves.
124
 The loss of Portuguese 
identity allowed greater freedom of choice in their relationships with other nationalities and 
peoples, a higher income, and simply the ability to integrate easier into the communities they took 
residence in. The lançados were known to trade in unethical ways, as well as willingly trade with 
other European nations against the Portuguese best interest.
125
 The unethical trading habits and 
connection to the local area is consistent with the captain-majors’ behavior, and a lucrative option 
for the governors in office.  
 Regardless of the consideration that many of the captain-majors may have been degredados, 
descendants of lançados or Africans, candidates for the position often served for several years in the 
military forces once in Angola, occasionally within the jurisdiction for which they applied to the 
post. Although this is ascertained through correspondence between the crown and authorities in 
Angola in which military service would have been strongly emphasized, candidates for the position 
formerly held other prestigious positions. Antonio Vas de Sylvera, for example, who was a 
candidate for captain-major of Ambaca in 1707, and served for thirteen years in Angola prior to this 
as a soldier, lieutenant, and captain at Caconda, as well as sergeant-major at Benguela.
126
 Among 
notable qualities listed about Sylvera were that he served as an “example to others in obeying his 
superiors.”
127
 The opponent, Manoel Florim Correa was in greater favor with the local authorities. 
Serving in Angola for fifteen years, he had been a soldier, a lieutenant of the infantry, lieutenant to 
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the mestre de campo, captain of the district of Massangano, and captain-major of the presídio of 
Cambambe, chosen by the governor.
128
  
  n addition to Correa’s previous posts, he guarded the slave ship Santiago for several days 
and accommodated it while they loaded human cargo. In 1692, he waged war against the Dembo 
Ambuila, creating a hostile altercation in which many people were killed, and resources were 
burned. By 1693 in continued war and conflict, it was resolved through force and slaves were 
offered to the Portuguese.
129
 The residing council’s first choice was Sylvera, whereas the Count of 
Alvor’s choice was Correa. This shows not just a conflict of interest, but that the municipal 
authorities desired an obedient and “just” leader, whereas the royal authority desired one that 
clearly caused conflict amongst the African populous.
130
 The governor had previously appointed 
both of the men to their positions. This does not necessarily mean that the Municipal Council did 
not want a war inclined individual, as the council had voted for Francisco Mogo de Melo for the 
position of captain-major of the presídio at Caconda in 1704 because he had been courageous and 
wounded in battle.
131
 What this may indicate, however, is that the royal authorities were more 
interested in territorial control, whereas the municipal council, aware of injustices caused by the 
captain-majors were more disposed to choosing someone with higher moral character although this 
may also indicate that they preferred a just individual that would not impinge upon their own 
commercial aspirations.  
 Because the presídios were so far removed from the Luanda, they were able to assume a 
different character that was often one of hybridity between the local population and the Portuguese 
residents. The living conditions were extremely taxing due to the heat, and although the Presídios 
were placed near rivers
132
 as a result, water was still in constant demand. It was difficult to arrive to 
the Presídios through the expanse of the hinterland, which only added to their isolated state. This 
may have been a major contributing factor regarding the demographic within which captain-majors 
were chosen. In fact, the people that frequented the presídios were often men with great experience, 
accustomed to taking chances, seeking adventure,
133
 and in search of personal fortune.
134
  
 The captain-majors having an exclusively military education if any were not prepared for 
agricultural duties especially because of the frequently poor conditions. The same can be said for 
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their experience in other realms within their duties. However, their involvement in commerce was 
clearly a defining factor in their selection. The governors appointed favored merchants to the post in 
the hinterland in order to facilitate the governors’ personal business. When the relationships 
between the captain-majors and the African populations worsened, the governors often instructed 
them to retaliate with military force, which inevitably resulted in the capture and sale of additional 
slaves.
135
 By the second quarter of the eighteenth century, after the atmosphere that was previously 
understood as a period of constant war and slave seizures, this tactic slowed slightly as the slaving 
frontier moved inland,
136
 and their modus operandi for acquisition evolved from the use of military 
methods to capture slaves, to those akin to commercial slaving such as debt. In addition to the 
governors, many merchants from overseas even created relationships with the hinterland officials, 
incentivizing them to become their trade agents. This transition occurred for a number of reasons, 
but the paramount causes were the growing influx of firearms sold by other European powers to the 
Africans who could from then on better defend themselves, especially new legislation that restricted 
the officials from their most desirable commercial relationships. 
 A missive from March of 1703, in relating the death toll of military personnel, protests the 
warring tendencies of the captain-majors. The author concedes that commerce in the hinterland 
became very weak, and that the markets were unsuccessful.
137
 This trend appears to fluctuate over 
time, and there were probably many contributing factors, but he indicates the most salient reason to 
be the Captain-majors. The governors’ commerce enacted through such ‘commissaries,’ allowed for 
their resources to be traded through violence toward the sobas, giving their goods priority in the 
marketplace. The goods traded by the captain-majors to the sobas were often older and lesser 
quality goods, forced upon them in exchange for slaves.
138
 Recognizing that this was not in the 
sobas’ interests, it was clear that commerce could not easily proceed without consent from the 
captain-majors. If the Africans trading with these men did not comply with their orders, the captain-
majors would “respond with war.”
139
  
 A letter from a Florentine Capuchin missionary, Friar Antonio Maria working at the hospital 
in Massangano servicing soldiers in need of medical attention from the presídios along the Kwanza 
River laid testimony to the damage that the captain-majors were committing through war 
techniques. Complaining that no one with medical experience desired to serve in the hospital 
because of fear of the danger raised by the omnipresence of criminal activity, he blames the 
hardships on the captain-majors’ behavior. The friar states that the goods regulated and traded by 
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these military officials were the sources of violence towards the sobas, and that freedom of choice 
was not offered to the African leaders in accepting the trade goods in exchange for slaves. This 
warring violence not only caused damage to personal belongings, but was prejudicial to the 
relationship between the Portuguese and their relations with Africans, as the friar contends that this 
caused many of the Africans to flee to “enemies” of the Portuguese.
140
  
 Captain-majors essentially held a monopolistic role controlling the influx and export of trade 
goods and slaves from their respective jurisdictions. By the eighteenth century, the captain-majors 
used contacts they had gained in the trading networks to secure goods and profitable slave trades. 
This allowed for extending the commercial diaspora throughout the hinterland, and merchants from 
the coast were forced to exchange goods under the captain-majors’ own terms, creating various 
conflicts among the different trading groups.
141
 Such power permitted these military officials to 
devastate entire areas with their military force, and use others in their jurisdictions to exchange or 
transport their goods at unfair rates. However, this misconduct did not go unnoticed, and the 
Municipal Council took strides to limit the captain-majors’ authority. 
 On April 22, 1702, a letter from the Municipal Council to the traditional authorities relayed 
the gravity of the abuses committed by the captain-majors at their stations in the hinterland. The 
Municipal Council began by stating that they received notice in reference to the disregard and 
damage caused by them for years, and the Governors should have been more obedient for the 
peoples’ sake, giving only special authorization to those that enter the hinterlands.  
 The <captain-majors> have faded their diligence and negotiation of that fortune, having  introduced damaging 
abuse with some insignias, and names of captain-majors, that aside from having usurped the power and dominion of 
Your Majesty, they have attenuated and destroyed this kingdom, and must stop using it in the <jurisdictions>; because 
all of the wars that have occurred are born out of such occupations because they have no more merits than the quantity 
of their goods or bundles.
142
 
The captain-majors had indulged in such severe misconduct, that they were accused not only of 
having abused the power given by the Crown, but that they had damaged the entirety of the colony.  
The letter accuses them of being the reason that many of the wars occurred because their only 
qualifications appear to be their commercial prowess. The letter continues on to describe their 
extremely violent actions, “depopulating” the hinterlands, which also hurt missionary work being 
done in those areas.
143
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 The situation was so atrocious that the Municipal Council essentially pleaded with the 
Crown to strip the captain-majors of districts entirely, and require the captain-majors of presídios to 
have residências.
144
 In fact, the captain-majors of the districts had previously been clerks 
(escrivães). These clerks in hopes of becoming more powerful and respected within their districts, 
wanted to use the insignia of the captain-majors. Soon after wielding such social power, these 
officials began to heinously abuse their positions, ruining relationships with local peoples, as well 
as with the central government. 
 Months later, the Municipal Council published a public announcement (bando) throughout 
the city of Luanda, as well as the presídios and districts in the hinterland on their own volition. The 
public announcement was disseminated on January 26, 1703. Speaking of damage done to the 
“common good” of the people of the territory, a statute from 1676 was brought up to the central 
authorities in order to remind them of its existence and implications.
145
 Chapter XVIII of the 
regimento assigned to governor Aires de Saldanha de Meneses on February 12 of that year required 
the governor to disallow entrance of anyone into the hinterland of Angola of European, mixed, or 
African decent, yet Africans devoid of military insignia were allowed to enter.
146
 
 The announcement condemns the “false pretexts” of the military rank that allowed the 
captain-majors to exploit their power for personal ends using crude levels of violence. The behavior 
of ignoring their orders enormously harmed the “vassal sobas...through the injustices committed 
towards them.”
147
 Although the public announcement is primarily directed towards the captain-
major, the Municipal Council states that the Governor is involved in the corruption. The Municipal 
Council forcefully asserts that chapter XVIII of the document was not being observed at all, and 
that the governors were harming the kingdom’s vassal sobas by allowing people into the hinterland 
that partook in calamitous injustices, and were often individuals unwelcome in the interior. The 
captain-majors that had essentially become intermediaries between the kingdom and the African 
population doing the governors’ business transporting goods obligated Africans to transport goods 
by physical force “without compensating them for their work.”
148
 When these men arrived to the 
different districts, they would divide the goods that made it to the destination into bundles 
(Banzos).
149
 These bundles were subsequently used in exchange for slaves among people in the 
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region, and the goods were mischaracterized as being more valuable or exotic than they were in 
actuality. In turn these goods were traded for Africans in the region to become enslaved.  
 All of the captain-majors in the region were to be sent back to Luanda and stripped of their 
position. This did not apply to the captain-majors of the presídios, but those of the jurisdictions such 
as in the Sobingo, the Ecolo, and the Dande were given four months since the publication of the 
announcement to submit. People who did not comply with the order, including anyone without an 
insignia was “rigorously punished” for their disobedient acts.
150
 Three weeks later, on February 
15th, the Municipal Council sent yet another letter to the Overseas Council saying that the public 
announcement had been published and put into action. The captain-majors had drawn numerous 




 The primary reason that many of the vassal states reacted with uprising and war was because 
of the usurpation of their resources and violence caused by the captain-majors, and because the 
governors upon hearing of these uprisings, mandated retaliation efforts rather than other problem 
solving tactics. The retaliation was performed through war, and the captain-majors were blamed for 
the unrest. The Council maintained that “of all the wars that have occurred in this kingdom, the 
<captain-majors> are the principal origin.”
152
 The colony depended on war for its colonization 
efforts, but it was absolutely necessary that these people were prohibited from entering the 
hinterlands, and thus chapter eighteen must be observed.  
 Finally, on June eighth of the same year, the Council received a response. This response was 
in full accord with the Council officials. Highlighting the corruption caused by the military ranks, 
the central authorities stated that the various upheavals exasperated the African communities and 
contributed to the colony’s military and political decadence. Thus, the captain-majors of the 
districts should cease to exist. The old post of the clerk should replace the military post in the 
peripheral communities. The clerks were to hold no other titles than this, and would serve merely to 
“give notice to the governors about things that happened.”
153
 They should henceforth be used solely 
to relay information about the mistreatment of the Africans, and general movements of the people 
throughout the areas. If this endeavor had come into fruition, it would have been a success for the 
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merchants in the council for two reasons. After recalling the captain-majors from their positions, 
they could send clerks in of their choice that would more accurately and meticulously log 
commercial transactions (and debts owed to council members), stripping the governor of his 
collusion with the former officials, allowing more egalitarian trading arrangements in their favor. 
This would also curb the military raids harming Lisbon’s commercial methods,
154
 thus transitioning 
from militarism to a more capitalistic practice.   
 The continual phenomenon of trade commissioned by the governors was witnessed though 
several contemporary communiqués, maintaining that commerce dictated by the governors was so 
detrimental that it proved more injurious than in “any other conquest.”
155
 In many places, this 
preferential commerce weakened trade in the feiras, making them only marginally profitable, in that 
“their commissioners, the captain-majors of the presídios” that disrespected the sobas throughout 
their jurisdictions were able to employ the vast amount of bundles sent by the governor to these 
areas.
156
 The governors’ goods were often more valuable than the goods brought by pumbeiros 
owned by private merchants,
157
 and were able to buy a higher quantity of slaves. 
 The sources transmit perplexity over why this was continuing to happen, as the Municipal 
Council had already sent a notice to the central authorities asking for governors to be prohibited 
from indulging in commerce.
158
 Although the central authorities acknowledged this by June 9th, 
1703, it was not being observed. Instead of the governor’s commerce “outside of contract,” if the 
inhabitants were able to send pombeiros into the territory to engage in trade, it would help the 
vassal states and the other traders, and promote free trade.  f the system were fairer, “with this 
voluntary commerce, there would be no wars, and everything would improve, in particular, the 
royal endowment would benefit greatly.”
159
 The governors were indirectly creating conflict and 
wars through commerce that was ruining the relationships between inhabitants in the territory, but 
this persisted for a great deal of time. 
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 A law was instituted on August 29, 1720 that prohibited the governors and all other public 
officials from engaging in commerce in the overseas.
160
 This law, stating that the legal ability to 
engage in commerce reinstated on November 26, 1709 was an egregious mistake, and that because 
of the issues caused by preferential and personal commerce, the government officials were to cease 
all commercial activity.
161
 The decree encompasses all government officials including and above 
the rank of captain, and asserts that no one that falls under these stipulations may participate in 
commerce “for themselves or for others.”
162
 They can no longer be included in commercial 
contracts in any way on land or in regard to commercial ships destined for other parts of the 
kingdom.  
 Despite this prohibition causing a significant decrease, by 1724, the governors were still 
somewhat engaged in illicit commerce. Josepeda Roza Coutinho, the clerk of the royal endowment 
of Angola, cited many letters from the administrators of the royal contract of Angola from 1714 
until that year, demonstrating blatant discontent for the injustices and unfair nature of the trade.
163
 
The collusion between the governors and the captain-majors reached the point where they were 
dividing goods between themselves and “trusted sobas” acquired from people that passed away in 
the hinterlands.
164
 Because Angola’s conditions were so poor, and many people died soon after 
arrival, especially if they left Luanda, people could take advantage of them as well as their 
belongings. The officials trading such goods forced the sobas “to take the goods that they were 
given, obligating them to pay in the correct number of slaves.”
165
 In fact, these military officials 
made the sobas believe that the goods were from the king, demanding that they be compensated 
with a greater quantity of slaves than the real value of the slaves could actually provide for.
166
 The 
fact that this forced slave trade was being pushed by the governors and that goods were stolen from 
deceased merchants made it virtually impossible to imagine that there could be any other sustained 
forms of industry or trade relationships.
167
 Perhaps the most succinct way of describing the situation 
created by such ludicrous corruption and self-serving trade was that “everyone says that having 
goods outside of Luanda was the same as losing them.”
168
 The hinterland trade became so high-risk 
that any increase in income could be instantly lost because of the nature of the trade.  
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 A series of implications regarding the law condemning commerce by government officials 
after 1720 can be extrapolated. The intention to strip the captain-majors of their insignias at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, although unsuccessful, shows an implicit reluctance that the 
Crown held to hold the governors responsible for their actions, while the captain-majors were easier 
targets. The possible elimination of the trade intermediary would have been a less intrusive way to 
brindle their commercial activities. The law cites attempts to permit the governors to seek 
supplementary incomes, but it was abused to too great an extent. While this mandate excluded the 
governors from trade, it raised their salaries to several times the previous amount. Clearly 
encouragement to be content with a higher salary so as not to seek financial resources elsewhere, it 
was also a way to attract more obedient gubernatorial candidates
169
 that would enforce royal 
dictates in the future. With this law, the militaristic methods of slaving became less pertinent as a 
slave acquisition method contributing to the aforementioned shift the captain-majors dealt with 
from military raids to credit. The law can also be viewed as a step in the direction of ‘free trade,’ 
stripping the governors of the comparative advantage enjoyed through using captain-majors as their 
trade intermediaries in the Angolan hinterland. This mandate did not only affect the interior. It 
impeded governors from sending their own ships, or colluding with officials in other colonies. 
However, the degree to which the captain-majors and governors traded in the interior was evinced 
when they were forced to stop doing so.  
Conclusion 
 Colonization in Angola at the turn of the eighteenth century is most applicable to the 
relationships between the Portuguese and Africans in the hinterland communities. At this time, 
Luanda and the surrounding area was the only location that was entirely under Portuguese control. 
The capital city was the center of political and commercial consolidation, yet even then enjoyed a 
plurality of identities and languages. The highest colonial authority in the territory was the 
governor-general, though other judicial and municipal authorities were created prior to this time. By 
virtue of the governor’s preeminent position in the territory, the colony assumed a militaristic 
nature. Ranking under the governor was the captain-major who was the military leader of presídios 
and other districts in the interior of the colony.  
 The presidios were military structures that were strategically placed in locations conducive 
to water sources, indigenous communities, and commercial networks. This allowed for Portuguese 
persons to create a presence inland from the coast, most predominantly along the Kwanza River. 
Because the hinterland bases were not always placed in the political epicenter of the African 
communities, they played an effective role as a disaggregate force in the composition of the African 
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kingdoms. The African populations in the interior became increasingly accustomed to European 
goods and commercial relationships. The Portuguese jurisdictions became significant trade centers, 
which made the Africans value those locations and markets, as well as alter their commercial 
ideologies to accommodate the sale of slaves and other goods.   
 The Africans became accustomed to European goods, but they continued to dominate the 
hinterland. Vassal language used in Portuguese documentation in reference to them used 
phraseology of conquest, but it was uncharacteristic of the reality of the relationship for the 
majority of African communities. As the hinterland became more lucrative as a trade sector, the 
governors began to capitalize on trade intermediaries for personal means. The Crown elected 
trusted individuals to the post to work for the empire’s best interest, but when the governor’s 
arrived in Angola, many of them supplemented their salaries with commerce, using the captain-
majors as their trade intermediaries. This trade collusion was prejudicial to the relationship between 
the Africans and the Portuguese in the interior because the captain-majors abused their authority by 
using gratuitous violence towards the inhabitants in their districts. The trade in the hinterland was 
overwhelmingly connected to the acquisition of slaves, and in order to accrue as many slaves as 
possible to meet the demand on the coast, the captain-majors used a policy of warring and hostility. 
They purchased goods and slaves at comparatively unfair prices using physically coercive methods, 
inevitably reselling them to the governors. This relationship was one of the most important of the 
period, contributing to immense amounts of problems in the colonizing effort.  
 The governors were chosen to work strictly within the Crown’s interests, especially as these 
men had defended the Crown on the battlefield in previous positions. The governors always 
exhibited their allegiance in their correspondence with the Crown before and after arriving in 
Angola. However, upon arrival, they capitalized on their authority and supplemented their incomes 
with trade. The governors’ opportunism and personal motives in the colonial commerce, although 
unintentionally damaging the colony, created a series of conflicts that proved cataclysmic to 
hinterland relations. The governors either chose or suggested captain-majors for the hinterland 
positions. As a result, the governors were able to elect individuals that worked in the governors’ 
favor, serving essentially as trade agents for the governors in the interior.  
 The case of the Captain-major is distinctive in that they were forced to work simultaneously 
within a series of forces, yet their background corroborates their conduct in the hinterland. A high 
percentage of soldiers sent to Angola were mandated by force, especially those that had committed 
violent crimes. Because many of the captain-majors began as soldiers in Angola, climbing up the 
ranks to the hinterland position, it speaks to the moral character of the individual. The propensity to 
respond to conflict with extreme violence, or use violence to ensure favorable outcomes in 
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commercial transactions, would have been more natural to a person of this type. The governors 
chose ambitious individuals whom had shown great commercial promise, and the combination of 
violence and commercial savvy were predominant among these men. However, an additional reason 
that the captain-majors’ deplorable actions contributed to the situation in the hinterland is an 
increasing trend of Africanization. The captain-majors were in the hinterland for extended periods 
of time, immersed in an overwhelmingly native population that drove them to adopt African 
customs and language. Their low salaries, isolation from the coast, and commercial connectedness, 
as well as marriage into the African communities may have contributed to the loss of allegiance to 
Portugal and to their military duties, making their primary focus personal commerce. Without the 
strict imperial regulations, they could trade with the other African communities and even other 
European powers, furnishing trade connections rather than focusing on their military duties. 
However, Africanization from the colonial Portuguese perspective could have been viewed as 
corrupt or violent simply because the officials did not act in the best interest of the Portuguese. 
 Authorities such as the municipal council attempted to end the abuses committed by the 
captain-majors, but it did not come into fruition. The council cited the violence and war tactics that 
they committed towards the African populous, but an additional impetus to these actions was likely 
to stop the monopolistic nature of the trade between the governors and captain-majors, as many 
council members were traders as well. The most successful regulation was the law in 1720 that 
prohibited colonial officials from commerce. This law attempted to curb the focus on commerce 
demonstrated by the military personnel and make trade more accessible to others, and it coincided 
with a move towards using credit rather than warring raids to capture slaves in the interior.  
 Concurrent with commerce in the interior was a growing need for military resources to 
continue the colonial military project. However, the strained relations resulting from violence 
impeded progress as well as financial standing. European aggression, such as from the French in 
1705 showed the connectedness of the hinterland outposts amongst themselves and to the coast. The 
French attack depleted much of the resources from the presídios, and the native populations turned 
on the Portuguese. In order to justify the use of the presídios, and their reconstruction, the structures 
were characterized as being in terrible condition, and lacking resources. Governor Albuquerque, for 
example, describes the destruction of the military edifices, yet demonstrates what measures he had 
taken to improve the colony. This justifies the allocation of increased financial support for the 
militarization of the colony after showing that the poor situation of the hinterland was due not to 
lack of intent or malpractice, but rather to the need for capital. It also shows a movement from 
purely military focus to a more commercial based rhetoric. The subservient rhetoric used by the 
governors to the king evinces a justification of their own actions and the desire to show their 
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allegiance to the military cause, while they were also hampering the process through their personal 
commercial endeavors.  
 These economic trends of the Angolan interior indicate that there were conflicting personal 
and colonial interests. The captain-majors and the governors’ commercial relationships were 
detrimental to the colonization in the interior. The purpose of their positions, and the reality of their 
conduct conflicted, and it was regressive to the interior relations. Although checks and balances 
were instituted to curb these issues, it is clear that individual interests were in line with the 
governors’ exaggerations and misrepresentations sent to the central authorities that showed 
justification for an increase in military force and expenditure as the colonial project continued. It is 
curious that the hinterland officials that the governors’ appointed were in large part to blame for the 
deplorable state of the interior as a result of commercial incentives.  
 Colonization of the hinterland in Angola was marked by violent acts committed by military 
officials. The militarization of the interior that required economic backing from the state, and 
commercial exclusivity marked by trade collusions between the governors and captain-majors were 
the major economic trends of the time. Although much of the socio-political difficulties of the 
period can be attributed to the captain-majors, their actions were permissible until the 1720’s that 
caused them to use credit agreements to engage in illicit commerce rather than war. As much as the 
use of force and violence was detrimental to the relationship with African peoples, it was an 
effective method of securing goods and slaves. Their relationship to the governors would have been 
an attractive opportunity rather than an indication of corruption. Trade with foreigners, or using 
their status to improve their commercial relations is consistent with the fact that the harsh 
conditions that the captain-majors lived under in the hinterland made survival and safeguarding 
their commercial activities the top priority. The distance from the metropole, and even from 
Luanda, would have diminished their allegiance to the Crown, and contributed to the africanization 
that many of them experienced. When other political forces complained, or attempted to discontinue 
these commercial advantages such as the Municipal Council, a shrouded motive would certainly 
have been the opportunity for themselves to gain greater access to commercial relations. However, 
it is clear that the Angolan hinterland at the turn of the eighteenth century until the 1720’s was a 
period of violent colonization efforts, and exclusionary commerce. 








Commerce and the Angolan Coast 
 The turn of the eighteenth century on the coast of Angola was largely defined by 
commercial relationships. From traders connecting the Angolan hinterland to Luanda, to large-scale 
businessmen connecting the coast of Angola throughout the Atlantic, trade held a central focus and 
dependency in the livelihood of the inhabitants. Merchants in Angola performed a diversity of tasks 
within myriad subgroups whose agglomeration made the network possible. Several ports along the 
Angolan coast were instrumental to the local and imperial economy, and each subsector operated as 
a constituent of the Angolan colonial commercial composite regarding commercial actors, territory, 
products, or means of transport. 
 This chapter will focus on commerce on the Angolan coast throughout this period. An 
analysis of the commercial actors at the distinct trade levels serves to understand the system in its 
entirety. This also exposes important links and relations between the Angolan hinterland and the 
coast. The different demographics that comprised the trade networks were socially and categorically 
distinct groups that traded under differing conditions and circumstances. The smaller scale porters 
and traders exchanged goods in the interior and brought them to larger commercial centers, and 
eventually the coast where merchants trading in larger volume transported them to places such as 
Brazil. Credit was essential to the growth of the merchant capitalist market and the transfer of goods 
in Angola. 
 Credit was a means for bankers and high-volume merchants to inject large amounts of 
capital into the circulation of trade goods. The local currencies in Angola proved insufficient for 
commercial growth, and although monetary changes were made, credit ranging from small-scale 
 OU’s to large-scale credit arrangements provided the means for commercial growth in the territory, 
as well as individual net worth. The potential for capital growth attracted businessmen to the colony 
that supported the transportation of goods, especially in relation to slaves. Slave export was 
protected under monopoly rights ceded by the Crown to an individual through a royal tax-farming 
contract. The contracts allowed the recipient to collect taxes on each slave and award licensure to 
business associates to become factors and purveyors, as well as hold exclusive privileges to trade 
within the constraints of the monopoly. The privileged position that the monopoly rights provided 
for the coastal traders came at an annual cost that was primarily used to sustain political and 
municipal functions in Angola. This requirement evinces the significant and inextricable link 
between the commercial and political spheres. This link is substantiated in a major conflict that 
occurred in Loango.  
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 Loango was a region of Angola that was abundant in raw materials and human cargo that 
were essential to feeding the contracts in Luanda. Loango was included amongst the regions of 
Angola that included the Kongo and Benguela as well, although Portuguese colonization efforts had 
been less successful there. The coastal indigenous communities still set the terms for trade, and 
other European empires traded widely throughout the Loango Coast. Portugal did not have a 
military presence in Loango, and the turn of the eighteenth century experienced intensification of 
English trade on the region’s coastal trade ports. Beginning with English merchants sending African 
porters into Portuguese jurisdiction, the rivalry culminated in an English fort built by the port at 
Cabinda. Faced with the threat of an English monopoly in Cabinda with potential to spread beyond 
such port, Portuguese naval forces sacked the fortification. Portuguese perception viewed the 
Loango Coast as theirs due to centuries of prior contact, and the commercial importance that 
Loango exhibited demonstrated that the loss of trade relationships in the area would be to not only 
commercial, but political and colonial detriment as well.    
Commercial Actors in Angola 
 Because trade in the interior was largely under African terms of conduct, no unauthorized 
Europeans were allowed into the hinterland. In order to trade in the interior at the commercial 
centers, trade agents were an integral part of supplying the coastal demand for products unattainable 
at ports such as Luanda. The most common trade agent that serviced the export ports were whom 
contemporaries referred to as pombeiros, as mentioned in the first chapter. The pombeiros were the 
most common and most essential trade intermediaries in Angola that furnished the market 
commodities from the deep interior to the Angolan littoral. The term originated in the fifteenth 
century,
170
 and is derived from the Mpumbu market that was located by the Stanley Pool.
171
 The 
word was used most widely up until the first quarter of the eighteenth century, when new 
appellations appeared that were ascribed to similar commercial roles. Rather than further 
differentiation or stratification as commercialization of the hinterland progressed, this indicated that 
the designation pombeiro was probably used as a blanket term that signified any sort of trade 
intermediary that frequented the markets intending to exchange raw materials for slaves.  
 These trade intermediaries began as an important link between the Mpumbu market and São 
Salvador, beginning their denotation as a commercial transporter of goods. Itinerant traders such as 
them carried small volumes of goods that were inevitably traded for slaves, coming into contact 
with foreigners from various European and African nations. Such contact was often necessary 
because the bundles that the pumbeiros traded for slaves were often so diverse in terms of products 
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they contained that the bundles could not be assembled without multiple commercial interactions, 
expanding trade networks even further. Drifting between districts, they were the ideal demographic 
to perform commercial transactions. They identified with the African populous, spoke the native 
languages, and ascribed to the African customs and cultures.  
 The eighteenth century drew a fundamental change in the way that the pombeiros were 
societally viewed. Strikingly emblematic of penetration into the Angolan interior, they were revered 
as path makers and explorers, as distances between markets grew deeper inland. Some relate the 
pombeiros to other worldwide trends of those who extended into the interior regions from other 
coastal areas. Likenesses made are to the American cowboy, the Brazilian bandeirante, French 
Canadian coureurs des bois, or the argentine gaucho.
172
 Although the aforementioned social groups 
assumed an exploratory and nomadic nature, they are somewhat disanalogous to the pombeiros. The 
other examples did not always have a continued relationship with the coast, were not always native 
to the region, or intimately associated with commerce. Above all, the pombeiros were Africans, and 
although they were useful in forging new transport routes and methods, trade was their principle 
objective, and they were already a part of the African culture. The pombeiros’ utility originated in 
the fact that they were already a part of the African community, and the adaptation process was 
irrelevant. A distinguishing characteristic of the pumbeiros was that they did not wear European 
style clothing such as shoes.
173
 As the African’s still essentially controlled the interior, 
characteristics such as footwear were included amongst the characteristics disallowed inland that 
were viewed as European influence.  
 By the end of the seventeenth century, the pombeiros lost much of their illustriousness as 
pioneering hinterland traders, although they retained their original commercial function. The 
intrusion of foreign capital and competition, as well as expanding trade routes and the rise of 
slaving caravans decreased their competitive advantage. They became associated with the lowest 
ranks of the Angolan society, and were either commissioned to trade at commercial centers between 
shorter distances, or were simply slaves of Luanda merchants for whom the pombeiros negotiated. 
Although the pombeiros were the most common, similar traders existed as well. Aviados were 
traders that did not have their own capital either, but were distinguishable by their use of footwear, 
signifying a more Europeanized trader.
174
 Etymologically speaking, the Portuguese origin is the 
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verb ‘aviar,’ in this context meaning dispatch. The Aviados, or ‘dispatched men’ worked more 
closely with the Portuguese as traders, and were often appointed by local merchants.
175
 
 A myriad of distinct tasks and positions existed in Angola that were directly connected to 
commerce beyond African inhabitants that merged with the Portuguese system. In addition to 
contracted porters and market traders, other individuals traded in larger volume and lived in coastal 
communities. Many of these people were slave owners that supplied Luanda with human cargo, or 
maintained them for personal purposes in the colony. The plurality or hybridity of identities 
amongst settlers that resided in Angola and the various backgrounds from which they came inhibits 
clear definitions of sub-cultures or groups. Many academics have opted to group these inhabitants 
of Angola under the general term ‘Luso-African’. The primary function of the distinction is the 
differentiation between Portuguese persons that spent most, or the entirety of their lives in Angola, 
or were of Portuguese decent that most often had one African parent, and Portuguese merchants 
coming directly from the metropole. Many of the Luso-Africans were Portuguese or Brazilian born 
traders that settled in Angola and “made a life of trade.”
176
 They were also individuals born on the 
African continent that emphasized their putative descent from Portuguese merchants.
177
 The term 
‘Luso-African’ is ascribed to various groups of trading individuals, and many of them were mixed 
race, lived in the Angolan interior, spoke Kimbundo at home, and Portuguese as their business 
language.
178
 These individuals were not only eager to become involved in the slave trade through 
contractual agreements or sales as well as direct slave ownership, but owned their own slaves that 
worked for them or on farms (arimos)
179
 although not all that worked there were slaves. Some 
Luso-Africans that lived in Luanda owned land with this purpose in the Dande, Icolo, or Bengo 
regions.
180
 The Luso-Africans were crucial to the commercial sector in Angola, and in creating a 
Portuguese-African identity among the Portuguese expatriates that moved there. These men that 
resided on the Angolan coast or regularly interacted with coastal merchants were widely connected 
through business relationships or family ties to other Lisbon or Brazilian merchants that traded 
directly or indirectly with ports such as Luanda.  
 The Luso-Africans were crucial links in all facets of colonial trade between the interior 
markets and smaller volume traders, and the coastal merchants. They were employed in innumerous 
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positions as receptors, traders, and regulators of goods and slaves. With such a wide range of 
individuals, some of the most important ones were quite wealthy and powerful. The most powerful 
however, were the elite businessmen (homens de negócio) that hailed primarily from Lisbon, 
financing trade in the colonies. The difference between what was designated as businessmen as 
opposed to local merchants (mercadores), is that the businessmen traded in substantially larger 
volume. This became one of the principle lexical distinctions made by contemporaries in Angola 
that increased throughout the eighteenth century. However, before the second half of the eighteenth 
century, these two words were used somewhat interchangeably.
181
 Later, the distinctions became 
clearer, and other distinctive words such as negociante became agents of stratification. Although 
many of these men were based in Lisbon, the term in this period was used to designate someone of 
great commercial prowess. In general terms, the way of signifying the businessmen were those that 
rented or leased out goods or dealt with credit, especially dealing with wholesale merchandising.
182
 
These large-scale merchants were also often in some way associated with royal contracts for export 
commodities throughout the empire. This allowed them to enjoy a great deal of bourgeois 
exclusivity and intimate links to the Crown. Many of the men considered homens de negócio if not 
Lisbon based had very strong family ties such as parents, siblings or cousins that lived in areas that 
were conducive to trade relationships between the various businessmen. Financial investments that 
the businessmen made were essential to the growth of overseas commercial networks.   
 The major businessmen in accordance with their exclusivity in many cases belonged to 
selective organizations. One of these was the Luanda chapter of the empire-wide Holy House of 
Mercy (Santa Casa de Misericórdia) that was a religious, social, and financial club for the social 
elite and dignitaries.
183
 It was upheld to have members of high moral character, and conducted 
many aspects of municipal life in the city. A high percentage of the members of the organization 
were businessmen that acquired a great deal of social status, influence and connections as a result. 
Many men that worked within the same commercial companies were members and collaborated 
through the organization. Some of the businessmen that were members held important positions 
there such as Manuel Correa, who served as Purveyor of the organization in the 1680’s.
184
  
 If commercial actors such as the pombeiros were necessary to the acquisition of products at 
the base of commercial networks, the businessmen were equally vital in making those networks 
possible. The start up capital provided by the businessmen created the means for commercial 
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players to create networks that the entire system functioned through. Capital investments provided 
by the businessmen allowed for them to become a part of the mercantile system through long-
distance trading ventures.
185
 Regardless of the fact that the businessmen were largely composed of 
wealthy people that entered the Angolan trade with a large fortune, the lucrative trade made them a 
great deal richer. Savings were required in order to enter the business, but it was not necessarily a 
prerequisite for the businessmen to have a great deal of capital. Many were able to trade in this way 
investing enough resources to begin, and growing their net worth upon receiving returns from 
debtors. As such, the businessmen would have been capable and business savvy individuals with 
investment capital. The penchant for business arrangements that these men had lead them to 
diversify in the products that they traded throughout the Atlantic. Investing in various products was 
a business strategy in that it diminished commercial risks incurred through trade. Avoiding the 
commercial risks omnipresent in the south Atlantic not only disincentivized men from investing 
exclusively in particular products, but also from owning slaves. Although many of the businessmen 
invested in slaves, and slaves were profitable in the Americas, it was not always considered a smart 
or secure business venture for the wealthiest merchants. The far distance that the slaves traveled 
opened the opportunity for a wide array of issues. In addition to pirates and other human actors, the 
slaves were malnourished and prone to diseases as a result. The high cost of participants in the 
capture, maintenance, transport, and sale of slaves, as well as many possible deaths along the way 
made it difficult to justify heavy dependence upon it.  
 Businessmen invested in goods dispatched from Luanda and sent throughout the Atlantic. 
Losses suffered from one product would be compensated in another. The businessmen’s propensity 
to invest in various products was based in their conservative tendencies to avoid the risks associated 
with consolidation regardless of the profitability of particular products.
186
 This contributed to the 
ability of these businessmen to socially ascend as they gained influence throughout the territories. 
The Crown’s distribution of contracts ceding monopoly rights for raw materials from the colonies 
was not restricted to external businessmen, and many men from Luanda held them, which may have 
been for this reason. However, a contributor to this may have been conflicts between the Lisbon 
based businessmen and Luso-Africans. Awarding the Luso-African merchants such contracts was 
not only in their best interest, but protected the Angola-Brazilian trade relations that included 
business partners and other confidants that were affected. Distance from the Lisbon based 
commercial bankers and businessmen in addition to strengthening relationships amongst the south 
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Atlantic merchants would have emphasized it. This also indicates a movement at the end of the 
seventeenth century toward a strengthening mutual relationship or identity between Brazil and 
Angola.
187
 Notwithstanding, contracts were attractive to the merchant elite but the South Atlantic 
relationship allowed for a great deal of smugglers to evade taxes imposed on goods, as well as for 
traders to illegally traffic contraband between the two territories. The dynamics of royal contracts 
will be discussed more in-depth in a subsequent section of the chapter.  
 The wealthy businessmen that traded in Angola in the latter part of the seventeenth century 
infrequently remained long enough to integrate into the Luso-African community. Regardless of 
attempts to attract these men to the territory, many of them oscillated throughout other areas in the 
empire. This became evident when Governor Gonçalo da Costa de Alcáçova Carneiro de Meneses 
(1691-1694) wanted more businessmen to concentrate on Angola. Whether or not coupled with 
personal commercial interests, Governor Meneses contended that the “wealth that each of them 
possess in a business of so many interests” was integral to the good stature of the territory.
188
 More 
businessmen needed to be based in the territory for commerce to grow. The governor noted that 
many of the businessmen that passed through Angola continued on to the Estado de India in the 
East, working within their commercial company. While the presence of these commercial giants 
would have brought ‘honor’ to the colony and the individuals working with them, the governor 
astutely recognized that there was a direct correlation between the amount of wealth brought into 
the colony by the businessmen, and increasing trade in Angola.
189
  
 Businessmen that resided in Angola lived in the major cities such as Luanda and Benguela. 
Maintaining that the governor may have embellished the state of the living conditions in hopes of 
generating interest, in the late seventeenth century they lived on an ‘abundance’ of land.
190
 They 
would most likely have lived in the upper part of Luanda throughout this period.
191
 Because Luanda 
was situated on a hill, the most important power structures and institutions were located in the most 
prominent locations. Much of the local aristocracy and most influential traders resided there as well. 
This was a trend since the beginning of the colonization of Angola, and held true almost until 
Luanda’s sesquicentennial, changing in the 1720s. This resulted from the increased importance of 
the port at Luanda, attributable to the increasing slave trade in Brazil due to the discovery of 
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enormous quantities of mineral resources, as well as the commercial accessibility because of the 
discontinuation of commercial collusions previously enjoyed by the government officials.
192
  
 Slaves owned by the large-scale merchants in Angola aided with the men’s agricultural 
produce, as well as with their household or shipping needs. Especially slaves living in communities 
closer than the arimos called senzalas were those that helped with the various tasks that the 
businessmen needed. These men at times owned a great deal of slaves, although it was yet again 
stated that regardless of the high profits obtained from selling slaves, it was not desired. In essence, 




 An additional issue associated with the businessmen’s worth was that it was prejudicial to the 
territory for them to make their fortune and then leave the colony. Also important to the colonizing 
effort was a growing number of Portuguese individuals taking residence there. When the 
businessmen left the territory, so did their families and belongings, clearly contrary to the interests 
of Angola and of the empire. The solution proved too idealistic for the period, but it was to promote 
the voyage to Angola only to those that would “wed <in Angola> in order to become residents and 
not leave with their fortunes.”
194
 This was suggested in accordance with encouraging secular lives 
for their children. People coming to Angola and marrying solely within the Portuguese community 
was extraordinarily rare, with very few examples other than Domingos Luis, who had seven 
daughters, all of whom married into wealthy families of Portuguese descent.
195
  By having several 
children marry into other families in Angola, the wealth would have been distributed and filtered 
into the different families, consequently allowing for the wealth garnered as a function of 
commercializing Angola to remain in Angola and benefit the local mercantile community.  
 The merchant elite in Angola was in many ways an integrated community. The way that they 
interacted with the local areas such as Luanda was largely societally formative. The commercial 
sector in Angola also depended on their exports and credit. However, the businessmen could not 
have realized their commercial aspirations in Angola without the other participants in the greater 
commercial machine. Commerce in Angola was an aggregate of several sub-mechanisms working 
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within separate functions for economic ends, but each sector was essential to the whole. The 
interlinked system allowed for each part to realize their purpose, and for commercial 
competitiveness throughout the Atlantic stemming from Angola. Depending on the location and 
task of the Angolan traders, different forms of currency were used that were inevitably linked to 
systems of credit that allowed transactions to occur and business to grow.  
The Angolan Monetary and Credit System 
 It is clear that the intricate trade relationships between the various commercial figures in 
Angola were connected through the exchange of various products that were desired by the 
particular groups. Notwithstanding, what made the trade possible was an intricate credit system 
because of the volatile local currencies. The credit system in Angola served a plethora of functions. 
The use of credit was an essential institution not only on the Angolan coast, but also in the Angolan 
interior and throughout the Portuguese empire. It aided in facilitating and standardizing the sale of 
goods, while primarily protecting coastal merchants from fraud, theft, or damaged goods throughout 
the course of transaction that often endured several months or even years.  
 Trade agents exchanged several important products to and from Angola throughout the 
commercial networks. Angola imported a series of raw materials and goods such as European cloth, 
iron wears, beads, Brazilian alcoholic beverages and red dyewood, guns and other weapons, and 
gunpowder, among other goods such as those contained in the bundles traded for slaves. Export 
goods from Angola aside from slaves consisted primarily of ivory, wax, and salt.
196
 These products 
were largely available at the markets in Angola that additionally sold items such as foodstuffs. 
Although Luanda was the main port through which the products were transported, other ports 
specialized in particulars. Some items were sold universally such as slaves and ivory, however 
Loango was a major port for cotton cloth and salt, whereas Benguela markets primarily had beads, 
foodstuffs, and wax. Many times, these products were traded for other raw materials foregoing a 
currency exchange, but Angolan currencies were commonly used and better gauged the products’ 
worth. 
 Angolan currencies at the time were highly undependable as a way of accruing personal 
savings. Products such as salt were exchanged for others for example in some areas. Using 
perishable or expendable goods as currency made future transactions difficult, and there were also 
material goods whose express purpose was monetary value. Objects such as shells (nzimbu) found 
on Luanda Island used in the Kingdom of Kongo,
197
 or beads used in locations such as Benguela 
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were considered currency, especially in the initial stages of Portuguese colonization.  Instituted in 
the seventeenth century, the libongo was a small straw mat used as currency in Angola.
198
 They 
were tightly woven palm leaves, made to be durable, smooth and lasting.
199
 Primarily manufactured 
in the north, in the kongo and the Loango Coast, the libongos were stamped with an R for the king 
by the Municipal Council after 1649,
200
 and were the Portuguese royal currency in the mid 
seventeenth century. This legal tender was utilized universally, and was even used to pay 
Portuguese military personnel. However, the more valuable currency was the macuta.  
 The latter half of the seventeenth century experienced financial difficulties in the Portuguese 
empire, and the currencies were revaluated throughout the period. This occurred especially with the 
devaluation of the reis in 1688, a time when the economy was beginning to heal.
201
 The macuta was 
equivalent to ten libongos, and was a cloth currency that existed in Angola since the onset of the 
Portuguese initial occupation of Luanda, used concurrently with other forms of local currencies in 
the beginning. The macuta was a long cloth fabric that served not only monetary functions, but was 
used in making candles for ships and for dressing slaves leaving the ports.
202
 This proved 
problematic because the fact that the cloth had other uses aside from monetary value caused a 
scarcity of the resource. Foreign merchants trading in ports such as Mpinda and Cabinda, namely 




 The macuta was not only causing financial problems because of its functional versatility and 
drain from the Portuguese empire, but the material itself was undependable. The two currencies 
considered were made from materials that wore easily, and when exposed to the elements or to 
insects they eroded rapidly. Many contemporaries complained of annually loosing thousands of reis 
worth of the two forms of currency, especially libongos, as a result. In 1680 for example, these 
official forms of currency were described as being extremely “inconvenient”, and a source of “great 
damages that the inhabitants experienced.”
204
 Macutas in the early 1680’s were worth “150 reis 
each.”
205
 Problems with the valuation of the currency erupted because merchants as well as military 
officials on a fixed income received payment with such value. The nominal value of 150 reis was in 
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practice less than a third.
206
 This caused an uprising in 1682 because of the “enormous loss” that 
was suffered through the misrepresentation of the macuta’s value.
207
 Lesser quality workmanship in 
order to make up for losses that the macutas were manufactured with created unequal values of the 
currency. An additional problem was devaluation efforts committed by the governors largely for 
personal trade reasons. This made goods from the interior cheaper on the coast, but the merchants 
were largely affected by the “diminution of the price of the macutas.”
208
  
 The problems associated with these forms of currency were hoped to be resolved with the 
institution of copper coins. Promotion of the use of copper coinage began in the in the last quarter 
of the seventeenth century.
209
 The desire to use copper gained momentum throughout the decade, 
and was eventually given the namesake of the cloth currency, macuta. The copper coin was 
instated, and by 1694, the Angolan troops stipends were paid in part with copper, that lead to an 
uprising against the ouvidor-geral in the same year whom they deemed responsible for its 
distribution.
210
 A contributing factor to discontent associated with the copper coinage was its 
subsequent scarcity throughout this period. By the eighteenth century, a noticeable lack of the 
precious metal was hampering the ability of contractors to pay those that they owed in the colony, 
especially in return for credit.
211
 However, the use of copper persisted although there was a constant 
undersupply.  nstituting the precious metal was a theoretically positive change, but “in Angola, the 
issue of copper coins was the great monetary problem of the seventeenth century.”
212
 The credit 
system circumvented or delayed the direct use of currency, and ensured that commercial 
transactions came into fruition that allowed for growth in the Atlantic economy that bullion could 
not adequately provide for. 
 The use of credit in Angola was important to trade and the completion of business 
arrangements, but it was also essential as a safeguard for coastal merchants. It was extremely 
dangerous for Luanda merchants seeking trade agreements in the Angolan hinterland to entrust their 
goods to trade agents before receiving the exchange upon the intermediary’s return.  f there were no 
fluvial means of access to a particular market, the journey lasted several months before the 
individuals returned with the desired products that would subsequently be shipped out of Luanda. If 
a credit system did not exist, theft would have been rampant, and there would be less incentive for 
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return. In addition, the long journey frequently meant that products would be lost, poorly treated or 
cared for, or spoiled. The uncertainty and mortiferous nature of the slave trade almost guaranteed 
losses before reaching Luanda. The conditions under which slaves were acquired and transported 
was a determinant in their value when they reached the ports for sale to be shipped elsewhere in the 
Atlantic. Many of the slaves were injured, malnourished, or died throughout the journey. The credit 
system enabled costal merchants to reject offers that did not meet the requirements stipulated in the 
credit agreement. It also allowed the merchants to redirect blame towards others if a problem 
occurred, making damaged goods or deceased slaves the liability of the porters.
213
  
 Credit was necessary in order for smaller scale traders to assemble the bundles that they 
traded for slaves that were given a value in reis. Other merchants were able to finance commodity 
transferals though other types of credit that were inevitably financed through wealthy businessmen 
and bankers from Portugal. The bankers used credit as an investment strategy. They invested in 
goods such as ivory, but credit was a lucrative means of income. Credit indebted the Luanda 
merchants to the richer businessmen that in turn created a client-patron relationship between 
them.
214
 This was a favorable business strategy for the bankers, increasingly funneling capital 
through credit to Luanda exacerbated the financial hold that they had over smaller scale merchants. 
However, this allowed ambitious merchants to continue to thrive in Angola. Credit was attributable 
to the merchants’ ability to generate commercial routes from scratch.  n fact, credit had a profound 
effect on trade maintained at the “core of the complex forces that fueled the transport and 
distribution sectors of western central Africa's eighteenth century political economy.”
215
 As 
previously suggested, although credit was universally necessary to the Angolan commercial sector, 
it assumed different names and characteristics that corresponded to its worth and function in 
society.  
 Credit was allocated through written agreements between the various commercial parties. 
These credit arrangements assumed the form of letters acknowledging debt owed from one party to 
another. The least widely distributed form of credit was only circulated and redeemable in the 
Angolan hinterland. It was sometimes found in towns that based their commercial arrangements 
towards the interior. These were called folhinhas, and many merchants were somewhat reluctant to 
use them because of their limited circulation. The folhinhas were cloth fragments that were given a 
monetary value.
216
 An additional form of loans that was also rather insignificant in the credit 
hierarchy was the livrança. This form of credit remained mostly on the coast, specifically in 
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Luanda, but was only redeemable in Angola as well. This exchange was not particularly 
dependable, and was not intended for long distances. Livranças were mostly extended in small 
quantities, and were dealt with on a daily basis. They essentially took on the character of early 
 OU’s that were entirely dependent on frequent interactions with the receptors and their goodwill to 
reimburse them. Although the livranças were usually given in smaller amounts, and intended for 
short periods of time, their value was accumulated. Typically, at the start of a new royal tax-farming 
contract, the contractors would encourage the sale of large quantities of them to the Luso-Africans. 
The higher the quantity of livranças that the contractor could sell, the easier it was for him to accrue 
the necessary funds to support more substantial credit arrangements that could be cashed in at the 
end of their contract.
217
 In essence, the livranças, although circulating locally and strengthening the 
local economy, were a stimulus for the larger forms of credit called letras.  
 Letras were bills of exchange that proved extremely important for the generation and 
sustentation of commerce in Angola, as well as the Atlantic. These credit bills were awarded in 
substantially larger quantities, and were used far more by the merchant elite and with coastal Luso-
African merchants. They were a mechanism that functioned as a “fundamental business 
instrument.”
218
 Letras allowed for substantial volumes of goods to be transported throughout the 
terrestrial and sea routes without significant start up costs. This would have allowed many Lisbon 
merchants a great deal of social and economic mobility, offsetting expenses until trade relations 
were realized. These credit notes were used intensively for trade, and many of the merchants 
maintained relationships with solicitors in the destination zones in order to “guarantee the smooth 
operation of their businesses.”
219
 Many colonial officials’ salaries were partially paid in letras, and 
they were extremely common in the territory. One of the greatest aspects of the letras was their 
inherent security, as the large return guaranteed payment. Contemporaries perceived them as more 
lucrative than using money, ensuring that raw materials from locations such as Brazil would be very 
well cared for.
220
 In fact, the letras were so trusted that many merchants were willing to front the 
bills of exchange up to “two years before” the return.
221
  
 Credit was largely dependent on accounts in other areas of the Atlantic, especially Lisbon. 
The credit system was diverse, yet there were three major types of bills of exchange used for 
commerce in Angola. These were the letras dos direitos, letras seguras, and letras de risco. The 
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preferred form of credit in Angola was the letras seguras. These were less associated with the 
crown, and widely circulated throughout the South Atlantic. Their desirability was founded in their 
fail-proof ability to produce returns on goods dispatched to the Americas. Using letras seguras was 
preferred because they “<did> not run the risk of fire, sea, or corsairs, and those that fle<d> with 
the goods, and misconduct should not be feared.”
222
 They were used as an effective method of 
assuring quality and control over transport, but also as product insurance in the case of disaster. 
Angolan merchants shipping slaves to Brazil administered the Letras seguras, although various 
other products were shipped in the same way.
223
 This allowed Angolan merchants debt restitution 
from merchants passing through Brazil, and furnished the American accounts of the African 
merchants. 
 Letras de risco differed from the letras seguras in that they did not concern merchants, but 
rather the ship captains.
224
 This is significant because there was not the same level of security 
involved. The captains of the trade vessels would not have had a financial backing in Brazil or 
Portugal. As a result, it would have been more difficult for these men to accrue the necessary funds 
to redeem the credit. The raw materials transported to Angola were not as lucrative as human cargo, 
which was the principle reason that the credit was necessary. This form of credit was quite 
common, and largely depended on the return of the individual that received the bill.
225
 This made 
many of the merchants extending these bills work primarily with frequently used and trusted 
individuals, although such concern was coupled with the issues associated with pirates and the 
natural elements.   
  The letras dos direitos were directly connected to the slave trade. The contractor of the 
royal tax-farming contract awarded them. Consequently, these letras that were essentially a slave 
export tax were closely linked to the crown. This was essential to the functionality of the slave trade 
and its contributors. Duties collected by the contractors were often sent in the form of letras and 
many public officials were paid in part through them. Because the bills were obtained through the 
contractor, they held a great deal of importance overseas. Such letras were not particularly 
common, but were sought after and secure. They were awarded with primacy towards private 
merchants (who were in many cases highly ranked colonial officials), and often divided into 
subcategories, such as old duties (direitos velhos) and new duties (direitos novos). 
226
 These 
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particular types corresponded to the old and new taxes imposed on each slave exported from 
Angola, paid to the contractor.  
Monopoly Contracts and contractors 
 The function of the contracts as well as merchants that held them were fundamental to the 
Angolan economic system, and although there were distinctive characteristics, the use of contracts 
was non-unique to the colony. The use of contracts expanded throughout the Portuguese empire, 
and came into being at the onset of Portuguese expansion and inter-continental trade. Over time the 
system evolved, beginning in the late fifteenth century, in which contracts were awarded in order to 
collect taxes for the Crown in the overseas. This system allowed the Crown to essentially employ 
commercial agents to collect the royal taxes. These contracts were allocated through an auction 
style process in which the recipient bought the rights to the contract. This was a way for the crown 
to better regulate tax administration, as well as have an immediate return through the initial bid in 
order to compensate for financial deficits at the time. 
 During the Iberian Union (1580-1640) businessmen operating in the overseas colonies 
adopted the Spanish system of contracts called the asiento.
227
 The asiento was the Spanish form of 
contract that was used to supply the slave market from Western Africa to the Spanish American 
colonies.
228
 With the system of the asiento, slaves were transported on Portuguese or Spanish ships, 
creating a voluminous market for slaves that drove many Portuguese merchants in the period to 
Castile in order to secure the rights. Because Spain held no West African colonies, the asientos 
were not based in export taxes. The asientistas paid taxes to royal officials in the Spanish colonies, 
and took more direct ownership of the slaves. Throughout the union this was a lucrative way of 
sustaining the slave trade from Angola to diverse locations in the Americas.  
 After the Iberian Union ended, the Portuguese merchants returned to the contract system. 
When a businessman bought the rights to a contract, it conferred monopoly privileges over a 
product in a particular area. These contracts, by the latter part of the seventeenth century coincided 
with a departure from the older system of merchants as Crown agents to “a trading framework 
controlled by private merchants and supervised by royal officials.”
229
 The most important contract 
in Angola was the royal tax-farming contract. This allowed exclusive rights to the taxation of the 
slave trade through all Angolan ports. At this time, the merchant elite was able to enjoy a great deal 
of commercial power. Instead of being subjugated to the Crown’s power, they regulated the flux of 
                                                 
227
 Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial Vo. IV, Lisboa: Editorial Presença, 1971, 
p. 177.  
228
 Albert Van Dantzig, “Effects of the Atlantic Slave Trade on Some West African Societies,” in ed. J. E. Inikori, 
Forced Migration: the Impact of the Export Slave Trade on African Societies, London: Hutchinson University, 1982, p. 
189.  
229
 Ribeiro da Silva, p. 92. 
61 
 
products into particular areas, while in large part free to choose their own terms and officials. In 
fact, the auctioning of royal contracts was one of the principle systems of the Portuguese state’s 
fiscal organization, that lead to the “interpenetration of the public finances with the private.”
230
 This 
is essentially a style of merger that allowed for the Crown to diminish expenditures because they no 
longer needed to employ a great deal of officials to regulate taxation. It also encouraged contract 
holders to maximize profits in the colony through the system. What by todays jargon would be 
considered a public-private partnership allowed private merchants to become extremely wealthy 
seemingly at the states’ expense.
231
 Both parties benefited from the system, but the businessmen 
accrued immense amounts of individual capital. 
 The royal contracts outlined a series of stipulations considered under the agreement that 
allowed the men specific obligations, as well as exclusive prerogatives associated with such tasks. 
Contracts were negotiated to last three, six, or nine years. The contracts tended to follow a common 
rubric in terms of content and style. They would begin with stating the monopoly that was being 
rented. This would have who thee individuals were that the contract was awarded to, and what the 
product in question was to be. The contract followed with the length of duration of the contract. 
Thirdly, the payment procedures were presented. The amount awarded was discussed as well as the 
form of payment such as styles of currency or credit, and the place or institutions involved. The 
chattels pledged, and the other men that were associated as business partners were also included.
232
 
In addition to these formalities, the obligations that the contractors were expected to fulfill 
followed. This included the privileges that the contractors were given along with the duties that the 
contractors had in relation to the local authorities, and finally the relationship between the 
contractor and the local royal commercial and fiscal agents.  
 When the contractor received the contract for Angola, the territorial boundaries 
encompassed what the Portuguese considered its dependencies that throughout this period were 
Benguela, the Kongo, and Loango. After the merchants paid the contractor the entry duties, they 
were free to enter the territory and send the goods to any destination without further taxation.
233
 The 
only two anomalies in terms of the taxed export goods from Angola were precious metals and ivory. 
Precious metals were considered property of the state, and ivory was subjected to an additional 
tax.
234
 The low price ceiling placed by the Crown on the commodity made it less lucrative for some 
traders, but was important to the royal treasury in Portugal where the overwhelming majority of 
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 This may also have contributed to ivory becoming an item commonly smuggled 
out rather than taxed.  When slaves were exported from Luanda, the taxes were paid to the 
contractors, but they did not have to pay further taxes upon reaching the Americas. Although the 
duties were always paid to the contractor, in his absence or during the interim periods between the 
times that one businessman’s contract expired and the new recipient’s began, the taxes were paid 
directly to the royal treasury. The Crown gave incentives to hamper the continued circulation of 
contraband that the contractors at times allowed, knowing that the crown would not be 
compensated. If an individual or group was caught engaging in contraband, the Crown took two 
thirds of the goods, and left the rest to the contractor for having apprehended them.
236
 However, the 
contractors themselves succeeded in evading their own taxes and allowing contraband to enter for 
their own benefit. This was rather common and the repercussions for getting found out were less 
severe than the average person that attempted to do so. 
  Although the contractors held the monopoly, there was a series of other people that worked 
within the system. These were other businessmen that were allowed to work inside the monopoly 
system without collecting the duties. The contractors were allowed to place their own officials and 
factors in particular geographical areas. In addition, the contractors were permitted to award trading 
licenses (avenças) to private merchants. These licenses allowed the holders (avençadores) to export 
a specific quantity of a particular good from a predetermined area. In the case of Angola, the port of 
export that the license holders were allocated to was Luanda. When the avençadores exported the 
goods, local officials inspected them, and the license holders paid the royal tax to be collected by 
the agents of the contractor at the destination port.
237
 The avençadores held their license for a 
shorter period than the royal contract, and the recipients of the license were entered into a book of 
records in Lisbon. These men, as well as the contractors themselves hired local agents from the 
Luso-African community to aid in regulating exports. The avençadores were essentially the 
receptors of indirect taxes, and were the “true slave traders”.
238
 The way that the avenças were 
structured made the holders much more intrinsically involved with the slave trade than the 
contractors.  
 In addition to the avenças, another type of license existed as well. This license was called a 
licença. The fundamental difference between the two types of licenses was that the avenças were 
trading licenses issued by the monopoly contractors, whereas the licenças were trading licenses 
effectively administered by the Portuguese Crown
239
 allowing private merchants to trade within the 
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monopoly areas. The administration of these licenses showed that although the monopoly contracts 
existed, they did not close Angola off from private entrepreneurship, as long as the businessmen 
respected their allotted areas and specific range of goods.
240
 Businessmen purchased the licença 
from the crown that allowed access to the market, transporting their goods into the colony and 
paying taxes to the contractor.  Although the licenças allowed for other traders to be a part of the 
monopoly, they were given to people in privileged positions, and only to those that could afford to 
buy the rights in the first place. Hence, regardless of the fact that licenses could be attained that 
admitted additional merchants into the monopoly system, they would have been associates or 
connected in some way to the contractor or to the crown in order for the favorable treatment to be 
bestowed upon them, and for them to continue to gain commercial strength in Angola.  
 There were several contracts awarded throughout this period, each with a timespan of six 
years. The organization of the contracts was intended to cover the subjects discussed above, 
concerning the necessary elements pertaining to the privileges and raison d’être of the contractor, 
but they were subdivided into dozens of subsections. The contract awarded in 1717 to begin on 
January 5, 1718 to Francisco Gomes Lisboa contained forty-seven stipulations. The contract like all 
others throughout this time period, ceded the rights to Angola distinguishing Benguela, the Kongo, 
and Loango as separate yet included provincial entities.
241
 This shows that in the Portuguese 
colonial mindset all of these areas were nominally under Portuguese control and subject to the 
commercial monopoly. The annual price of the contract was forty-four thousand cruzados (17.6 
million reis). The contract began by stating that the payments were to be made in goods in order to 
clothe and sustain the troops, including payment in flour. The contractor also paid in credit, and the 
fourth and final style was to be in the copper macutas. The coins paid were from “copper collected 
from the factories in Loango.”
242
 The fact that the contract begins with matters concerning military 
sustenance shows the importance of the military in Angola, and how necessary the contractor was 
in providing for them. In fact, item twenty-eight stated that under no circumstances could the sitting 
governor enlist the contractor or anyone working under him in the case of a hinterland military 
threat in order to continue collecting taxes.
243
 In addition to providing for the troops’ salaries, the 
contractor was expected to subsidize other public facilities. The contractor was required to 
subsidize the functionality of the hospital in Luanda, and was expected to pay eighty thousand reis 
annually to two members of the Overseas Council.
244
 Among other officials that derived their 
income from the contract, these were the primary beneficiaries.  
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 The execution of the contract protected Lisboa as well as the Crown itself from potential 
abuses. Anyone that did not comply with the contractor’s mandates could be brought to court 
including highly ranked government officials. This included the governor if he attempted to restrict 
exports for his own benefit, although this had been a problem in the colony. Religious figures as 
well as noblemen belonging to prestigious military orders were expected to comply with the 
contractor and pay the full duties assigned to the slaves that they wished to dispatch.
245
 The required 
taxes for each slave corresponded to the old duties and the new duties. The old duties were four 
thousand reis per slave that went to the contractor, and the new duties were worth three thousand 
reis that were to be turned into the royal treasury.
246
 The contract administered by the Overseas 
Council stated that a particular number of slaves were to be exported from Angola per year. 
Condition twenty-four made it clear that only the contractor and his representatives were allowed to 
be paid, and that “fifteen hundred heads <were> to be sent each year in contracted vessels.”
247
  
 The contract continued on to say that the salt and slaves in areas such as Benguela were only 
to be retrieved, especially at the coastal factories, by individuals licensed by the contractor.
248
 
Licensed individuals along the coast for the various products could establish factories, but a large 
portion of Lisboa’s contract outlined the restrictions placed on merchants, the procedure for dealing 
with the factors and accountants that the contractor was to hire for the tax collection, and 
punishments for straying from the conditions. The contractor chose the avençadores that were to 
pay the taxes directly to the contractor’s officials in Angola and deal with his associates in Brazil. 
Merchants that entered Luanda were required produce their avença upon arrival, thus their 
disembarkation was contingent on the contractor’s consent. Additionally, the licensed individuals 
had to record all of the products leaving the port for the treasury’s commercial log. If licensed 
traders strayed from their contractual obligations or traded without a license they were required to 
pay reparations in treble.
249
 To ensure good conduct in regard to the contractual agreements, the 
Overseas Council was adamant that if there were legal or business disagreements, the personnel 
involved had to go through the judicial system or they would be fined two thousand cruzados.
250
 
The government officials could not override or become involved in commercial decisions made by 
the contractor as long as the contractor was working within the guidelines of the contract.  
 Within the restrictions on trade with raw materials and slaves, the twelfth and thirteenth 
stipulations explicitly treat the additional tax placed on ivory. Ivory was highly restricted, and could 
                                                 
245
 March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18. 
246
 March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18. 
247
 “mil e quinhentas cabeças se tirarão cada anno em embarcações do contrato,” March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18. 
248
 March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18. 
249 March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18. 
250
 March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.  
65 
 
only be traded by the contractor, or those designated by him. Additionally, all ivory exported from 
Angola was required to pass through the customs house, where it was quantified and weighed 
before the additional tax for ivory was applied. The import of ivory to Lisbon and the royal treasury 
was so controlled that “neither the governor nor other official can transport it” anywhere outside of 
the colony.
251
 Any amount of ivory that was not sent solely by the contractor and did not follow 
such procedure was to be confiscated and attributed to the royal treasury.  
 The contract that followed Lisboa’s in 1723 rented by native Lisbon resident Vasco 
Lourenço Vellozo was very similar with a few modifications. The contract was substantially more 
expensive, worth fifty-six thousand cruzados.
252
 Vellozo was expected to pay the military salaries 
as before, as well as some administrative officers and religious institutions, but the major difference 
was a new tax. This new tax of twelve hundred reis per slave was intended to “help pay the 
governor’s salary.”
253
 Not only does this further show the connection between the commercial 
sector and the military, but this is also a result of the law from 1720 prohibiting governors from 
commerce. The governors’ involvement in commerce had hindered the businessmen’s trade 
throughout the empire, and the law aided in allowing fairer trading conditions, yet the traders were 
ironically required to pay additional taxes in order to supplement the governor’s substantially 
higher salary as a result. No government officials were permitted to intervene in the commercial 
networks or disallow the businessmen’s trade agents from negotiating in the hinterland. There were 
also new restrictions on the number of slaves that could be sent to particular locations such as Rio 
de Janeiro
254
 as a result of the preferential treatment it received because of the gold discovery in 
Minas Gerais.   
 The royal tax-farming contract at the end of the seventeenth century was administered in 
1698 to Antonio de Castro de Guimarães for the price of twenty contos
255
 per year for a period of 
six years. The contract lists associates that appear in many other contracts in the time period as the 
factors and was to be compensated in “four equal parts, and each one in a different style.”
256
 The 
first style was to be paid in letras. The letras were intended to be worth the same in Angola as in 
the metropole, with the intention of awarding enough to provide for the upkeep of the military 
officials on the coast and in the hinterland. The second type was goods to be discounted for further 
military sustenance. The first two types of payment were awarded in this way because the crown 
contended that the goods would be more valuable in Angola, especially in the interior than 
                                                 
251
 “Nem o Governador, nem outro ministro o poderà navegar,” March 18, 1718, AHU, Angola, cx. 18.  
252
 February 18, 1723, AHU, Angola, cx. 22. 
253
 “para ajuda dos soldos do governador” February 18, 1723, AHU, Angola, cx. 22.  
254
 February 18, 1723, AHU, Angola, cx. 22. 
255
 One Conto denoted the value of one Thousand milreis.  
256
 January 18, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15. 
66 
 
elsewhere. In addition, the troops were to receive rations of flour, leaving the fourth installment to 
be paid in copper because the macutas and libongos carried different values in the hinterland and on 
the coast, which worked in the contractors favor, but was unfair to the troops.
257
  
 Although this was a standard contract, the municipal council pleaded for various 
amendments because of particular local trends. The copper currency was meant to have more 
universal acceptance, but fluctuated in availability. The other forms of payment such as goods and 
flour were necessary, but by the time such products reached the hinterland soldiers, many of them 
spoiled, decreasing in value, and the council suggested that these goods be replaced with letras to 
ensure that the infantry was compensated in the necessary value.
258
 The value of the macutas 
contributed to a further issue, which was that associates listed in the contract Manoel do Porto 
Barboza and Diogo Fonseca Henriques, were both still deeply indebted to the crown from past 
contracts, and as a result they should be dissociated from any involvement in the current monopoly 
contract. Issues over monetary valuation and back payments were extremely prejudicial to the 
current state of the colony. The issues with payment and currency, as well as compensating the 
military in Angola were the primary concerns, and listed in the beginning of the written contracts. 
 In this movement towards Crown sponsored private merchants and their associates holding 
the monopoly over goods in the Atlantic, their ability to award rights to others and their position 
allowing for them to selectively permit the influx of contraband, the contracts were rented at prices 
lower than their actual worth. The royal tax-farming contracts in the Atlantic rewarded not only 
monopoly rights for the slave trade, but also for an additional product. The additional product in 
Angola was ivory, which lead to a great deal of corruption in relation to the transportation of the 
product. Although there were issues of primary importance in the contracts that were necessary to 
the functionality of the colony, and various officials attempted to manipulate the commercial 
system for their own means, the contractors committed corruption and traded contraband as well. 
One particular case involved the holder of the prior Angolan royal tax-farming contract in Angola, 
Diogo da Fonseca Henriques.  
 Diogo da Fonseca Henriques came from a family linked to the Crown, and many of his other 
family members held prominent positions in Portuguese society. He was highly respected in 
Angola, and held the royal tax-farming contract for two consecutive terms, among other contracts 
afterwards. He, like many of the major merchant families were New-Christians that had family ties 
in West Africa for several decades. Henriques was a merchant that grew up in Angola, had five 
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 and a father who had been the holder of the royal contract for many years. Henriques’ 
father, Lopo da Fonseca Henriques was the contractor of Angola from 1645 until 1651.
260
 Over a 
decade later, Lopo da Fonseca Henriques farmed out the contract again, this time with his brother 
Jeronimo da Teixeira Henriques who had been captain of Massangano.
261
 Throughout this same 
period, the entrepreneurial brothers dealt not only with the slave trade, but were bondholders in 
Portuguese public debt and investors in the Brazil Company chartered by the Crown in 1649.
262
 The 
two terms of the contract were from 1663 to 1664, and then from 1669-1676.  Family ties to Angola 
previous to this demonstrate the depth of the family in the area. Duarte Dias Henriques held the 
contract from 1607 until 1614, and then proceeded to acquire the Spanish asiento from 1627 to 
1647,
263
 fostering vast connections with others in Brazil and Spanish colonies as well.  
 Diogo da Fonseca Henriques assumed the contract rights for the first time in 1675. The 
contract that Diogo bought had a duration of six years. His subsequent contract was awarded in 
1679, but did not take effect until 1691.
264
 His first contract terminated with a great deal of 
controversy that followed him throughout the 1680’s. These issues centered on several accusations 
of breach of contract. However, the negligence and active participation that he undertook in relation 
to the assertions from various individuals were based in the transportation of ivory. Ivory was not 
the only source of corruption in relation to Fonseca Henriques’ tenure as contractor in Angola, but it 
was a central issue concerning the misdeeds committed by him as well as conspirators in the tax 
evasion scheme. The power wielded by the contractors not only allowed them to conduct illicit 
trade, but to involve others on their payroll, or those that could benefit financially from doing 
business with them.  
  Diogo da Fonseca Henriques entered his first contract after the end of his father’s. Already 
accused of owing back taxes from his fathers contract, the precedent was set for a great deal of 
scrutiny. In fact, it was expected that Diogo pay them, as he was the heir to his fathers contract.
265
 
Citing the eleventh condition of Diogo’s contract, officials stated that he was failing to record all of 
his transactions, and that commercial movements throughout the city needed to be accessible in 
order to monitor the validity of the records he was keeping. Additional issues by the end of Diogo’s 
first contract that rose were that in less supervised ports such as Benguela and Loango, trade with 
foreigners was happening far too commonly. In Luanda the governor’s ships were given precedence 
for embarkation before the other merchants, which was proving detrimental to the commercial 
                                                 
259
 January 18, 1698, AHU, Angola, cx. 15. 
260
 Ribeiro da Silva, p. 292. 
261
 José Gonçalves Salvador, Os Magnatas do Tráfico Negreiro, Lisbon: Livraria Pioneira Editora, 1981, p. 52. 
262
 Salvador, p. 53. 
263
 Ribeiro da Silva, p. 292. 
264
 Miller, Way of Death, p. 555. 
265
 December 22, 1682, AHU, Angola, cx. 12. 
68 
 
activity in the colony.
266
 The preference for the governor’s freight was leaving the port days ahead 
of individuals who were intended to have commercial privileges, “as occurred with avençador João 
da Silva’s lighters.”
267
 Additional problems with the governor were that as the contractors were to 
pay the infantry’s salaries, the contractor wrote a petition to the Crown to stop the governor from 
cutting the military salary by a third. Regardless of the fact that this period was marked by an 
economic downturn, this would have been harmful to the local economy and to the wellbeing of the 
troops, especially since due to the lack of flour, its price had gone up, and the troops were paid in 
part with this commodity as well.
268
 This was only the first issue that the contractor had, as the 
Governor impeded the “free administration of <his> contract”. 
269
  
 In 1690, Diogo da Fonseca Henriques was caught in a scandal that inevitably brought him to 
prison. Because the value of ivory was far greater smuggled than when “sold in the public domain,” 
the contractor in collusion with several other individuals allowed for ivory to enter Luanda from as 
far up as Loango. The occasion on which he was caught exposed that not only was he not adhering 
to the freight standards in terms of how many saves were allotted per shipment, but that he had been 
smuggling large quantities of ivory. In this particular shipment, “forty-one large and seventy-three 
small tusks” were found and confiscated, that were not logged in the customs records.
270
  The ivory 
had come from Loango, passing through the Dande, with soldiers and other officials as 
accomplices. One occasion entailed an English ship that anchored well off the coast of Luanda so as 
not to draw attention, and remained in the port under the pretext of maintenance needs, loading 
ivory at eleven at night under the veil of darkness.  
 The crimes that the contractor allegedly committed were in direct violation of contract 
conditions. Diogo failed to report some of the goods passing through Luanda, he allowed slave 
ships to board beyond capacity, and not only did he allow smuggling, but he colluded with foreign 
merchants. Ivory from Loango that Fonseca Henriques traded in large quantities was shared with 
some of his business associates and factors that he hired for his contract such as businessman 
Manoel do Porto Barboza, that failed to report over thirty thousand reais worth of goods.
271
  A 
devassa initiated by the royal treasury inspector Antonio Pacheco de Almeida was conducted 
surreptitiously with the intent to implicate as many participants as possible. The questionable 
legality of the procedure undertaken with the devassa, however, did not stop Diogo from being sent 
to prison. Regardless of the fact that many of the stipulations of the contract were broken by virtue 
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of the interconnectedness of the specifications, items seventeen and twenty were stated as the most 
directly violated, treating the slave embarkation capacity and the requirement to record transported 
goods respectively. The inspector gathered information such as from the captain-major of the 
jusrisdiction of Dande, in hopes of gathering enough evidence to indict Diogo. By 1695, Diogo had 
been imprisoned for some time, yet was garnering support from colonial officials that testified that 
the devassa had fictitious details.
272
 The governor himself had previously stated that the inspector 
could not be trusted, and that the relationship that the contractor and Pacheco de Almeida had were 
biased, as the two were ‘capital enemies.’
273
 In the same year, colonial officials began to suggest 
that Diogo be let free, regardless of the smuggled ivory and other crimes committed, under the 
auspices of health issues. He had become extremely ill, and had to be bled out several times as a 
result. The health concerns could not be adequately treated in the prison, and three months of house 
arrest were suggested for his recovery. An additional excuse for Diogo’s uncustomary release was 
that he was a fidalgo, with ties to the royal family, which they deemed terms for judicial lenience. 
In 1697, the contractor was freed from the cell and sent home to care for his health and take care of 
his personal business.
274
 After Diogo’s legal issues resolved, he continued to be a prominent 
member of Angolan society and deeply involved in commerce, holding future contracts in the early 
years of the eighteenth century, such as in 1709. Diogo’s prominent position appears to have 
overridden the injustices he committed. It is curious that after the ordeal, and the fact that the 
contract explicitly states that he was still in considerable debt to the Crown from before, they still 
auctioned him the rights.
275
 In addition to the crown, he still owed the Saint Xavier Hospital as well 
as other institutions. Regardless of Diogo’s financial indebtedness, it was clear that general 
consensus considered his business associates untrustworthy, and they desired “more dependable 
people.”
276
 Diogo’s situation shows that the contractors were able to trade on their own terms, and 
that although contraband was illegal the contractors had leverage in its distribution without fear of 
severe consequences. The source of a great deal of Diogo’s contraband was Loango because the 
products that he sought to illegally export originated from commercial centers along the northern 
coast. 
 The importance of Loango in the Angolan trade is often overshadowed by places such as 
Luanda and Benguela. Because a large portion of the slaves and valued products such as ivory were 
abundant in Loango, it was a valued place for merchants and contractors. It was also virtually 
impossible to trade in Loango without frequent interaction with other European empires. Regardless 
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of the fact that Diogo da Fonseca Henriques may have conducted illicit commerce or evaded taxes, 
his situation serves to show that the Loango Coast was important to Angolan commerce. Loango 
was also a location where essential commercial products overlapped. The slaves and ivory 
converged there, not only because both the human cargo and ivory were extracted from there, but 
because ivory was in many cases used amongst the goods traded for slaves in the region.
277
 The 
copper used as currency was also produced in that area, making the Loango coast a valuable part of 
the Portuguese West African coast. Diogo was an example of the preferred treatment that the 
businessmen in Angola received, and although the products exported from Angola left through 
Luanda, many of the most valuable items were most easily acquired and transported from Loango. 
However, the turn of the eighteenth century marked a series of conflicts between the Portuguese 
and other European powers that all desired commercial supremacy in the region. If the Portuguese 
Crown lost control, or worse, could no longer commercialize the region, a major supply of goods 
would be inaccessible and thus the contracts could not be filled.  
Commerce on the Loango Coast and British Opposition 
 The Loango Coast was an expanse of the African littoral that the Portuguese colonizers gave 
primarily commercial focus throughout their expansionist efforts in Angola. Loango was 
comparatively under explored, and a number of factors lead to its underdevelopment as a premier 
colonial entrepôt. Firstly, concentration on Benguela and especially Luanda was already important 
for trade relationships, and as colonization in the interior was largely unsuccessful, financial and 
human resources were concentrated there. The depression in the second half of the seventeenth 
century made expanding up the coast past the Congo River even more difficult. Also, the Vili 
kingdom still controlled the region, and it was difficult to maintain a settlement in the area. 
Although the Portuguese began trading in Loango in 1576, roughly a century after having 
discovered the region, naming the beach Praia Formosa de Santo Domingo, there was still no slave 
trade established, and Luanda was more lucrative at the time. This may be attributable to the fact 
that the raw materials exchanged were valuable subsidies to the slave trade, and that yet another 
slave exportation port would have diminished Luanda’s importance. A last reason for avoiding the 
northern coast was purely geographical. It was extremely difficult to navigate the coast, and even 
anchor a ship in the harbor. As noted through the Portuguese colonization efforts in the interior by 
means of the Kwanza River, waterways were the ideal modes of transporting cargo for export. The 
rivers that flowed into the Atlantic along the coast were impossible to enter. At virtually every river 
opening, a sandbar crossed the entirety of the entrance. The only river that was remotely traversable 
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was the Chiloango, whereas the long coastal sea shelf elsewhere required trading vessels to anchor 
as far as a mile out to sea.
278
  
 The trade monopoly on the coast beginning with the establishment of Angola produced a 
plethora of goods that were useful to Portuguese traders in Luanda and throughout the empire. 
Some of the most important products traded at daily markets were elephant tusks, skins, palm-cloth 
used for the macuta, elephant tail hairs, redwood, and copper.
279
 Elephant tusks were a desired 
commodity in the metropole, as well as copper, which was equally desired in Luanda. Because the 
Portuguese could ship the products to Luanda, Loango’s raw materials were regular additions to the 
circulation of goods in the colony. 
 By 1600, the Portuguese monopoly gave into the Dutch, who began trading intensively in 
the region. The Vili leader, Manikongo, was a fervent supporter of free trade, who welcomed the 
presence of European newcomers. The absence of a Portuguese military presence and politico-
economic pressures
280
 made it impossible for there to be any legitimate concern for retaliation. The 
free trade policy of the Vili Kingdom was a marked characteristic of the period, and severely 
checked Portuguese influence. Only after the sustained Dutch presence for a half-century did the 
slave market begin to appear. With the Dutch intrusion in Brazil after 1624, they became 
increasingly interested in creating a slave trade network. By the late 1600’s, the Dutch had set up a 
series of factories along the coast, but they closed them in order to trade directly from their ships in 
the mid 1680’s. This may have been in part due to the fact that the English Royal African Company 
arrived in 1672,
281
 drawing from the slave trade as well. By the end of the 17
th
 century, Loango was 
exporting in excess of 10,000 slaves annually.
282
 The trade to the West of the Vili Kingdom created 
new opportunities for them as more and more villagers became involved in commerce. New trade 
sector hierarchies emerged that enriched the Loango natives, allowing them to become proactive 
about their own financial security that caused a decomposition of the formerly centralized society. 
The Europeans still traded on the African terms, but the seventeenth century witnessed the move 
from the use-based economy to the more integrated multinational export system.
283
 This was 
important to the coast’s development as a commercial center, but it additionally aided in expanding 
the other European powers’ spheres of influence at the ports and inland.  
 In 1702, the French first appeared on the Loango Coast after Dutch and British success in 
the territory. They arrived through military force, much as they did in Benguela, although it was 
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unnecessary in Loango’s case. French traders were able to offer higher quality goods. The products 
at French disposal were also potentially cheaper because they were able to draw from colonies in 
relatively close proximity that were also potentially more exotic, such as Mauritius and Reunion.
284
 
Shortly after the French attack at Benguela, in 1706 the French contingent left the Loango Coast 
because of difficulties resulting from the War of Spanish Succession. However, 1712 marked their 
steady return to the trading zones.
285
 By this time, the four European empires were trading 
concurrently in Loango, contributing to the growing prominence of other ports such as Cabinda, 
Kakongo, Nsoyo, and Malemba.  
 The fact that the Loango Coast was enjoying free trade amongst the various participants 
meant that there was increased competition between the empires. This cheapened the price of the 
products exchanged. Loango thus achieved a comparative advantage over Luanda that was still 
monopolized by Portuguese trade. The free trade agreement between the Africans and Europeans 
especially in “Loango, Cabinda, and Sonyo”
286
 was noted in Luanda as due to the fact that the 
slaves supplying coastal markets were far closer geographically to the ports than they were in 
Luanda that had become depopulated in that respect. “The capture of slaves was greater because of 
the brevity of the journey,” and the methods of slave acquisition were not as strenuous as they were 
in other locations throughout Angola, as with the Portuguese style, “there are always wars.”
287
 It 
became so clear that Loango was a commercial success, that by 1717 non-Portuguese trade at the 
area was “named as the cause of decreased trade at Luanda.”
288
 This may have been the turning 
point, but it was not by any means new to the Portuguese merchants at the Angolan capital city.  
 The Vili inhabitants involved in the trade sector that evolved into a stratified system of 
commercial positions began to expand their trading methods long before this. The Vili foot traders, 
called mubires by the Portuguese, began to encroach upon the territory that the Portuguese 
dominated. Portuguese contemporaries appear to have associated these traders exclusively with the 
English, but they were contracted traders much like the pombeiros in Portuguese Angola. The 
mubires originated from the lower Loango Coast, and travelled over tremendous amounts of 
territory. They collected goods such as cloth, salt, and even travelled over 150 kilometers through 
the Teke controlled Mindouli region in search of copper.
289
 However, the facility with trade that the 
mubires held was not the only thing that the Portuguese feared. As early as 1682, the English were 
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trading with them as far down as the Portuguese district of Dande, trading with the captain-major.
290
 
Not only confined to the sought-after ivory or tobacco, the mubires were exchanging firearms, 
gunpowder and ammunition even to the African populous, a practice that empowered the Africans 
to retaliate against the violent raids.
291
  
 This was becoming increasingly problematic, as the mubires were noted not just in the 
Dande, but in the Congo and Sonyo, which was also considered by the Portuguese to be under their 
jurisdiction. Equally as alarming as the sale of firearms to natives, was the fact that they “sell their 
goods cheaper than <the Portuguese>.”
292
 The continued impingement on Portuguese territory 
eventually culminated in a treaty with the Kingdom of Kongo in 1684 not to allow mubires to enter 
their jurisdiction. The treaty asks that only the pombeiros be allowed to enter the kingdom, or 
rather, only people associated with Portugal in order to maintain their commercial preeminence.
293
 
São Salvador had been a primary destination for the mubires, and many of them had originated 
from within the Kongo. The issues that surfaced from mubires trading further south in Portuguese 
territory however did not entirely subside.  
  n the 1720’s, English merchants tried to create the subsequent monopoly on Loango trade. 
They began at Cabinda with the intent of expanding throughout the coast. On August 24, 1721 
Captain Antonio Pinheiro returned with news of being robbed of goods that he brought to exchange 
for slaves to be sent to Rio de Janeiro by Dutch traders.
294
 In addition to the unfortunate report, he 
stated that he was given news that English corsairs had begun constructing a fort within “a few 
leagues of the port”.
295
 The English arrived with individuals such as clerks, surgeon mates, a 
chaplain, and six soldiers under the pretext that it was only for their own protection.
 296
  It soon 
became evident that it was their first attempt at the trade monopoly. Materials were brought to the 
area for construction, and many merchants and captains already arrived that were to live by the fort. 
The information originated from Africans that were also told the news second hand. English 
merchants had sailed past Luanda without stopping my as a way of flaunting the fact that they now 
had a land holding on the coast, but the gravity of the situation still awaited corroboration.  
 Constructing a fort in Cabinda carried serious implications. Commerce in that region was 
already extremely disruptive to Portuguese merchants, and creating a fort meant not only that the 
English intended to permanently commercialize the area, but that they intended to stay. Dutch and 
French merchants were equally preoccupied with the prospect of their commercial competitors 
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having a fort by the most important port in the area, but the Portuguese felt as though they had the 
most at stake, adamant that this was “<their> land.”
297
 Anticipation of official confirmation of the 
English fort at Cabinda aroused speculation regarding potential threats this could create. 
Apprehension over the unknown, coupled with previous difficulties that the Portuguese had 
incurred due to the English trade beforehand startled those down in Luanda with the potential 
“terrible consequences towards the usefulness of commerce in the kingdom.”
298
 The English 
persistence was menacing, especially as the Portuguese imagined their favored products being sold 
in larger volume than they already were, due to the “liberality, scope, and economical” trade 
strategy that the Anglo-Saxons had already proven possible.
299
  
 The lack of available ships in Luanda noted by several contemporaries could not compete 
with the prices at Loango. By the time ships arrived, with much fewer goods than the other 
Europeans, the prices would have been much higher than the competitive rate. Bringing more ships 
was too costly for the royal treasury, but the captain-majors had been sent notice under an initiative 
sent by governor Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho to confiscate the mubires goods 
such as tobacco before they returned to the British.
300
 The forts connection was concerning as the 
captain-majors had clearly proven themselves undependable in respect to trade restrictions, and the 
pombeiros were revealing that their goods were not nearly as desirable as the offers from the 
mubires. The initial hope was that if the mubires were sufficiently blocked from commerce within 
Portuguese territory, it would discourage the English enough for them to leave Cabinda.
301
 The 
prohibition effort resulted primarily in recovering valuable goods such as elephant tusks
302
 that the 
mubires exchanged with tobacco, likely because of the monetary and social capital associated with 
it, although the mandate was not considerably successful.  
 A Portuguese delegate was sent to Cabinda with intent to discover what the English were 
planning to do with the fort, and to declare that the line of demarcation of the Portuguese 
jurisdiction indicated that they could go no further south. The Portuguese discovered through the 
exchange that vassals of the local King of Angoy sold a plot of land to the British, because they 
were “immediately satisfied with the <English> goods.”
303
 There is conflicting information 
regarding the terms under which the fort was bought, however, the King of Angoy appears to have 
ceded the land for commercial purposes but did not license the fort’s construction.
304
 The King 
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attempted to retaliate with war against the British, but without success. The British almost 
immediately began trading from the fort, showing that the express purpose of the structure at 
Cabinda was to “take over” the harbor.
305
  
 By December, Capuchin missionaries working in the area confirmed the construction of the 
fort as well, stating that not only had the fort been erected, but that they had mounted sixteen pieces 
of artillery, that a year later was increased to eighteen.
306
 The fort was made with four one hundred 
foot long bastions that were four by twenty feet thick. Lacking a wall, it had a ditch that surrounded 
the structure that was ten feet deep and twenty feet wide.
307
 In addition to the fort led by British 
captain Hereford, houses were built for English merchants. When the King of Angoy failed to 
respond to a plea to restrict the English from building more houses in the bay it became clear from 
this point forward that the Portuguese needed to act themselves. The conflict arose from the 
Portuguese asserting that the Loango Coast was supposed to be under their jurisdiction, and 
Cabinda becoming an English monopoly spurred reactionary measures. Portuguese merchants and 
missionaries were the first to reach Cabinda, and they assumed that the native population was still 
dependent on Portuguese imports. In fact, one rationalization for promoting military action against 
the English at Cabinda was the relationship with the natives. Before the English could further 
influence the native traders, the Portuguese felt that if they attacked Cabinda, they would not incur a 
great deal of damage because the natives would side with them. “ t <was> not possible for <the 
Africans> to war with <them>” because they “are greatly dependent on having commerce in 
<Portuguese> territory.”
308
 The natives cited that lived by commercial relationships extending 
increasingly further into the Portuguese jurisdiction in order to commercialize areas as far as São 
Salvador and Dande were the very people that the Portuguese had attempted to keep out of their 
lands for the previous half-century. Now realizing that force was necessary in order to expel the 
stubborn British, the English merchants in addition to the sale of property, attributed the legitimacy 




 The British soon began to restrict trade to Cabinda, and Portuguese merchants were forced 
to go elsewhere in order to make up for the goods that they normally exchanged there.
310
 The 
Portuguese merchants where closed off from trade there by 1722, which cut down on the raw 
materials such as ivory that they had customarily brought back to Luanda, as well as slaves. After 
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being entirely excluded from trade, the gravity of the situation became exceedingly clear. 
Apprehension over competition caused by the democratization of export trade in the northern coast 
had led to exclusivity, turning Portuguese trading vessels away upon arrival. At this juncture, 
Portuguese officials in Luanda considered the appropriation of Cabinda a subject of “highest 
importance.”
311
 New implications began to emerge after experiencing the impossibility of trading at 
Cabinda.  
 The loss of Cabinda did not just force the Portuguese traders to trade at other ports. If the 
English ‘corsairs’ were capable of restricting trade at Cabinda, there was little doubt that they 
would not only attempt, but succeed in expanding their monopoly to the other major export centers 
along the West African littoral. Cabinda had been essential for exporting not just ivory, but products 
extracted from mines inland of the Northern zone as well, and because Cabinda was the major port, 
in order to recuperate losses merchants would have to go to multiple ports for the same amount of 
merchandise. Discovering new ports and forging new coastal relationships was “useless” when 
faced with the reality that Portuguese merchants were already extricating between three and four 
thousand slaves per annum.
312
 Finding new commercial zones would severely impede the ability of 
the Portuguese merchants to meet the demands stipulated in the contract attributed to Francisco 
Gomes Lisboa, contractor of the royal duties of the territory of Angola.
313
 Losses that may be 
recoverable in the short term were destined to be impossible in the future; especially if the English 
advanced at the same pace that they had previous to this. In October of 1722, the council implored 
Lisbon to negotiate with the King of England, and if it led to no avail, to send a warship to surprise 
and evict the English settlers, as they had been equally aggressive with Portuguese merchants 
previously in Cabinda.
314
 This could not be done from Luanda because there was already a lack of 
troops and other military resources that prevented them from doing so.  
 In the same year the French were excluded from trade as well, and British war vessels were 
stationed there for defense. British forces soon destroyed a French factory, and it became known 
that British settlers planned to extend their monopoly to Malemba. The French traders sent for help 
from the Crown to attack the English fort, unaware that the Portuguese had already done so. In 
1723, a Portuguese military vessel arrived at Cabinda that with help from others including the Vili 
natives razed the fort to the ground.
315
 The destruction of the English fort paralyzed their monopoly 
as well as their presence in Cabinda, and aided in restoring the freedom of trade that preceded it. 
From this point onward, although there was no clear European monopolistic hold for many years, 
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the Portuguese were aware of the fact that they had a minimal presence in Loango comparatively to 
the coast South of the region. Despite the Portuguese contracts stating that the recipients had a 
monopoly on the goods extracted from the region, the lack of resources and forceful presence lead 




 Commercial relationships on the Angolan coast at the turn of the eighteenth century were 
crucial to the functionality of the colony. Luanda was the preeminent port for the colonial import 
and export of raw materials and human cargo. Notwithstanding, other ports within the Portuguese 
colony fed the trade networks with materials that converged at Luanda, and sent elsewhere in the 
Atlantic. The distinct tasks within the commercial system were allocated to differing social groups 
but the network was only able to function as an aggregate of the parts. The pombeiros were 
intermediaries that occupied the lowest level of the trade network, connecting major trading centers 
in the interior with the coast. In addition to the African traders in Angola, many other individuals 
from myriad backgrounds and careers composed crucial roles in the exchange of import and export 
goods in Angola. These Luso-Africans residing in Angola traded amongst Africans as well as 
Europeans on a number of levels that devoted their lives to commerce, preparing goods for sale, and 
largely dependent on credit systems for the sustenance and growth of their commercial enterprise. 
 The credit system in Angola was extremely complex, creating a system of 
interconnectedness that encompassed all of the commercial actors. The credit system included 
materials or leaflets that signified that one individual or party owed another. Some forms of credit 
were more secure than others, especially when the quantity or quality of the goods was high, or 
when the transport conditions or level of trust created a high-risk environment. Some forms of 
credit depended on daily or weekly interactions, whereas others could take years to redeem. The 
risk involved in the credit arrangements largely depended on the amount of time before redemption, 
bringing traders deeper into debt through the constant need to generate material goods or capital in 
order to satisfy outstanding payments. Notwithstanding, the credit relationships in Angola were 
allowed to function through the influx of credit backed by businessmen either residing in Angola, or 
coming from places such as the metropole or Brazil. The businessmen’s investments in Angola 
generated the capital necessary for the rest of the colony to lend resources, and for trans-Atlantic 
commerce to grow.  
 The high-volume merchants were essential to Angolan commerce, as the credit they lent out 
created the circulation of goods, and transversely, the means of production. The Angolan currencies 
were undependable, subjected to scarcity of resources, and caused many internal problems in 
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Angola. The institution of copper was intended to solve many of the problems associated with the 
cloth and straw currencies, but its own scarcity and valuation conflicts were constant. Credit 
secured a steady flow of capital that allowed goods transported from hinterland merchants to feed 
demand throughout the Atlantic Ocean. The businessmen entered this system as financiers for the 
steady circulation of trade goods that connected the Angolan local economy to others throughout 
the empire. In this way, in most cases the businessmen were able to reap enormous returns from the 
transfer of raw materials rather than direct ownership of them, which was yet another benefit to the 
risk-averse business culture. Financing the slave trade was a way for the businessmen to create the 
means of production that cultivated products imported to Angola.  The major products exported 
from Angola, primarily slaves, and secondarily ivory held the highest social and monetary value for 
sale.  
 Businessmen were heavily involved in the slave trade, whether they were holders of the 
royal tax-farming contract, or merchants that held licenses to transport the slaves from Luanda. The 
royal contracts were an effective way for businessmen to accrue great personal wealth, and trade 
under their own terms within the guidelines of the contract. Contracts were in essence a public-
private partnership with the crown that not only garnered wealth for the holder, but also generated 
short-term benefits for the Crown in auctioning the agreement, as well as a sustained tax on the flux 
of goods in the colony that helped both the metropole and Angola. The yearly dues that the 
contractor paid for the duration of the six-year contracts, especially as a function of the slave trade, 
supported the colony by supporting the municipal infrastructure and paying salaries of particular 
institutions.  
 In virtually all of the contracts awarded at the turn of the eighteenth century, the first 
contractor obligation stipulated is subsidizing the infantry’s salary in Angola. The fact that military 
subsidies were prioritized shows that the wellbeing of the colony was dependent on the success of 
the commercial sector. This also shows that although traders worked within specific functions, the 
Angolan trade transcended other spheres of the Angolan colonial sectors. This evinces the 
importance that the military had to commerce itself. At this time in Angola, the “politics and the 
economy <were> deeply intertwined. The first <asked> for and <gave> a lot to the second.”
317
 
Many of the civil leaders were also merchants, and the inherently militaristic government in Angola 
was just as dependent on commerce for their salaries, as trade was dependent on the expansionist 
ideals of the military. When the governor’s salary rose after 1720 because of commercial conflict of 
interest, the contractor was mandated to collect taxes on slaves to provide the increase in salary. Not 
only were military raids a method of enslavement until the 1720s, but colonial expansion was 
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essential to the colony in order to expand commercial influence among the African communities, 
and move the Portuguese colonial control further inland as products became increasingly difficult to 
acquire. The monopoly contracts specified a slave export quota that required slaves sent from other 
ports in the colony in order to meet it. Because the contracts gave the rights to Angola, Loango, the 
Kongo, and Benguela, large amounts of products were shipped from those locations to Luanda 
before export to their final destinations. Loango supplied a great deal of slaves, as well as ivory to 
Luanda, which made it an integral part of the Angolan economy.  
 The latter part of the seventeenth century experienced a decline in Portuguese influence in 
Loango. The Loango coast had a series of important ports that were monopolized by the Dutch for 
the last three decades of the century. French and English merchants became heavily involved in 
trade in the region that the Portuguese considered under their jurisdiction for centuries. When 
British merchants attempted to forge a monopoly in Cabinda, it would have blocked the Portuguese 
from trade there entirely, inhibiting the Angolan contractors from meeting their demands. Land 
possession was also important to the time period, and an English stronghold in Cabinda signified 
British encroachment on Portuguese territory, as well as on the ability of other European nations to 
trade there. This was certainly not an irrational fear for the Portuguese merchants, because English 
merchants had already begun to trade within Portuguese territory through their African porters. 
Loango is exemplary of the Angolan African societies’ hegemony over trade relationships, while 
becoming integrated into the European trade networks. Portuguese colonists expressed this fear 
with the 1684 attempt to prohibit the entry of the mubires into the Kongo and below, but the 
insidious nature of the Loango traders into Portuguese areas was impossible to regulate, especially 
since Portugal had no military presence there. 
 The Loango Coast serves to show that the peripheral region of Portuguese Angola was 
equally important on the commercial level to the territory in its entirety. Through conflicts and trade 
losses due to the porters originating on the coast, it is clear that even the most organic level of trade 
affected the continuity and connectivity of the entire system. This also indicates that the coastal 
businessmen were directly impacted through difficulties associated with foreign trade and 
commercial control of the area. Although Luanda was the Portuguese central port, a large portion of 
the most important exports originated in Loango. When the Portuguese military finally took 
military action at the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, it showed that the universal 
Portuguese commercial interest in maintaining commerce in the region, and support from military 






The Angolan Slave Trade: The Atlantic Dimension 
 This chapter centers on the Angolan dimension of the Atlantic slave trade at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. It was a period of change and transformation that impacted several other facets 
such as the Angolan commercial and political arenas. The slave trade was a product of the 
colonization efforts in Angola, and the backdrop through which many of the motives discussed in 
the previous chapters were shaped. Three of the most important events were a law that restricted the 
number of slaves on each vessel for export, the discovery of gold in Brazil and the government 
officials’ exclusion from trade in 1720. The impact that these occurrences had on the slave trade 
will be explored. In order to enrich the discussion, the vantage points through which slavery can be 
studied must first be considered. Slavery as an ideology and an institution, as well as the current 
state of study on slavery and African participation in the trade are crucial to a better understanding 
of the trade itself, and the repercussions incurred by the aforementioned significant events. Atlantic 
History is a field of study that is gaining prominence in the academic sphere. Recent scholarship as 
well as problem areas posed by the authors aids in framing the Atlantic world, and in this case the 
South Atlantic, through which the history of the Angolan slave trade in this period can be studied. 
 A fundamental aspect of the Angolan economy at the turn of the eighteenth century was the 
Atlantic slave trade. The external slave trade consumed the Angolan commercial sector either 
directly or indirectly. Whether merchants that comprised the network of trade relationships that 
resulted in slaves being sent throughout the Atlantic, or military, religious, or political figures 
entered the trade for personal economic reasons, it was an omnipresent enterprise that involved all 
of the major ports on the Angolan coast. In addition to the slave exports emanating from ports such 
as Luanda, the hinterland was essential to the acquisition and transport of human cargo. The 
relationship expressed in the previous chapters between the hinterland and the coast eventually 
extended far beyond the territorial boundaries of Angola throughout the Atlantic as the slaves 
embarked on their voyage of forced expatriation. The external dimension of the Angolan slave trade 
was fundamental to the formation of the Atlantic world, and especially in the Southern hemisphere. 
This period marked a crucial change in the Angolan economy, and the greater Atlantic community.  
The Angolan Slave Trade and Atlantic History 
 The extraction of slaves from Angola began as early as the first Portuguese contact in the 
region. The slave trade was a preexisting institution in northern Africa and the Atlantic archipelagos 
as Portuguese explorers and merchants moved farther South and East.
318
 When the Portuguese 
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reached Angola, they immediately began slave trading. Luanda was initially considered the 
mainland entrepôt for slave trading after moving south of São Tomé. The first slave missions in 
Angola extracted slaves from coastal areas by force. This was consistent with the universal 
acceptance of slavery as spoils of conquest, aside from clear racial justifications.
319
 After this was 
performed for a short time, the Portuguese were forced to move inward, while adapting to the local 
economic structures, and using war as a means for accruing human cargo. Using solely brute force 
was a failed short-term strategy because the Africans outnumbered the Europeans, and the 
European warring technology at the time could not easily defeat the Africans. Although African 
ships could not traverse the Atlantic, they were agile and efficient in protecting their coastline. The 
European firearms took a very long time to load, and the African weapons such as crossbows were 
far more efficient weaponry as a result. It was not until the late seventeenth century that 
improvements in firearm technology allowed Europeans to have a decided advantage in that 
respect.
320
 It was when the Portuguese had a sustained coastal and interior presence that they could 
use warring methods to extract slaves from the interior.  
 The slave trade was by no means foreign to Africans. Africans did not necessarily have a 
slave trade, but they certainly had a slave system. Within the slave system, the acquisition of 
coerced human dependents was extremely important for societal reasons such as status. The number 
of slaves was corollary to the height of an individual’s social stratum. Even African laws 
concerning products were based in taxation and slaves.
321
 In the European ideology of power and 
social prowess, property was the single greatest signifier. For Europeans, property was inextricably 
linked to the means of production: land ownership provided the ability to cultivate products for sale. 
Africans adhering to the institution of communal land viewed slaves as the means of production as 
they cultivated the shared land, producing goods. As such, the means of production held 
commercial value. The “capture, purchase, transport, and sale of slaves was a regular feature of 
African society.”
322
 Therefore, one can assume that when Europeans entered African markets, they 
were met with vast opportunities to buy slaves within the existing infrastructure. After a growing 
shortage of supply, the Portuguese used military and judicial methods, and later focused on debt 
related slavery. The European concept of slavery as a mercantile good is important to understand 
within the Atlantic economy, because it was dependent on the demand which fueled the need for 
supply, making slavery not only dependent on the demand for slaves, but on the demand for 
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products that required slave labor.
323
 The slaves were only as valuable as their need to cultivate 
goods throughout the Atlantic, which is a fundamental concept of this chapter. 
 Given that the African nations essentially controlled the influx of goods into the interior as 
well as the slave trade to the coast, Portuguese colonization efforts through economic means was 
essential to the influx of slaves. Using the African economic systems, the Portuguese were often 
challenged by African distain for monopoly privileges, as seen in Loango. The presídios were 
essential for this reason because even though they were only symbolic of control, they guaranteed a 
continuity of trade throughout the colony. The maintenance of Portuguese presence in the internal 
trade networks made trade possible in the interior that reinforced the importance of goods of 
external provenance that assumed social value. Aside from the fact that the Europeans largely 
traded in Africa through African consent, the intrinsic value ascribed to the goods exchanged was 
incomparable. Second rate manufactured materials or agricultural products were far less 
economically valuable than slaves that could provide several times their worth in those goods 
through manpower.
324
 Commerce and especially the slave trade merged the African and Portuguese 
commercial systems in a way that was preferential towards the Europeans; but these commercial 
interactions also aided in African inclusion in the greater Atlantic network. 
 Academic analysis of the slave trade began as late as the 1 30’s,
325
 and remained sporadic 
for decades afterwards. The likely impetus that lead to studying the slave trade was an intellectual 
change after world war One in which European imperialism was questioned. The start to the study 
of the slave trade did not gain momentum for decades, probably due to a number of factors, 
however the most salient factor that scholars attribute to this is the “conspiracy of silence” because 
of the guilt and emotional nature of the subject. The 1 50’s and 60’s experienced a rise in African 
history that followed with the first attempts at quantifying the slave trade. Philip Curtin’s work in 
1969
326
 was a comprehensive slave trade census performed because he believed that the previous 
censuses were exaggerations, yet it focused primarily on secondary sources for its findings.
327
 This 
lead authors to challenge the results such as David Eltis as well as others to estimate the slave 
export volume from particular locations or empires. From the final years of the 20
th
 century until 
the present, much of the academic work has addressed the problem areas associated with the 
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 The major issues, perhaps the most difficult to resolve, are concerned with a divergence 
from a European or imperialist perspective, and the definition of parameters through which the 
study of slavery should be conducted. The parameters that many slave trade historians disagree 
upon are consistent and should coincide with concrete and ideological boundaries sought by 
Atlantic historians. Atlantic History is a growing field in historical research as a separate entity 
from the rest of the world. Because the slave trade from Angola had an intrinsically Atlantic 
dimension, the slave trade can serve to define the parameters of Atlantic History through the lens of 
its principle problem areas, while setting the stage for the turn of the eighteenth century as a 
significant period of transformation.  
 In order to understand the essence of Atlantic History, one must start at the beginning. 
In many highly credible sources, the first work in the image of Atlantic History was published 
in 1949 when Fernand Braudel wrote a monumental multivolume work entitled La 
Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen a l’Époque de Filippe   . Citing this book as the 
beginning, many authors credit the work with not the first real Atlantic History, but the first 
with conceptually new and relevant material analogous to what Atlantic History has become 
today. This is clearly the fist history of the Mediterranean as a concept that works into the 
greater agenda of contemporary Atlanticists, considering the oceanic space as a singular 
component. Using this work as a reference point for the formation of a similar Atlantic 
example, a comparison can be achieved. Atlanticist Alison Games cites this work as the 
beginning of Atlantic history, as many historians can be considered ‘Braudelian Atlanticists.’ 
These historians include entire regions, characterizing geographic and historical components, 
and seek to discover vantage points that are not rooted in any one particular place.
329
 
 Braudel’s work as a reference, although spatially analogous, received criticism from 
Atlanticist Bernard Bailyn. Bailyn conceded this spatial relationship, but asserts that Braudel’s 
work is a disaggregative rather than aggregative history, of a Mediterranean comprised of 
several worlds. Instead of attempting to show the connectedness of the sea, he shows the 
opposite. Bailyn continues the critique stating that rather than the book being historical, it is 
epistemological, and is more poetic than it is intellectual. Subsequent histories situated in the 
Atlantic spoke of exploration and discoveries that showed how a new world was eventually 
discovered, but these narratives were limited in demonstrating what the world was actually 
like.
330
 Early Modern Atlantic actors also wrote with the intention of their own kingdom to be 
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the reading audience instead of showing a greater interconnectedness that can be extracted 
from the magnitude of cross-imperial sources today. The emphasis on particular empires 
creates another problem because it is not the intention of Atlantic History to be perceived as a 
history of colonization. An egalitarian approach to studying the Atlantic should be promoted 
instead.  
 Bailyn believes that Atlantic History did not come into being by chance or because of 
intellectual curiosity, but because of events that shaped the way in which people viewed the 
world. Until the twentieth century, much emphasis was placed on one’s national identity rather 
than a worldly viewpoint. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the world suffered a 
great transformation resulting from World War One. The First World War opened people to the 
idea of a worldly interconnectedness. Walter Lippmann, a journalist in 1917 wrote an editorial 
called ‘The New Republic’ in which he highlighted the necessity for the western world to stay 
interconnected in order to continue its primacy as the world superpower. Lippmann wrote of 




 Although Walter Lippmann was a journalist and not a historian, this shows a cultural 
transformation as a result of the war that may have geared people towards thinking in a more 
connected way. These views disappeared into the isolationism that resulted after the war, but 
they returned in World War Two. In the wake of the Second World War, Lippmann himself 
reappeared, and began reasserting his views of a necessity for this interconnectedness in stride 
with another journalist Forrest Davis. He supported a post war New World Order that assumed 
the participation of culturally European states that all functioned under the Atlantic World’s 
scope.
332
 These examples show that it may have been cultural conditioning that moved people 
towards a situational conception of the world as a connected entity because of the particular 
circumstance of the World Wars and at the time. Western thinkers were conditioned to 
understand the connectedness of the world to have a western hegemony, comprised of the 
nations situated on the littoral of the Atlantic Ocean. Contemporaries that ascribed to this 
mentality began to write collective histories of the Atlantic.  
 Some contemporaries of this post-war time period began to write histories that built the 
framework for the history of the Atlantic. Ross Hoffman of Fordham University in 1945 wrote 
a work about the spread of Western Christianity throughout the Atlantic.
333
 This became one of 
the first works that followed the spread of an ideology throughout the Atlantic World. Soon 
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afterwards, a British historian H. Hale Bellot expressed his belief that British schools  should 
teach American history not as a separate entity, but rather as an extension of the British 
Atlantic identity.
334
 Jaques Godechot wrote in 1947, L’Histoire de L’Atlantique. This is of 
particular significance because, as Federica Morelli and Alejandro Gomez critique in their 
work “La Nueva Historia Atlantica: Un Asunto de Escalas,” the vast majority of Atlantic 
History works were and are being published by Anglophone authors.
335
 This homogeneity of 
the authors’ linguistic, cultural and educational background may prime the Anglophone 
thinkers to react to Atlantic History in a similar although not necessarily more correct or 
objective way. Although Anglo-American historians have produced a continued trend of 
macro-historical works concerning the Atlantic, Lusophone authors have begun producing an 
increasing number of recent works with an Atlantic scope such as O Antigo Regime nos 
Trópicos: A dinâmica Imperial Portuguesa that follows an analysis of the Portuguese political 
institutions in the South Atlantic, or Luis Felipe de Alencastro’s work on the slave trade O 
Trato dos Viventes: A Formação do Atlântico Sul.
336
  
 The first book to use the terminology ‘Atlantic System’ was Robert R. Palmer’s The 
Age of Democratic Revolution comprised of two volumes that came out in 1959 and 1964 
respectively. This work discussed the revolutionary processes seen in Western Europe and 
America in the eighteenth century. This book sparked a great interest in the Atlantic, and 
further conditioned the Atlanticists to uphold the concept of a ‘Western Civilization’ in 
contrast to Eastern or a smaller scale distinction.
337
 After the publication of this book, many 
more authors began to write Atlantic Histories. Most wrote about the expansion of the empires 
of their heritage, and as time progressed and more authors wrote on the subject, an explosion 
of concepts and terminologies came to the literary sphere and academic parlance.  
 The usage of the term Atlantic System is commonplace in contemporary Atlantic 
Histories. The ideology behind the usage is based in the belief that national economic systems 
existed, which would either make Atlantic History into an aggregate of several sub-systems or 
empires with an Atlantic dimension, or create several separate Atlantic Histories. Aside from 
giving Atlantic History a European slant, the reality is that this would be extremely difficult to 
define because of the mobile nature of people throughout the Early Modern period. People 
could resolve this by where they resided or were born, or generalizing nationalities into larger 
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groups such as Iberian for example. However, this would conflict with how the Atlantic actors 
viewed themselves.
338
 By giving precedence to the Atlantic systems, only the sea and the 
coastline can adequately be considered, whereas it is clear that raw materials or interior 
institutions such as trade and industry among Africans were deciding factors for the fluidity of 
the coastal and trans-Atlantic economy. Additionally, with high degrees of assimilation on the 
various continents, it becomes difficult to designate each of the various empires as purely 
Portuguese, Spanish, etc. The slave system itself was an institution that was born out of a 
common need for manpower, yet was dealt with in a plethora of ways depending on region, 
necessary tasks, the way that the slaves were traded locally, and obviously, because the slaves 
came from interior regions. The hinterland cannot be ignored in Atlantic histories, since the 
slave trade, mineral extraction, and local industries that made intercontinental transport 
possible must be considered. The captain-majors interest in trading with foreigners was driven 
by economic incentives, rather than what contemporaries viewed as corruption. Their 
oftentimes intimate association with the African communities and isolation from the metropole 
led them to feel less of a Portuguese affiliation, which led them to create additional networks. 
This is an example of what lead the newest wave of Atlanticists to try to find axis points within 
commercial networks that transcend national boundaries as the idea of nation-state is a 
designation that post-dates this period,
339
 linking regions or continents.  
 Furthering the movement towards Atlantic History as a concentration, the Commission 
Panamericaine d’Histoire became the first truly scientific base for the comparative study of 
institutions that shaped the origins of the Atlantic civilization. This commission produced 
“patterns of colonization and operation from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century: 
Mediterranean and Atlantic areas.”
340
 The trend of Atlantic History continued to develop, and a 
wide range of literature surfaced in the 1 70’s only gaining momentum into the nineties, and 
garnering enough respect as an autonomous axis for study at the turn of the millennium.  In the 
1  0’s, a series of Academic conferences spurred interest in the Area, and many leading 
institutions now award degrees in the field. Conferences such as the Harvard International 
Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World have been running annually since 1995. Other 
conferences have been regularly held at the University of Charleston, and a yearly summer 
seminar at the National University of Ireland- Galway. These are some of the most notable, 
however many others exist, and are gaining recognition.  
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 How Atlantic History gained academic significance is extremely important because it 
describes the societal circumstance from which it arose, in addition to its cultural meaning. It 
also explains the current situation of Atlantic History having formed through the lens of 
primarily Anglophone authors, and focusing primarily on the North Atlantic. The roots are 
important to understanding this area of history, but because the last phase of the development 
rests in roughly a decade of a burgeoning interest in Atlantic History, a comparative 
conceptual analysis makes sense as a way of seeking an understanding of what Atlantic 
History means to the academic community.  
 Contemporary historians take extremely different approaches to understanding Atlantic 
History and its foundation or nodal point as a common reference for setting boundaries for 
studying it. Alison Games is an Atlanticist that considers Atlantic history to be a slice of 
Global history. Games asserts that Atlantic History is a way of looking at global and regional 
processes within a contained unit. Thus, Atlantic History is a way of looking at 
transformations unique to the Atlantic, and those that are derived from global processes. 
Games asserts that Atlantic History can be understood as colonial history rewritten without a 
purely colonial perspective. Atlantic History is to be understood as the space encompassed by 
North America, South America, Africa, and Western Europe. Not only are these four 
continents to be considered, but we must also restore the ocean to Atlantic History. An 
extension of the oceanic concept is rivers as a continuation if the Atlantic. This is seen in the 
first two chapters as the Kwanza river as well as rivers on ports along the Loango coast 
facilitated contact with an inclusion of the hinterland. A common Atlantic identity is not 
possible without the intercontinental interaction afforded by transatlantic voyages. The very 
name of the subject in question shows the inextricable importance that the Atlantic Ocean 
plays in creating the unified region.
341
 Historian Pierre Chaunu suggested that processes of 
ending isolation in some areas and increased inter-societal interaction in the others 
(désenclavement) was an important element in this period.
 342
 Although this appears 
Eurocentric as they navigated these changes, implicit in this is the fact that Africans and 
Native Americans connecting was essential to the idea as well.  
 Alison Games Continues her spatial analysis of the Atlantic World by constituting what 
the Atlantic really is. The Atlantic throughout the Early Modern period to explorers was in fact 
to them several different seas.
343
 This is especially true to Native American and Africans who 
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lived in a very regional context and were not accustomed to trans-Atlantic travel. To those 
people, these separate seas were under different names and varied dramatically in climate.  
Because of such extreme differences climatically, biologically, and culturally, it was not seen 
as one singular space.  
 This makes it clear that the Atlantic Ocean just as much as the four continents that share 
the space are modern constructions. These modern constructions are very new concepts that 
are allocated to the different areas. The idea of the Americas, even just by name, is a European 
construct. This is also true in calling the body of water between the continents by one name to 
describe it: the Atlantic.
344
 This is problematic to the study of Atlantic History because it takes 
what today’s historians call these spaces, and these names are superimposed on anachronistic 
place names. The fundamental problem that this poses is the fact that the analyses proposed by 
historians in order to produce the most accurate findings must consider the subject of study 
from a point of departure as close to the contemporary’s reali ty as possible. In essence, 
discussing historical entities from a broader scope can be detrimental to the work’s focus 
because it may not best describe the context in question because of ideological or institutional 
retrojection resulting from current tendencies and practices in the academic community on 
what was considered the reality of the past.  
 Avoiding retrojection or dangerously broad extrapolations is a crucial component to 
Atlantic History. This is a concern for contemporary Africanists that seek to show the 
importance of African societies in Angola. This gives agency to the African communities that 
have all too often been merged into larger groups that did not view themselves as being a 
singular entity. Although historians have mentioned the kingdoms in early historical works, 
they were not given a central focus. For decades however, authors have focused on the African 
kingdoms such as Gladwyn Murray Childs in her Article discussing various Angolan kingdoms 
however, the source was António de Oliveira de Cadornega’s three volume work A História 
Geral das Guerras Angolanas completed in 1681. Even though this is a primary source that 
spoke of many of the African kingdoms, they were not given a central focus, nor were they 
discussed in extensive detail separately.
345
 In addition, the intrinsically Portuguese perspective 
is what historians try to avoid as they search for that of the African. 
 Since the 1 70’s, authors have been contributing enormously to eliminating the 
Northern bias of Atlantic history. Giving Africa a more central focus in the Atlantic shows the 
contributions that Africa made to the South Atlantic connections between Africa and  Brazil. 
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Instead of focusing on demographic data, they emphasize the “economic and human impacts of 
the slave trade.”
346
 Economic relationships and dependencies are what make Atlantic History 
accessible not only to the Atlantic, but also to the coast and hinterland. The extreme 
interconnectedness of the economic system incorporates the regional African or product 
specializations in the hinterland into the coastal and Atlantic relationship. The regional 
economies also were an incentive for individuals of different backgrounds to interact that 
eventually created creole communities
347
 or identities such as the Luso-Africans or lançados. 
As such, the economic processes are important to the study of the South Atlantic and the 
incorporation of the interior. 
 A contributor to the study of the economic system on a smaller scale is of  singular 
African kingdoms and anomalies in their political, social or commercial structure, as well as 
industries or products. Authors recognize that there is still much work to be done in order to 
achieve this, and in most cases primary sources are scarce. When a particular kingdom has 
been meticulously researched, its own connections to other institutions or nations such as the 
Portuguese, or throughout the Atlantic can be ascertained. Some of the most notable examples 
are John Thornton’s work on the Kingdom of Kongo,
348
 Jan Vansina and Joseph Miller, icons 
of Angolan history who researched many of the African Kingdoms such as Kasange while 
tying them into the Broader Angolan and Atlantic scope, and Beatrix Heintze who wrote 
extensively on Portuguese and African vassal relationships and political structures while also 
focusing on African peoples such as the Kisama
349
 or the Jaga. These authors as well as others 
studied African kingdoms with a particular focus while making important connections to the 
‘bigger picture.’ Discovering differences and intricacies allows historians to designate 
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anomalies within societies and identify trends. Bridging connections between several different 
regions and concepts through multiple perspectives is important to Atlantic History, but this 
becomes challenging when the original context is lost.
350
  
 Fastidious research focused on sub-cultures and singular societies creates a more 
knowledgeable and accurate starting point for broader histories following African institutions 
and cultures on a wider scale. It enriches future works that can adequately distinguish between 
cultures and credit particular peoples or regions with more focus while treating a larger 
spectrum. A plethora of monumentally important works exist that show African influence 
throughout the Atlantic. In addition to John Thornton, some of the most notable works were 
produced by James sweet, who followed African Culture, Heritage, and religion from Africa to 
Brazil, or José Curto who wrote on Brazilian alcohol in Angola, as well as cultural changes in 
Africa and Brazil.
351
 Additionally contributive authors are Paul E. Lovejoy, Robin Law, and 
Walter Romney.
352
 Although these are important studies in order to bring the Atlantic together, 
isolations must be made in order to better understand the extent of contributions throughout the 
area.  
 In order for Atlantic History to function as an area of study, a common language must 
be attained. The Atlantic World is full of innumerable languages from a wide range of people 
and cultures, with drastically differing worldviews. This is important to emphasize in order to 
show the great diversity through which the Atlantic World is perceived. Regardless of 
linguistic differences, the Atlantic World must find a common language of analysis. This area 
of history strives to break from preconceptions formed by the European expansionists. If this is 
to be achieved, a mutually appropriate system of describing the Atlantic World must be found. 
One example is that many Europeans referred to the Americas as the ‘New world’. Not only is 
this insensitive to the Native Americans because the Americas were by no means new to them, 
but their realities did not incorporate the distinctions imposed by the Europeans such as 
national or continental boundaries. Many of the Native American peoples cultural boundar ies 
transcended the impositions imposed by the notion of continents. The same holds true for 
Africa. The European imposed territorial boarders were not consistent with the preexisting 
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cultural boundaries. Through sustained intercontinental interactions, several similarities began 
to arise within the Atlantic World, which makes it easier to make connections between the 
landmasses. This created a new world along with new cultural identities. However, this can be 
simultaneously dangerous.  n Angola’s case, words such as ‘Luso-African’ are a modern 
construct that several historians use in order to group people into a common identity. This is 
important in order to give voice to that demographic, and it simplifies historical analysis. 
However, through this, sub-groups are forgotten or are not given the deserved voice as a 
separate entity. As Atlantic History further develops, historians must procure a more efficient 
and more mutually acceptable language of analysis of the Atlantic World.  
 Peter Coclanis is an Atlantic History dissenter highlighting further problems who wrote 
an article in 2002, and then four years later, wrote another article about Atlantic History with 
updated insights. Coclanis conceded at the onset of his 2006 article “Atlantic World or 
Atlantic/World?” that his views have been revised in terms of his understanding and support of 
Atlantic History. He exhibits a somewhat pessimistic view of Atlantic History, stating that 
Atlantic History has transformed the discipline of history “for better and for worse.”
353
 This 
field of history artificially limits the field of vision, blinding one to processes, developments, 
and conditions of central importance to understanding the Atlantic Ocean.
354
 This is Coclanis’ 
actualized view of Atlantic History as opposed to his former opinion that is dramatically more 
critical.
355
 His former view is in essence similar to that of Games, when she asserted that the 
language used to characterize the Atlantic World is largely Eurocentric. Many of the works 
published within the four years between Coclanis’ two articles have focused on the African 
engagement in Atlantic History. Many authors have also been more aware of Eurocentric 
preconceptions, and his first article’s publication stood at the peak of a great deal of new 
publications breaking away from anachronistic European understandings of the Atlantic 
World.  
 Coclanis’ critique of Atlantic History may have shaped the way that Atlantic History 
has progressed, but his contribution sheds light on why he is not a supporter of Atlant ic 
History. He asserts that a purely Atlantic History is conceptually impossible because outside 
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influences cannot be forgotten that contributed immensely to the formation of the Atlantic 
World. Asiatic influences on western culture were dramatic, and in many ways made 
exploration of the Atlantic possible. In Angola, Asian textiles became essential goods for 
buying slaves because of their exotic allure, and eventually began to replace the African palm 
cloth made primarily in Loango.
356
 The historian goes even further to say that at the height of 
the Atlantic World, there were close connections between the East and West. Many institutions 
and concepts were simultaneously transferred in the West and in the East
357
. The question 
becomes where a distinction can be made between the two spheres. Apart from concurrent 
processes, it is integral to understanding Atlantic History to remember the Asiatic advances. 
Chinese, Indian, and Islamic knowledge such as mathematics, science, engineering, and 
technology were used by Europeans as they formed their Atlantic World.
358
 The Western 
Europeans could not have advanced nearly as quickly if they did not have these integral 
advances, and Atlanticists often conveniently forget this. In fact, the Atlantic world was a 
world made by Europeans, Americans, and Africans created together, including the 
outsiders.
359
 One more aspect that Coclanis asserts about the worldliness of the Atlantic is that 
as the Europeans were traveling throughout the Atlantic, it was an illusion that the European 
powers held a special interest in the Atlantic sphere. Even though the European powers did not 
have the same level of success in colonizing the world outside of the Atlantic, there is no 
reason to believe that the Europeans held a unique interest in the Atlantic.  
  Coclanis concedes that Atlantic History could conceptually work if influences from 
elsewhere in the world were assumed. Here Coclanis Directly critiques another Atlanticist, 
David Armitage. In the introduction to Armitage´s coedited work The British Atlantic World: 
1500-1800, he proposes three different types of Atlantic History. The three kinds are ‘circum-
Atlantic’ history, ‘trans-Atlantic’ history, and ‘cis-Atlantic’ history. ‘Circum-Atlantic’ history 
studies the Atlantic Ocean as a singular entity. This type looks for consistencies throughout the 
entirety of the Atlantic zone, whereas the ‘circum-Atlantic’ history is founded in a comparative 
approach. Instead of viewing the Atlantic as a whole, it seeks to find points of difference and 
variation from which distinctions can be made throughout the four continents. The thi rd type, 
‘cis-Atlantic’ history, covers territories within the Atlantic context. Here, specific examples 
from particular places within the Atlantic are studied, which does not necessarily take other 
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places within the region into account.
360
 Unsatisfied with these three types of Atlantic History, 
Coclanis proposes a fourth. This fourth type is called ‘conjuncto-Atlantic’ history. This style 
of Atlantic History coincides with Coclanis’ agenda of incorporating the East. In instituting 
this fourth type, it could link up Atlantic History with “other questions and other 
historiographies to offer a broader, richer, amplified view of Atlantic dynamics.”
361
 
 The most recent major work, as well as one of the most comprehensive, is a collection 
of essays called Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal. This book edited by Jack Greene and 
Phillip Morgan does a superlative job of reviewing many of the most important contributions 
to Atlantic History. The introduction to the book gives a definition for Atlantic History, as well 
as proposes five problems that arise, and six ways of approaching the study of it. The authors 
give a definition for Atlantic History as the study of the Atlantic basin as the place for 
demographic, economic, social, cultural, and other forms of exchange, and how agents of 
change such as people, pathogens, and plants moved across the Atlantic permanently altered 
the identity of those residing within the Atlantic frame.
362
  
  The five objections presented in this work are very well thought out, and in many ways 
build upon aforementioned objections presented by other authors, although they are presented 
in a way that is far too simplistic. The first objection is that the Atlantic Ocean has no 
geographical enclosure, and thus has no definable unity. The Atlantic was never self-
contained, so there is no justifiable reference point. The second objection is that the Atlantic 
has little coherence or commonality.
363
 As a result it is very difficult to study a common 
Atlantic system, region, or civilization. Other major authors of Atlantic History frequently 
mentioned the third objection and it states that it is Imperial History masked by a more socially 
acceptable name. It is a politically correct way of saying the same thing. The fourth objection 
is one that was least discussed by the other Atlanticists, but it is a very important point. 
Atlantic History intrinsically privileges the coastal indigenous peoples.
364
 Because of its name, 
Atlantic History can be misleading as to its objectives, and in many ways it forgets the entirety 
of the four continents, focusing on the littoral. This is problematic because there is a loss of a 
reference point, and it is unclear where the Atlantic boundary ends, and another begins. Either 
just the ocean should be considered, or the entirety of the four continents must fit into the 
framework. The last objection is that there is little manifestation of differences and 
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commonalities through connecting the Atlantic areas. This last objection does not appear to be 
the fault of the discipline or of the researchers. Seemingly the weakest, the objection should 
improve with time. It is important to remember that this is a very new area of study, and it still 
requires a lot of research. The objection is rather unfair, because Atlantic History must first be 
defined, then improved upon. The number of recent works being produced also gives hope that 




 The first of the authors’ six proposals is connected to the last problem area. This is that 
there must be an effort to find general patterns in Atlantic History that must not exaggerate 
either the comparisons or the contrasts. They propose that the understanding of one element is 
“enhanced by knowledge of the other.”
366
  The authors propose next that some elements of 
Atlantic history must be able to cross boarders. Elements such as decisions, actions, reactions, 
raw materials, technology, among others took place on both sides of the ocean and beyond. 
The third proposal is to give thorough and sustained attention to particular aspects such as 
industry, and highlight regional differences. Next, the exchange of values and the circulation 
of ideas deserves a closer look. Following one idea or concept around the Atlantic would 
greatly improve the discipline. The various differences between the colonial powers and the 
ways in which they colonized or changed their power structures is the fifth suggestion .
 367
 The 
differing colonization methods in the Atlantic can provide a great deal of insight in to European 
interaction in the Atlantic. Recent works such as contrasts between the Dutch and Portuguese 
political and commercial structures in West Africa in Filipa Ribeiro da Silva’s newest book is 
a superlative example of an Atlantic approach to this method of comparison.
368
 This suggestion 
for improving the study of Atlantic History however, is dangerous because it can by nature be 
perceived as imperialist. It is clear that the intricacies of the colonial powers are important to 
study, but it may best be done under the umbrella of Colonial or European History. The last 
suggestion is that chronology should be closely considered, as it is important to Atlantic 
History, and intrinsically in the study of history regardless.
369
 The temporal dynamic of 
Atlantic History is the least contentious issue in the field in terms of a general time frame, with 
differing events as the parameters for the start and finish of the period.   
                                                 
365
 Greene and Morgan, p. 81.  
366
 Greene and Morgan, p. 156. 
367
 Greene and Morgan, p. 212.  
368
 Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa: Empires, Merchants 1580-1674, London: Brill, 
2011; this is an exemplary work on the Dutch and Portuguese political and comercial infrastructures that focuses on the 
West Coast of Africa while concurrently maintaining an Atlantic dimension as a frame of reference for her assertions. 
369
 Greene and Morgan, p. 212 
95 
 
 The period of Atlantic History coincides with the beginning and end of the slave trade. 
The slave trade resolves several other problems posed by Atlantic History, giving cohesion to 
the Atlantic because it involves all four continents of the Atlantic. Although the institution of 
slavery is non-unique to the Early Modern period and to the Atlantic basin, the way in which it 
functioned was unique to the period and aided in creating an Atlantic identity. In order for the 
Atlantic to be considered whole, it could not be considered as such until the four continents 
were mutually cognizant of each other. The transport of human cargo throughout the Atlantic 
would have done exactly that. In order to compensate for this, Atlantic History should be 
considered as beginning later than what Jack Green and Philip Morgan state as Columbus’ 
voyage to the Americas in 1492
370
 because that would give the discipline an intrinsically 
European perspective that is what the authors are attempting to resolve. The slave trade would 
resolve this issue beginning in the early sixteenth century after the transmission of slaves and 
institutions allowed for mutual impacts that created an Atlantic identity. Rather than labor over 
the choice of a particular date, it could be understood as a process that began throughout this 
time frame, although this began soon after the discovery of the Americas. Their contention that 
the end of Atlantic History centers around the French Revolution in 1789 is equally 
problematic, because the ideologies supported by the revolution did not reach the entirety of 
the Atlantic until much later, much less in a unified manner. A far better end to Atlantic 
History is the effect of the Industrial Revolution. The profound economic, technological and 
social changes that resulted from the Industrial Revolution supported a movement away from 
the need for slavery because of the rise of machinery, and unified the earth into a wider world-
system. This end can also be considered a process in that the industrial revolution spanned the 
1750s to the 1850s,
371
 whereas the end of slavery was outlawed by European and American 
nations in a successive manner along this timeframe, with illicit slaving occurring until 1850.  
 British accumulation of gold was fundamental to realizing the industrial revolution 
because it was a valuable imperishable commodity that was easily monetized, and universally 
sought after. The discovery of gold in Rio das Velhas that later became part of the captaincy of 
Minas Gerais in the hills two hundred miles from Rio de Janeiro was instrumental in 
revitalizing the Portuguese economy.
372
 It was also fundamental to British accumulation of 
wealth. The enormous quantities of gold found in the region attracted many European  nations 
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to Brazil, but England acquired a great portion of the gold. Where the Portuguese accumulated 
gold dust, the British acquired gold coins.
373
 Much of this was made possible through tax 
evasion and contraband because it was not in the interests of the local merchants to declare 
their gold, which contributed greatly to the gold being funneled out of the Portuguese 
Empire.
374
 Trade between the Portuguese and the British “was always in favor of the 
English,”
375
 however the discovery of gold was extremely important for the enrichment of the 
British Empire before the inception of the industrial age. The involvement of other European 
empires in the Brazilian gold rush is significant because it marked several trends such as the 
intensification of the slave trade,
376
 a change in its composition, and many more credit 
allocations, and a movement towards a more unified Atlantic. This shows the importance of 
gold in the Atlantic, however it was instrumental in strengthening specifically South Atlantic 
ties between Angola and Brazil.  
 The current state of scholarship on the slave trade shows the importance of plurality 
within the Atlantic. The slave trade was clearly an Atlantic enterprise, but contemporary 
historians are making breakthroughs in showing the differences between African cultures as 
well as European empires while maintaining the importance of the Atlantic as a whole. The 
new scholarship seeks a commonality of understanding in relation to the way that the slave 
trade is studied within the Atlantic, while acknowledging that reconciliations have to be made. 
Identifying the transferal of ideologies and institutions as a result of the slave trade is made 
possible by comparison to points of reference. Atlantic History allows one to use identify 
trends and aggregative forces in perceptibly fragmented areas. The following section will 
expose how the slave trade evolved during this period in a way that mutually affected Angola 
and Brazil, which in turn impacted the entirety of the Angolan territory in terms of 
colonization, politics, and commerce.  
The Angolan Slave Trade and Brazilian Gold 
 Angola was immensely affected by the discovery of gold in Brazil because the rise in 
gold mining required many more slaves to be sent to Rio de Janeiro. Luanda and Benguela 
were undoubtedly considered the major supplier of slaves to brazil as “fifty percent of all 
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slaves that arrived to Brazil were from the two ports.”
377
 Preceding the discovery of gold, 
Pernambuco and the Brazilian capital, Salvador da Bahia were major commercial centers. They 
produced important agricultural products such as sugar and tobacco among others, and were 
considered for centuries prior “pillars of the Portuguese Empire”.
378
 Businessmen turned their 
primary focus to funding human cargo voyages to Rio de Janeiro instead of other ports because 
the financial return was greater there as slaves were sold for higher prices, and gold created a 
more immediate gain. The focus on the search for gold did not only effect the slave trade in a 
mere economic or commercial manner, but created several stark political and societal  changes 
and difficulties as well.  
 The initial gold boom in this period was felt throughout the South Atlantic  while the 
demand for slaves was the one economic constant. The continued discovery of gold and 
fluctuations in its extraction largely “determined the prosperity of the South Atlantic 
economy”
379
 throughout this period. Although gold was valuable, the difference between 
agricultural produce and the precious metal was that gold was substantially more volatile. Gold 
was clearly not perennial in that it could not be grown. Hence, in order to capitalize on the 
gold market and extraction in Brazil, it was essential to arrive hastily.
380
 Between the years 
1695 and 1717, 2600 slaves arrived in Minas Gerais annually, whereas between 1717 and 
1723, the perennial arrival of slaves rose to as much as 4,000.
381
 The immediate high volume 
of slaves arriving to Rio de Janeiro caused a compositional change in the Atlantic.  
 Before Brazilian gold caused a series of conflicts that drew the need for vigilance over 
slave trade conduct in the Portuguese South Atlantic, the Crown already began to regulate the 
transport of human cargo. On March 18, 1684 the crown instated a law to limit the number of 
slaves that could be transported per ship to Angola and Brazil .
382
 This law was instated for 
several reasons, and impeded the expedient shipment of slaves to Brazil due to lack of ships. 
Two of the most salient reasons that the Crown created the law were the violence and 
injustices as well as the poor conditions caused by overcrowding on the slave vessels. The 
introduction to the law’s stipulations explicitly cited the reasons for the motion as the 
maltreatment and mortality rate on the voyage, as the slaves lacked the “necessary relief for 
life, whose conservation is communal, and natural for all, whether free or slaves.”
383
 The issue 
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of mortality was a constant concern in the slave trade. This is perceptible in the very name of 
the slave ships: tumbeiros. Joseph Miller emphasizes the fact that tumbeiros, or as he calls 
them, ‘floating tombs’ was accurate, as the “highest mortality rate began as the slaves boarded 
the ships.”
384
 The voyage from Angola to places such as Bahia or Rio de Janeiro lasted an 
average of forty and fifty days respectively.
385
 The long voyages in the lower decks of the 
vessels tightly packed with overcrowded space with very little rations of food and water 
ensured an extremely difficult trip to survive. The mortality rate on this route that came to be 




 As has been made clear, the slave trade did not begin on the coast and as a result the 
entirety of the venture was very expensive. From the capture and sale of slaves in the interior 
and their transport to the coast, the traders incurred enormous expenditures. Aside from 
changing hands, the slaves had to be fed and clothed. In fact, the time the slaves were captured 
to the time they boarded the ships could be anywhere from six months to a year. The average 
wait time at the port of embarkation alone was three months.
387
 The majority of the overall 
costs were attributed to the Africans. The Africans that sold the slaves in a commercial setting 
or because of wars to the Europeans demanded increasingly valuable goods. Both European 
and Asian cloths and other products were pursued as the Africans became more involved in the 
trading networks and placed more importance on imported luxuries. Because the Africans 
essentially controlled the sale of slaves all the way to the port of export,
388
 they set the terms of 
sale and price for the slaves. Consequentially, slave mortality was a great concern for traders. 
Some historians differ on their estimates on how many slaves perished before reaching their 
trans-Atlantic destination, but it is clear that a large percentage did not make it. For example, 
Klein estimates that as little as four or five percent of the slaves passed away on the journey 
along the coast to ports such as Luanda, where about fifteen percent died on the vessels across 




 Inikori takes a more dramatic approach, citing J. D. Fage, and states that the economic 
impact of slave mortality had wider implications. The military raids in the interior not only 
killed potential slaves, but weakened those that became slaves that were inevitably the first to 
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expire. However, Fage cites similar statistics to Kein offering sixteen percent mortality,
390
 
where Ernst Van Den Boogaart suggests twenty.
391
 Because the military raids often occurred 
on the periphery of African kingdoms, especially those that were outside of the areas under 
vassal agreements with the Portuguese, the war-torn nature of those areas often prevented 
further economic integration and development that was growing in other parts of the territory. 
The mortality rate from this approach could have been upwards of fifty percent.
392
 This does 
not include the acclamation period upon arrival in Brazil that took lives as well. The high cost, 
as well as the foreseeably high mortality rates incentivized ship captains to pack the slave 
ships with as many slaves as could fit on the vessel.
393
  
 The mortality rate on the vessels was due to the overcrowded decks. Free immigrants 
often used slave ships as a means of transportation. The death rate of immigrants is largely 
comparable to that of the slaves. However, this is attributable to the fact that a high percentage 
of the voyagers were children, or weaker than the desirably strong slaves chosen to cross the 
Atlantic.
394
 Disease was more easily transmitted amongst the slaves because of their proximity, 
and food and water were scarce. Ironically, the higher gains were achieved from slave voyages 
with controlled population than on the ships with condensed human cargo.
395
 The Portuguese 
were the first to strictly regulate the amount of slaves that could legally be transported 
overseas in order to ensure the slaves’ safe arrival. The 1684 law known as the Lei das 
Arqueações mentioned above was essentially a mandate that regulated the amount of slaves per 
interior tonnage of the vessel transporting them. This law was a technical measure that 
regulated the area of space that was allotted for housing slaves. Before each departure,  
“all of the embarkations <were> measured in tons that intend<ed> to be filled with slaves by the floor without 
respect to air, as well as the ceilings, and between bridges if they have them, as well as the decks, cabinets and 
cabins, the poop decks, and upper areas.”
396
  
Each vessel’s tonnage had to be recorded in a series of records that verified that the legal 
capacity per ton was never surpassed. This law was strictly enforced, however Brazilian 
traders attempting to send more slaves ran the ships along the coast in hopes of evading the 
contractors and searching for others that would disregard the law. Depending on the style of 
the ship, and where in the ship the slaves were placed, different values were given for how 
many slaves could be allocated there. The actual number of slaves that could be placed on each 
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ship per ton oscillated between 2.5 and 3.5 slaves.
397
 Because the average amount of slaves 
transported per voyage after this law was about four hundred and twenty, the ships depending 




 The food allotments that accompanied the regulations on the number of slaves were also 
strict. This returns to the costly nature of maintaining the slaves, and would have been 
resented, especially with a reduced number of profitable human cargo. The ship captains were 
required to feed the slaves “three times a day…infallibly.”
399
 In addition, an abundance of 
clean water was distributed. The added space for slaves, as well as their food provisions is an 
exhibition of compassion towards the slaves. The document’s wording shows a concern for 
violence towards the slaves crossing the Atlantic, yet it is peculiar that throughout the same  
period the slaves were treated with horrendous violence in all other spheres of the slave trade. 
Violence towards the slaves or disrespect towards this law carried life banishment to the 
Estado da India
400
 that shows the central authority’s seriousness and the severity of punishment 
towards transgressors. Regardless of the fact that this law appears to be a step towards better 
treatment of the slaves, the fact that the mortality rate of slaves reduced as a result leads to 
other conclusions. It was in the best interest of the slave trade merchants to ensure that a 
higher percentage of the slaves survived the journey. Because each slave was already a 
financial burden, especially when credit was involved, each loss of life meant a loss of profits 
once they arrived for sale in Brazil. Fewer slaves would have arrived in Brazil because of the 
limited number of ships available for export. However, the lower number of slaves would have 
made them a more profitable commodity on the other side of the Atlantic. As such, they could 
be sold for higher prices, and the people such as the contractors, and especially the governors 
could either give ships with their goods precedence over others, or mandate where the ships 
were to be sent. When slaves were in high demand for Brazilian gold mining, this became a 
defining factor.  
 The Brazilian gold rush had an immediate impact on the slave trade. Slaves sent from 
Africa were extremely desirable due to their mining capabilities, and Rio de Janeiro was the 
most efficient access point to Minas Gerais. The focus on Rio de Janeiro as a result of gold left 
other major slaving ports such as Bahia and Pernambuco without the necessary amount of 
slaves in order to furnish the agricultural products that were harvested there. This affected the 
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quantity and price of goods sent to Angola, creating subsequent issues that merchants 
disregarded for personal financial reasons. Because many of the local authorities were invested 
in the slave trade, many regulations attempting to curb the proportion of slaves sent to Brazil 
were disregarded.  
 Just a few years after the slave trade began to accommodate gold mining in Brazil, the 
Luanda community began to notice problematic trends that they feared would exacerbate if 
nothing were done to stop this. On September 26, 1711, the Municipal Council pleaded with he 
central authorities to resolve the issue.
401
 At this time, the slave ships were sent wherever they 
were needed, principally to where the merchant owners of the ships sent them. Because this 
was before 1720, the Council highlighted that the “governor approved <the ships> for dispatch 
to any of the ports that best accommodated the ship captain.”
402
 This was in violation of a 
mandate from King of Portugal D. Pedro V in 1703 to send 1200 slaves per annum to Rio de 
Janeiro, and 1300 to Pernambuco and Paraiba, with the remainder sent to Bahia.
403
 Clearly the 
governor was not following the mandate, and the majority of slaves were going to Rio. This 
was prejudicial towards Bahia especially that depended on slave labor for the plantation crops 
such as sugar, and many of the slaves that arrived in Bahia were shipped down to Rio de 
Janeiro and resold for higher prices.
404
 Brazilian merchants had become notorious for 
disregarding the law of embarkation tonnage, and they attempted to retrieve slaves from ports 
peripheral to Luanda such as Loango. This was already causing damage towards Bahian 
agricultural production, and merchants contracted to trade between Pernambuco, Bahia, and 
Angola were not only having difficulties drawing slaves to such regions of Brazil, but they 
were having trouble affording them. Fewer slaves for agricultural purposes meant higher 
production costs. The higher production costs made it difficult for the merchants in Bahia to 
afford more slaves, which exacerbated the cycle. When pumbeiros traded at the presídios to 
supply the coast with slaves sent to Bahia, they could not compete with the goods or prices 
demanded that the traders to Rio could because of the demand at the port.
405
 The advantage to 
supplying slaves to Rio had become so great that in the Angolan hinterland “ <a quantity of 
goods was> necessary that a few years before could have bought three slaves.”
406
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 For ports supplying agricultural manpower, the price for slaves was becoming 
prohibitively expensive. The short-term strategy of favoring Rio de Janeiro over the other ports 
was not just a means for Angolan businessmen to gain wealth. Additionally, this was not 
merely affecting the other Brazilian ports. The council stated that the price of flour rose 
astronomically.
407
 Flour rose to prices several degrees higher than what had been provided just 
years before. Flour was transported from Brazil to Angola for residents ’ dietary needs  Flour 
was a staple good for most food preparation in Angola. The higher price of flour indicated that 
the cost of living in the territory substantially increased. Because the Angolan troops were paid 
in part in flour, their already meager salaries were further devalued, and it cost the state more 
to issue the product.   
 The Municipal council reminded the central authorities that the problems emerging in 
the South Atlantic did not solely affect the local economies. The royal treasury depended on 
the taxes accrued from the output of slaves. If it became too expensive for other regions of 
Brazil to support slave import, the crown would loose out on those profits. The services in 
Angola that drew from the royal treasury were also more expensive. All of this was very 
problematic, yet he governor was still allowing almost double the allotted amount of slaves to 
go to Rio de Janeiro, sending roughly two thousand.
408
 While this was a dangerous trend, the 
Council acknowledged that this could be resolved.  
 A year later in 1712, correspondence with the crown evinced further issues associated 
with the preferential treatment towards Rio de Janeiro. The situation was not resolved, and the 
restrictions on the number of slaves allowed on the ships hindered the contractors from 
meeting their quotas.
409
 Roughly a quarter of the slaves intended to leave the ports to fulfill the 
royal tax-farming contract were unable to do so, thus inhibiting the contract’s fulfillment. The 
ships could not be filled to their former level of capacity, which created a shortage of ships. 
The higher number of ships required in order to send slaves across the Atlantic created a 
Crown induced lack of transport means. Ports such as Bahia and Pernambuco already had a 
shortage of slaves, yet the fact that the contracts were not even met indicated that they were 
loosing out on additional ones.  
 The Municipal council wrote again to the crown in the same year reinforcing the fact 
that the contracts were not being met. Paschoal Rodriquez Pontes held the tax-farming contract 
from 1699-1705 with the expected export of 9,000 slaves.
410
 This contract that ended six years 
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prior to the document only fulfilled two thirds of the agreed number of slaves by the time the 
six years were over.
411
 This was foreboding for the Angolan government officials because the 
loss of tax revenue continued to create difficulties for maintaining the municipal services and 
infantry. The current contract was having identical problems, and had already cited a loss of 
70,000 cruzados.
412
 Because nothing was accomplished to correct the problems created by the 
volume of slaves sent to Rio de Janeiro, the Council suggested that a law should be instated 
requiring the governor to send the ships to the necessary ports rather than to where he 
benefited most. The laws needed to be more explicit in favor of the contractors ’ duties rather 
than the governor’s wishes because the contractors “never follow their right against the 
governors out of respect and their power.”
413
 The accentuated waiting period to embark was a 
constant frustration as many slaves passed or weakened, and the maintenance costs grew. The 
letter gives several testimonials from captains that were fed up with the injustices caused by 
the governor, and the continually rising costs of staple goods as a result of mining interests.  
  n 1715, several businessmen signed a plea in “public form” to the residing governor, 
João Manuel de Noronha.
414
 The businessmen reminded the governor of the resolution from 
the King in 1703 to send just 1200 slaves to Rio de Janeiro. This was clearly disregarded by 
the governor, and the businessmen further restated that the current state of the South Atlantic 
was immensely affected by gold. However, it was not the gold in and of itself, but rather 
commercial, industrial, and institutional issues as a byproduct of mining it. The businessmen in 
this letter blame not only the governor, but the Municipal Council as well. Because many of its 
members were equally involved in commerce, they were also approving departures to Rio, 
allowing only “two or three to Bahia and Pernambuco.”
415
 Sustaining the infantry’s salary was 
a reoccurring theme in the discussions, and of enormous concern for the colonizing efforts, 
especially when not enough slaves were able to be taxed to even meet their salaries. Services 
such as the hospital were in danger of closing that were instrumental in servicing injured or 
sick soldiers.
416
 It is important to keep in mind that not only were products such as flour, sugar, 
and tobacco cultivated in Brazil far more expensive because of this but the troops and 
municipal workers were not the only ones effected. The rising costs in Brazil equaled rising 
costs in Angola, making goods such as tobacco used in the bundles exchanged for slaves in the 
Angolan hinterland much more expensive.  
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 The businessmen contended that for the two and a half years that Governor Noronha 
had been in office, some of the ships had been allowed to leave without following the 1684 law 
against overcrowding. Although this may have alleviated some of the wait period for the slaves 
in Luanda, the high prices of food lead those ships to disregard the food allocation 
requirements, and the slaves continued to pass away in high numbers. Of the last nine ships 
that left Luanda legally, three were governor Noronha’s.
417
 The governors’ usurpation of the 
slave trade in this way was hallmark of this period. High-ranking government officials such as 
the governor dominated the sale of shipping space (praças), and many of the governors were 
considered the most notorious individuals in the slave trade. The sale of shipping space 
became increasingly monopolized by the governors, which excluded many from the trade.
418
  
The preference given to the governor’s ships continued to occur until the 1720 law prohibiting 
them from commerce.  
 After the law took effect the shortage of ships continued. The governor-sponsored 
vessels were no longer allowed to run. Although the governor could not trade, more ships were 
necessary in order to compensate for the losses. This allowed for more freedom in terms of 
where the ships could be sent, but it severely exacerbated the already problematic shortage.
419
 
The interim governor, Mestre de Campo José Carvalho da Costa took it upon himself to aid in 
the reorganization of the Angolan slave trade after the law. He outlawed the sale of praças,
420
 
and raised freight charges from five thousand to seven thousand reis.
421
 Luso-African slave 
traders that had experienced a series of difficulties as recent crown ordinances favored Lisbon 
merchants fought against the increase that was also not being followed by many of the 
participants. The sale of shipping space was yet another way for the powerful officials to 
monopolize the trade, and the intention was to permanently end this.
422
 The interim governor 
ordered in his public announcement that the institution of praças should be ended “so that the 
shipping space <was> divided up in the most convenient way.”
423
 The new high price for 
shipping area drew many ship owners to sell space that exceeded the amount allowed by the 
1684 ordinance.
424
 This led the Luso-Africans to cite the law under the auspices of slave 
safety, although it was surely for their own ends. They viewed this change as a failure, 
favoring outsiders rather than the Luso-Africans, and it did not resolve the lack of departures. 
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Regardless of the new tax and the increased competition, sentiments from a year earlier 
remained as they “they still felt the diminution and delay.”
425
  
 The Brazilian gold made it possible for many Luanda merchants to meet the price 
demands because of the lucrative slave sales in Brazil. Regardless of the shipping fees, other 
surcharges, maintenance and upkeep, among other expenses in most cases they were still able 
to profit. Many Luanda merchants sold their holdings and eventually moved to places such as 
Brazil while the slave process were still favorable. By the end of the first quarter of the 
eighteenth century these intrusive changes in the slave trade and the lack of governmental 
regulatory vigilance in other areas led many slavers to send slaves directly to Brazil from 
Loango and Benguela.  
  n addition to Loango’s multinational slave trade along the coast , Benguela emerged as 
an important slave export area. Benguela had always been an important slave port in Angola, 
however it traditionally exported slaves to Luanda before sending them throughout the 
Atlantic. Benguela was a city of roughly three thousand inhabitants at the time, and slavery 
was the major industry in the area.
426
 The reduced military presence in Benguela and its 
distance from Luanda allowed for the merchants to slave trade without a great deal of 
interference. Because many of the area’s inhabitants were merchants, and primarily former 
criminals without administrative vigilance, they could trade without worrying about 
regulations. Merchants slave traded in Benguela because they could use methods discouraged 
in Luanda, and they could easily avoid the slave export duties expected by the contractor.
427
 
Due to opportunities afforded by the slave trade to Brazil and the lack of ships in Luanda, 
Benguela began exporting slaves directly to the Americas by 1716.
428
 In 1717, Governor 
Henrique de Figueiredo e Alarcão observed that another reason that Luanda was having 
difficulties producing was because of the increased slaving activities in the two peripheral 
ports.
429
 After Benguela began shipping human cargo directly to the Americas, the slave trade 
in the port intensified rapidly. Often disregarding regulations enforced in Luanda, Benguela 
sent vessels carrying freight over the allotted capacity. Preference towards Benguela because 
of more lenience in terms of standards made a marked difference in the composit ion of the 
Angolan slave trade, and the observations made by Governor Figeiredo were affirmed a decade 
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later by the sitting Governor Albuquerque.
430
 Benguela’s allure drew officials such as from the 
Municipal Council to the port for trade, even as they complained of its growing importance. At 
the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century for example, the public officials were 
investing in slave ships that were between three and four times the average size vessels sent 
from Brazilian and Portuguese merchants.
431
 Trading in Benguela would have been especially 




 Gold found in Brazil at the turn of the eighteenth century directly effected the economic 
enhancement of the slave trade. “Gold was used to buy slaves, and higher demand met higher 
prices, and more gold, expanding the slave trade.”
433
 The cyclical nature of the reactionary 
processes created by gold effected many other spheres of Angolan life, directly connected to the 
slave trade. Ports along the Angolan coast became independent exporters, and the slave trade 
became far more lucrative, especially when sending the slaves to Rio de Janeiro. Because gold 
was a commodity that could not expire or be used up, it retained its illustriousness and high 
value creating trust in the metal. As such, gold “created an explosion of credit.”
434
 Regardless 
of whether goods were sent back to Angola from Brazil, the bankers and large-scale merchants 
that were not directly affected by the problems that the issue induced were able to finance 
more slave voyages. The immense amount of credit that was enabled through the acquisition of 
gold allowed for the preexisting commercial relationships to expand. As the Crown set the 
price of gold, even the slaves in Minas Gerais were bought through credit by miners. Buying 
slaves through credit often carried interest rates of up to ten percent, and took three to four 
years to pay off.
435
 This affected not just Portuguese, Brazilian, or Angolan financiers to profit 
but also smaller scale merchants and commercial actors down to the pombeiros. Almost 
immediately after gold made its first major impact in 16   there were “an estimated ten 
merchants for each peça de India” in Luanda alone.
436
  
 The credit boom in Angola was important to all of the commercial actors in the colony. 
However, just as credit allowed people more investment opportunities, it created a large 
amount of debt. Enslavement by debt became a common form of doing so, eventually 
transitioning the form of slaving from warring raids to extreme indebtedness. The credit 
increase did not cause this form of enslavement, but greatly exacerbated its usage. This meant 
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that Africans indebted to others would sell themselves into slavery, or offer their family 
members into the industry in order to compensate for losses they could not repay. Another 
option was a form of indentured servitude, or “pawnship,” in which indebted Africans would 
sign themselves into temporary slavery until their debts were cleared.
437
 In several cases, 
Africans that agreed to this form of payment never returned to free status. Corrupt politics, the 
judicial system, or sale to Brazil before their time was up where people could not verify their 
timespan until freedom made it prohibitively difficult to become emancipated. Merchants such 
as Luso-Africans that traded among the Angolan or regional circuits that did not have the same 
level of direct contact with gold incurred a great deal of debt. African and Luso-African slave 
owners that found themselves indebted to others often ceded their slaves as a form of payment 
as well.  
Conclusion 
 The turn of the eighteenth century was a transformative period in the Angolan slave 
trade. The slave trade was a preexisting institution in Angola, and it largely grew out of itself 
into the Atlantic sphere. Although it is widely held that Africans controlled the slave trade 
from the hinterland all the way to the port of export, the commercial markets that the 
Portuguese and African merchants worked through and the valorization of external goods 
exchanged for slaves brought the Africans into the wider commercial system. Warring methods 
of capturing slaves existed as well, but financial opportunities and credit produced through the 
acquisition of gold increased the use of indebtedness to accrue slaves and colonize the 
Africans through bringing them into the European economic system at a disadvantage.  
 The study of Atlantic History and its ideological parameters is essential to the study of 
the slave trade in order to show the interconnected nature of the institution.  It also exposes the 
manner in which the issues from the previous chapters are intrinsically linked to the trade and 
vice-versa. It allows the hinterland as well as the coast to be brought into the Atlantic sphere 
through showing the plurality of perspectives that impacted the entirety of the Angolan colony, 
and its influence throughout the Atlantic. Finding a nodal point for historical reference such as 
the Portuguese empire permits one to detect the ways that it interacted with other empires or 
African kingdoms as well as institutions. In this way, comparisons can be made as forces affect 
the Portuguese empire, as well as identify how the influences had a direct impact on it. 
Although Atlantic History attempts to lose the European perspective as the dominant one, it 
allows for it to assume its own place within the Atlantic as a reference and a lens through 
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which other areas are studied. This also creates a method for common language or frontiers to 
be used in order to study the way that concepts such as commerce, colonization or politics 
were connected not just within themselves, but how they were co-dependently related through 
a series of internal and external forces and individuals. The concrete, ideological, and 
institutional issues considered throughout this chapter and this dissertation are shown to 
intercept through economic motives, yet were greatly impacted by processes of change 
stimulated through events that did not initially directly affect them. The slave trade at the turn 
of the eighteenth century in Angola clearly experienced a series of major changes that altered 
the colonial Angolan composition as a result.  
 The 1684 law was instituted with humanitarian rhetoric that claimed to be for the well 
being of the slaves. The law was an attempt to reduce slave mortality throughout the trans -
Atlantic voyage. In reality, this was advantageous to the slave traders whose profits were 
contingent upon the slaves’ safe arrival to the Americas. This law was theoretically 
advantageous for both the perceived humanitarian purpose and the commercial one, yet it led 
to unforeseen problems that resulted from the discovery of gold in Brazil. The intensification 
of the slave trade and its concentration in Rio de Janeiro incited serious levels of corruption, 
and the shortage of ships created by this law were exacerbated by the governors’ preferential 
treatment towards ships carrying his slaves, or those of his accomplices. The shortage made 
merchants procure slaves in other Angolan ports that were less observed by authorities, and 
this coincided with other ports in Angola such as Loango, or Benguela that began sending 
slaves directly to Brazil instead of through Luanda. After 1720, the shortage of ships was  still 
largely due to the governor and the 1684 law, however the lack of the governors’ contribution 
to commerce was in fact what continued to the shortage. When the residing governor 
eliminated the sale of praças in 1725 and raised the surcharge on freight, it was a further 
attempt to democratize the slave trade and to brindle the accentuated trade to Rio de Janeiro. 
However unsuccessful the enactment of this law may have been in the long run, it shows a 
continuation of the law enforced in 1720 moving towards a more liberally commercialized 












 The turn of the eighteenth century in Angola was an important period of change that 
impacted politics, commerce, and colonization. Although their objectives were distinct, they 
could not have functioned individually without the presence of all. Angola was a territory that 
functioned in different ways whether in the hinterland, on the coast, or its influence throughout 
the Atlantic Ocean. However, each of the geographical areas was intrinsically connected 
through the interdependence of the Portuguese political and commercial agents as well as 
Africans.   
 The Portuguese political structure in Angola was inherently militaristic. The governor 
was both a military position and the highest authority in the colony. The Crown entrusted the 
governors of Angola with a wide array of powers that were intended to maintain strong 
connections with the metropole and its interests. Governors throughout this period showed 
devotion to the imperial military interests through the transportation of in many cases hundreds 
of troops to replenish the losses incurred in the colony. Regardless of transporting high 
numbers of troops, they were largely inexperienced soldiers, or unaccustomed to the grueling 
Angolan conditions. Because many of the soldiers were forced to immigrate, they were 
uncommitted, and many left their positions. Governors additionally showed a great deal of 
these interests through correspondence with the crown in form of inventories that the central 
authorities requested, or in Governor Albuquerque’s case, characterized the colony as being in 
a deplorable state while showing what he has done to fix it using mili taristic rhetoric. The 
motive for characterizing the colony in this way was to incentivize further financial support 
that could be used to promote the colonization effort and the military enterprise in the interior 
whose success was exaggerated. Although increasing military force in the interior was justified 
because of warring with the native populations or external attacks such as Benguela that 
depleted hinterland resources, much of the correspondence that relayed the state of the colony 
mischaracterized the reality. The level of control of the interior was no more than nominal, 
especially anywhere outside of the districts along the Kwanza River where the interior 
communities were lead by captain-majors that the governors chose.  
 Captain-majors oversaw districts and presídios throughout the Angolan hinterland from 
Benguela up through the Kwanza River. Although their primary role was militaristic, they had 
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a variety of duties that they were expected to fulfill. The demographic that the governor’s 
chose the captain-majors from indicates that they were chosen for economic reasons rather 
than military. Both the lançados or their descendants, and degredados were notorious for their 
commercial skills. Whether these groups chose to flee into the hinterland or were  forced to 
leave their country, they would generally not have felt a strong sense of allegiance towards 
Portugal and its aspirations. Africans or Luso-Africans that were chosen for the position were 
desirable because their intrinsic identity with the Africans was beneficial to trade relationships. 
It was especially beneficial to the slave trade, and fortifying commercial relationships with the 
African communities.  
 Captain-majors served in remote locations that made it prohibitively difficult to 
communicate regularly with Luanda or even interact with Portuguese individuals. The journey 
to most presídios by land took several months, and unauthorized Europeans were not permitted 
inland. The extreme isolation that the captain-majors suffered would surely have caused the 
captain-majors to adopt African traits. This is expected, as Roquinado Ferreira  states: 
individuals that “ventured out to the sertões ended up more culturally black.”
438
 Aside from 
who the captain-majors were, if they were born outside of Angola, they certainly felt less of an 
identity with Portugal after long periods of being not only far from the metropole, but also 
from the Angolan political center. This led them to trade with foreign nations, and act in ways 
that most benefited themselves.  
 The position was highly regarded as a means to wealth. The post was filled with well -
connected and ambitious individuals that pursued higher returns. In the same regard, the 
governors chose captain-majors that formed economic collusions. The governors traded 
immensely with these hinterland commercial intermediaries that exchanged their goods for 
slaves at favorable prices and high quantity. Acquired slaves could then be sent throughout the 
Atlantic on the governors’ vessels.  n order to meet the demand for slaves to profit from, the 
captain-major used military force. They waged war on African communities, especially in the 
peripheral regions taking slaves by force or receiving them as a reward in war. This was a 
difficult yet lucrative way of enslavement, but it greatly damaged relations with the African 
communities.  
 The ties forged between the governor and the captain-major created decisive trade 
advantages, but other colonial officials challenged them. The Municipal Council attempted to 
end the captain-majors’ monopolistic hold on interior trade in 1703.  ncluding various other 
attempts, the Council tried to eliminate captain-majors in the districts and make those at the 
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presídios go under review at the end of their term. Citing reprehensibly violent acts committed 
by the Captain-Majors, they protested their continued recklessness that was affecting the entire 
colony. However detrimental the warring tactics were to colonial relations, their trade with 
governors was detrimental to the Council’s commerce as well. Many Council members were 
also merchants with trade aspirations in the interior, and the hinterland officials hindered their 
ability to have favorable trade conditions themselves. Replacing captain-majors with clerks 
would have allowed the Council to trade more freely, and have those indebted to them 
recorded. The move would have created freer trade, yet the Council members themselves 
would have benefitted. Although this did not occur, the law prohibiting high-ranking officials 
was enforced.  
 The 1720 law essentially ended the collusion between captain-majors and governors, 
but it had much larger implications. When the two positions could no longer form a 
commercial alliance, commerce became more widely democratized, and the captain-majors 
began to accrue slaves through credit rather than warring techniques. Unrest continued in the 
hinterland, but warring techniques to acquire slaves became obsolete. Depleted human 
resources because of previous slave apprehension and the military services expended made the 
method difficult to continue. Credit was extremely efficient as a means of enslavement because 
its use was so common. The advantage that high ranking officials such as the captain-majors 
had on credit made it difficult for small-scale merchants to fulfill their agreements, and they 
were often sold into slavery to repay losses. Whether individuals repaid with family members, 
or enlisted themselves, after 1720 indebtedness was by far the most common form of 
enslavement.  
 Porters called pombeiros were the most common traders in the Angolan interior that 
furnished the coast with goods. These traders were Africans that by the turn of the eighteenth 
century were primarily slaves, or lowest in the social strata. They covered large distances 
between the various commercial centers sent by enslavers and coastal merchants. In this way 
they connected commercial networks throughout the interior as well as between the hinterland 
and the coast. They traded an array of goods, and primarily bundles for slaves. The bundles 
were made up of a series of goods that could not all be found in the same place, and composing 
the bundles required deepening the commercial and credit networks. Many other forms of 
traders existed, but the differentiating names surfaced later in the eighteenth century. 
 Luso-Africans were also important to the Angolan commercial network supplying the 
coast with goods from the interior. The Luso-Africans often owned slaves for themselves, and 
to sell on the coast. Those who arrived voluntarily came for commercial purposes very 
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involved in trade and primarily married into the African community. They came from many 
different backgrounds that historians tend to group under the Luso-African umbrella term, and 
formed strong trade bonds with Africans and Europeans.  
 Angolan merchants traded expansively throughout the interior and on the coast, but 
bankers and merchants trading in highest volume were the financiers that enabled the 
expansion of commerce. The great merchants financed trade in Angola and the slave trade. 
They invested in diverse ways financing commercial voyages while not necessarily taking 
direct ownership of the slaves or products that boarded their vessels. Credit began with these 
merchants that profited enormously using credit types such as letras that secured profits and 
allowed them to accrue immense wealth and pump more and more credit into trade. Many of 
these merchants alimented commerce in Angola, but lived elsewhere in the Altantic such as 
Brazil and Portugal. Merchants of this type that lived in Angola frequently had family 
members that they traded amongst throughout the empire, acting as agents securing and selling 
their goods. This was the case for Diogo da Fonseca Henriques who was the royal tax -farming 
contract holder in Angola, yet had several family members in Brazil and Portugal with whom 
he traded.  
 Many Luso-Africans held the royal tax-farming contract at the turn of the eighteenth 
century until the 1720s when it became primarily merchants from the metropole. These 
contracts were auctioned off to merchants that were ceded monopoly rights on products in a 
particular location, in this case Angola. The royal tax-farming contract gave monopoly rights 
to the slave trade as well as ivory as an additional product. Each slave that left Angola was 
taxed, and the proceeds were split between the Crown and the contractor. The contractor sold 
licensure to his associates that either helped regulate the cumbersome tax collection, or were 
directly involved in the transportation of slaves. Part of the contractors’ contractual duties was 
to support municipal and governmental facilities. The contractor paid a yearly stipend to 
several institutions. However, in virtually all of the cases from this time, the contract began 
with the payment of the Angolan troops.  
 The contracts stated that the holder had to subsidize the military salaries. This evinces 
the connection between the military government and the commercial sector. Colonization 
efforts in the Angolan hinterland expanded the Portuguese sphere of influence that increased 
trade connections. It also accrued slaves for the merchants that were taxed by the contractors 
upon departure. When the slaves brought from the hinterland were taxed, it paid the contractor, 
who in turn paid the troops’ salaries. Militarization and colonization of the interior benefited 
the contractor, while the contractor benefited the military. While the credit increase in the 
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early 1700’s provided more opportunities for merchants, it drew attention away from Luanda 
towards ports on the Loango coast and Benguela. Throughout this period, British merchants in 
Cabinda posed a serious threat to Portuguese commerce, politics and colonization.  
 In 1684 The Portuguese established an accord with the Kingdom of Kongo to prohibit 
English trade agents from trading there or any further south. The Vili Kingdom on the Loango 
Coast traded extensively with foreigners. For decades several European empires traded with 
the Vili while attempting to create a stronghold in the region. English merchants sent mubires 
into the interior that were essentially their pombeiros. The Vili benefited enormously from 
trade with the Europeans, and it was in their best interest to maintain free trade in the region. 
The Portuguese were extremely threatened by the mubires encroachment on Portuguese 
territory. The African porters covered great distances inland, and went through São Salvador 
down into the Dande. The Portuguese considered this their territory, and not only were the 
agents successfully trading with captain-majors in the interior, but the goods transported by the 
mubires were traditionally cheaper and higher quality. This was not only negative for 
Portuguese merchants, but also for colonization efforts as this empowered the African traders 
and showed the increasing presence of British exploratory interests in Africa.  
 The Loango Coast produced between three and four thousand slaves per annum for 
Portuguese traders, and losing this influx would be extremely detrimental to the colony. It also 
fabricated the monetary cloths used as currency, and minted much of the copper circulated in 
Angola. Valuable export items such as ivory came predominantly from Loango, which was 
important to the contractors as well. Ivory was also an item that was smuggled out as seen in 
Fonseca Henriques’ debacle that led him to prison. The fact that the product was valuable 
enough in places such as Portugal for ivory to be smuggled out gives ever more importance to 
Loango as a region of immensely important production and extraction. In 1721,  British 
merchants constructed a fort in Cabinda under the pretexts of facilitated trade. Doubts 
concerning their real intentions were realized when it became clear that the English merchants 
fully intended to remain in the area after purchasing a plot of land and began furnishing a trade 
monopoly at the port. Other Europeans and the Africans despised the monopoly, but the 
Portuguese were most concerned because of expansionist implications. The English merchants’ 
actions indicated that they intended to stay and expand. The British began venturing down the 
coast intruding on French trading stations, spreading further down Angola. Two years after the 




 There was no substantial Portuguese sustained military or political presence on the 
Loango Coast. However, the Portuguese considered the territory to be under their jurisdiction, 
as seen in the royal monopoly contracts and correspondence concerning the English in 
Cabinda. Loango was a crucial region for Angolan commerce because of its natural resources 
and slaves, and their loss had serious implications for the state of the colony. The British threat 
to interior trade was hindering the commercial and colonization init iatives, which affected the 
coastal merchants. The English monopoly at Cabinda would have been disastrous to fulfillment 
of the monopoly contracts that fueled the Atlantic slave trade and paid for colonial resources 
such as the military. This is especially significant as Luanda was loosing its illustriousness as 
the prime slave export area. Trade in Loango had a commercial advantage because the 
products were often higher quality and cheaper than in Luanda that had more rigorously 
enforced regulations. With the cargo restrictions and high demand for slaves, Angolan 
commerce could not afford to lose Loango.  
 The limitations on human cargo instated in 1684 impacted not only Angola, but the 
Atlantic, especially in the southern hemisphere. The merchants involved in the slave trade 
could no longer load as many slaves as possible into their ships, which was detrimental to 
business in Brazil, as well as the Angolan enslavers that were required to wait far longer for 
slaves to leave Luanda. The slaves sent from the hinterland by the captain-majors and interior 
merchants were not leaving at the same rate as before. The governors’ ships were given 
primacy, leaving before other ships, which was also problematic for the flow of goods. 
Although the law proved important for seemingly humanitarian efforts while concurrently 
resolving the issue of slave mortality, it disallowed the supply of slaves from meting the 
demand.  
 The discovery of gold in Minas Gerias around1695 added another dimension to the 
shortage of transport means. Because the easiest access point to what became Minas Gerais 
was Rio de Janeiro, the vast majority of slaves were sent to the Brazilian port to goldmine. Rio 
de Janeiro became extremely sought after as a slave importation area because of the gold 
mining, but the devaluation of previously important agricultural zones such as Bahia and 
Pernambuco meant that they were not receiving the adequate amount of slaves to fulfill local 
demand. Without sufficient manpower, the region could not produce the previous ly enjoyed 
amount of crops.  
 Rio de Janeiro was flourishing because of the mining industry, slaves were sold at 
astronomically higher prices there, and the shortage of slaves in the other regions drove up the 
price of agriculture. Because many of the agricultural products consumed in Angola were 
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grown in Brazil, the prices affected the Angolan economy and standard of living. This made 
products such as tobacco much more expensive that was sold in Angola and used in the 
bundles to buy slaves. The English porters, mubires, were notorious for selling tobacco in the 
Angolan hinterland, and this would have made their tobacco cheaper than that sold by their 
Portuguese counterparts. The price of flour is a recurrent issue in the sources from this period, 
and it was a staple product of consumption. Flour was used as a supplementary form of 
payment for many colonial officials. The military in Angola was paid in part in flour, which 
placed higher burden on the contractor that supplemented the cost of the product for their 
salaries, and the soldiers that received the product. These financial burdens made colonial 
expenditures rise, which impacted colonization efforts in the interior, making the officials 
consistently plead for more financial resources.  
 These issues least affected the bankers and businessmen because they were supplying 
the financial means of transport and profiting enormously from gold. The gold was siphoned 
back towards the metropole, and benefited the most powerful businessmen rather than the 
small-scale merchants, which allowed them to enormously increase the amount of credit given 
to the merchants dealing in Angolan commerce. Injecting credit into the Angolan commercial 
relationships allowed for the trade relationships to grow, but gold was still the most lucrative 
concern. Before 1720, the governors were still some of the most involved men in the slave 
trade, and the lack of ships caused by preference towards Rio de Janeiro came to be attributed 
by governors’ withdrawal from commerce. This was a continuing problem, but the intent was 
to allow more democratized trading methods in Angolan commerce, including merchants in the 
civil government such as the Municipal Council that did not view the law as applying to them. 
When the governor motioned to outlaw shipping space in 1725, it was an additional measure to 
weaken trade collusions that could continue to influence where ships were sent. Although this 
did not garner a great deal of success until later, it evidenced a continued effort towards 
curbing the special interests of the time period in order to change and regularize trade in a way 
that was less detrimental to Angolan society and commercial relationships.  
 The marriage between the government and commerce in Angola was evident in the 
hinterland, on the coast, and throughout the Atlantic. Not only was relationship evident in each 
place, but the connectivity between the three places is clear. Discussing the interlinked nature 
of the institutional and spatial spheres is enhanced by the study of Atlantic History. The 
relatively new field of Atlantic history has still not been adequately defined in terms of its 
ideological and methodological parameters, and many authors disagree about how to resolve 
them. Many contemporary authors contribute to the area of study by identifying reconciliatory 
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reference points for its study, and others by contributing research on micro-histories that can 
be reapplied to the bigger picture that expose further trends and anomalies that show 
influences throughout the Atlantic contributed by subgroups and previously marginalized 
demographics.  
 The Atlantic slave trade helps define Atlantic History in many ways concerning the 
spatial and temporal dimensions throughout the modern period between the four continents. It 
also aids in showing the external influences that were present in Atlantic History and the 
Angolan commercial networks. Authors have shown that Africans from Angola had a great 
impact on cultures throughout the Atlantic, and research is now being done to give voice to 
particular sects of African society that can distinguish between different societies’ cultural and 
geopolitical traits that were transferred throughout the Atlantic area.  
 It is through these particular traits that Atlantic History can be quantified in terms of 
contributions from micro-histories to macro-histories. Future research will be able to define 
the intricacies of Atlantic history, but the current undefined state of the historical area may be 
a positive aspect. The lack of definition allows for a more egalitarian way of showing mutual 
influences, processes, systems and institutions because of the lack of a nodal point. It also 
permits different reference points to have distinct parameters through which they are able to 
view Atlantic History. This makes it more conducive to Angolan history throughout this period 
in order to view the convergence of several different institutions and processes that impacted 
one another in order to discern a common driving force using the Portuguese empire as a lense.  
 The common force at the turn of the eighteenth century in Angola perceived through 
trends affected by events between 1684 and the first quarter of the eighteenth century 
stemming from the law in 1720 that united politics, commerce, and colonization, along wi th 
the agents of change within those institutions was economic. Colonizing efforts from the 
governors upon arrival and throughout their tenure shown through inventories and 
correspondence always had an implicit or explicit need for financial resources because of the 
quality of resources and troops. The captain-majors’ colonizing tactics of war changed to 
indebtedness because of their own financial gain attained through the changing methods. The 
most effective form of colonization throughout this period was economic in that the African 
communities became accustomed to European goods and the sale of slaves into the Atlantic 
system. Historians such as Joseph Miller and John Thornton concur that European goods were 
not a necessity for Africans within their local commercial structure. However, they began to 
value European goods that became sought after for social stratification. This was a contributor 
to the decentralization of African societies as they became more dependent on commercial 
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centers controlled by the Portuguese. Many Africans benefitted from the European trade as 
seen with the Vili traders that became wealthy through commerce on the Loango Coast. It is 
also evident that Africans essentially controlled interior trade. The transferral of slaves in 
Angola predated European contact, however the way that they viewed slaves and the exchange 
of goods changed as a result of European intervention. As the slave trade grew decisively after 
1695, more and more forced migration depleted the population of the African communities and 
the goods received for slaves were not as valuable to the Europeans as the loss of manpower 
was to African production. Commerce at the presídios was a standardizing force that 
acculturated many of the Europeans, but it unremittingly drew the Africans into the European 
system.  
 Commercial success in Angola was mutually dependent on all levels of the economic 
system. It demonstrates the interconnectedness of the various colonial political figures and 
merchants whose involvement or seclusion from trade greatly impacted the entirely of the 
commercial sector. From the Africans in the interior to the coastal businessmen, many people 
were intimately involved in trade or directly affected by it. The Angolan hinterland was deeply 
connected to the coast through the confluence of commercial and waterways that in turn deeply 
affected commerce throughout the Atlantic. When laws such as in 1720 that excluded 
governors from trade occurred, it affected not only themselves but the entirety of the 
commercial system. The turn of the eighteenth century in Angola was clearly a period of 
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This is a map of the Loango Coast trading networks. The map is courtesy of Joseph Miller in way of 



































Map Courtesy of Roquinaldo Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange, p. 20, enhanced to include the 
presídio at Muxima.  
 
 
 
